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A few words from  
the Director of the IFDD
The 22nd session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP 22), which will be held in 
Marrakesh (Morocco) on 7-18 November 2016, is a chance for all stakeholders to 
identify concrete actions for implementation to provide a targeted and appropriate 
response to global warming.
On 25 September 2015, the United Nations adopted a sustainable development 
programme entitled “Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development”. The thirteenth Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) urges “taking 
urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts”. Thankfully, under the aus-
pices of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 
the Parties to the Convention adopted an agreement in Paris on 12 December 2015 
to stabilise global warming. This goal of this agreement, which was supported by 
all Parties, is to maintain the rise in temperature below 2 degrees Celsius and for 
the Parties to continue their efforts to achieve a threshold of 1.5 degrees.
In addition, major progress on adaptation has been made in the Paris Agreement, 
with the establishment of the global objective of “enhancing adaptive capacity, 
strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability to climate change with a view 
to contributing to sustainable development...”11.
This is excellent news for climate stability and all regions of the world which 
are vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. With the Paris Agreement, 
which entered into force on 4 November 2016, the international community, 
through its Heads of State and Government, has shown comprehensive consensus 
on the need to act urgently and measure the climatic disorders of the planet. But 
what is the Paris Agreement worth without concrete, diligent actions, was it 
intended to be binding or universal?
During recent weeks (September 2016), the Cotonou Declaration by local 
and regional elected officials in Africa, the Nantes Declaration by non-State climate 
players and the Ministerial Meeting of the Least Developed Countries in Kinshasa 
have unanimously called for enhanced concrete action to plug the gap between the 
current commitments and the goal of the Paris Agreement.
Readers, the COP 22 in Marrakesh will be undoubtedly, or so we sincerely 
hope, the COP for action. The Parties must, among other things, operationalise 
the national mitigation and adaptation contributions, make financing available 
and accessible and adopt actions to minimise loss anddamage, build capacities 
and clarify the implementation control and monitoring mechanisms to ensure 
transparency and that these commitments are met.
1 Paris Agreement, Article 7 (1)
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All stakeholders in the climate negotiations, including the non-State players 
who will subsequently play an essential role, must continue, during this COP 22, 
to discuss the ways and means of implementing concrete actions to slow down 
climate change, by combining them with the initiatives launched in Paris under 
the Lima-Paris Action Plan.
Readers, the International Organisation of the Francophonie (OIF), through 
its subsidiary, the Institut de la Francophonie pour le développement durable (IFDD 
– Institute of the French-speaking world for Sustainable Development), will support 
actions for a transition to a low-carbon economy which creates co-benefits (job 
creation for young people and women, quality of life, reinforced solidarities) in the 
member countries.
I hope that this new edition of the Guide to the Negotiations produced by 
IFDD will enlighten you on the issues of COP 22. The purpose of this guide is to keep 
you advised of progress in the negotiations and on the key points to be discussed 
during COP 22.
Its production has been made possible through the mobilisation of the French-
speaking expertise and of our partners, especially Énergies 2050, who we thank most 
warmly.
Negotiators and partners, I leave you to explore the Guide and wish you excellent 
work and a successful outcome in Marrakesh. The moment has come to move from 
negotiation to action. Pleasant reading!
Jean-Pierre Ndoutoum
vHow to use this guide
The Guide to the Negotiations and the Summary for policymakers is enhanced year on year and goes beyond the climate change negotiating structure. Academics, 
public or private figures and representatives of civil society organisations or inter-
national institutions – they are all using the Guide and the Summary increasingly 
as an independent, factual and up-to-date source for the negotiations with an 
exhaustive, dynamic review of issues, challenges and opportunities for action.
Once again this year, the drafting team has attempted to break new ground 
by boosting the accessibility of information to readers with varying degrees of 
knowledge about the negotiation process – whether they have in-depth knowledge 
or knowledge of certain aspects only or are first-time attendees. The aim is still for 
each individual to access all the information he needs, but also that every person 
can dip into it based on his priorities and the time he can give to it. With this in 
mind, efforts have been made to engage with a wider audience. Outreach boxes 
support the descriptions and detailed analyses of the various questions addressed 
in the negotiations wherever possible.The notion addressed can thus be grasped 
immediately. Special emphasis has been placed on creating an iconography that is 
as detailed and educational as possible. Illustrative diagrams and summary tables 
round out the whole and aim to give the reader all the keys he needs to understand 
what is happening within the negotiation chamber. 
The Guide is once more benefiting this year from input from a group of authors 
comprising eminent members from different French-speaking countries who have 
been involved in the climate negotiations for many years. Known and recognised 
players, their early involvement in the negotiation chamber as well as in implement-
ing policies and measures resulting from climate agreements brings this collective 
work as close as possible to the negotiation realities and the understanding of major 
issues and challenges. We are hopeful that the various contributions will make the 
work even more relevant, productive and fully engaged with the reality of negotiators 
and actors implementing concrete projects resulting from the negotiations.
Part I proposes a detailed analysis of the 21st Conference of the Parties to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP 21) held in 
Paris on 30 November-11 December 2015. Beyond the results of COP 21 which 
culminated in the first universal climate agreement, this part attempts to decipher 
the negotiation processes and cycles occurring prior to the Conference and which 
led to this historic result. Deciphering the Paris Agreement and operating modalities 
emerging from Decision 1/CP.21 is also proposed.
Part II presents in detail the execution and challenge of implementing the 
Paris commitments, by focusing on the issues relating to the permanent subsidiary 
bodies, namely the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) (Section II.1), the 
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) (Section II.2) 
and the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (AWG-APA) (Section II.3).
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Part II puts into perspective the major themes debated under COP 21 and 
included in the Paris Agreement and Decision 1/CP.21. This includes especially 
the implementation of commitments forming part of the Intended Nationally 
Determined Contributions (INDC), the ambition, the financing questions and 
the role of non-State players. 
Each theme forms part of what is called the “spirit of Paris” by many people, 
which must be maintained during COP 22 and over time to take up the challenge 
of implementation and convert the ambitions of the international community 
into reality. The insufficient national mitigation commitments given the target of 
limiting global warming to less than 2°C are naturally the overriding question in 
this context.
The authors have attempted to offer an overview and then detailed analyses 
for all three parts, featuring the main climate negotiation issues and the challenges 
in achieving the objectives set by the Paris Agreement. Numerous synthetic diagrams 
figure in the body of the document. These are designed to give the reader an educa-
tional overview of the various topics addressed. 
The outlook within each section on the expectations of the COP 22 is presented 
in terms of execution and operationalisation of major issues. Terminology sheets 
relating to the French and equivalent English vocabulary specific to the climate 
change negotiations and the abbreviations and acronyms currently used under the 
negotiations are also provided.
Readers are referred to other sections of the guide and to the source documents 
the length of the text so that they can broaden their understanding of a topic if 
they so wish. Note that only the document listings are quoted when reference is 
made to UNFCCC documents. These listings, designed to make reading easier, 
can furthermore be used to find the documents referred to very easily on the 
UNFCCC Internet site2. A table has been added so that each individual can 
understand the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol document listings3.
We hope that this guide will meet readers’ expectations. We ask them to share 
their assessment and suggestions with us by filling in the form at the end of the 
guide.
This Guide and its accompanying Summary for policymakers were updated 
on 5 October 2016.
Climate change is an universal issue where the effects are very real for an 
increasing proportion of the world population. More than ever there is an urgent need 
for action and the negotiations, even if they are still the remit of the UNFCCC 
States-signatory Parties, must not remain within the restricted enclave of specialists. 
This Guide to the Negotiations and its accompanying Summary for policymakers 
augment the firm commitment to give every reader the keys to act.
2. http://unfccc.int/documentation/items/2643.php
3. See Sheet 8: UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol document listings
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1Introduction
From Paris to Marrakesh...  
The challenge of implementation
It is now acknowledged virtually unanimously that climate change is caused by humans. 
Scientific analyses highlight gradual disruptions and a global rise in temperatures 
over the last two centuries, at an increasing pace during recent decades4. They are 
mainly caused by greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) associated with our consumption 
and production modes, with consequences that could quickly prove irreversible5. 
Despite international negotiations, it is clear that progress in combating climate 
change has remained very modest compared with the numerous challenges raised.
The fifth Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
restated in 2013 the anthropogenic (human) origin of this phenomenon. It hence-
forth deems the link between the rise in temperatures noted since 1950 and human 
activities as “extremely likely6” (i.e. a probability higher than 95%). According 
to this same report, the increase in average temperatures may be between +2.6°C 
and +4.8°C by 2100, well in excess of policy objectives fixed by the international 
community. This rise could have considerable impacts, mainly disordered rainfall 
systems, melting ice, rising sea and ocean levels (26 to 85 cm by the end of the century, 
depending on the scenarios), salinisation of lands, advancing desertification, acid-
ification of oceans and an increase in extreme climate events. These effects would 
exacerbate already complex environmental, economic and social problems, especially 
in developing countries7.
The negotiation process set up to face up to this planetary challenge is a pioneering 
experiment in the history of our societies. For the very first time, the governments 
of virtually all countries are working together in a complex process which questions 
our organisation model and our economies and replaces the environment, human 
development or solidarity between peoples at the heart of the issues. The only 
precedent is the Montreal Protocol adopted in 1985 on the emission of substances 
that impoverish the ozone layer, which was, by comparison, simplicity personified 
in relation to the complex climate change and GHG emission processes. The world 
agreement on the ozone layer must, however, be a source of optimism, as thanks 
to the international mobilisation that united most nations around a same table, 
the ozone layer is now recovering8.
We can only wish the negotiation process under the auspices of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) the same success. 
4. IPCC, 2013
5. IPCC, 2013
6. IPCC, 2013
7. Source : IPCC, quoted in ENERGIES 2050, 2016a
8. WMO and UNDP, 2014.
After all, we must remember the overwhelming size of the challenge – no more 
and no less protecting present and future generations from the multiple, devastating 
consequences potentially generated by too rapid a rise in Earth’s temperatures. The 
responsibility weighing on the shoulders of negotiators and policymakers is therefore 
huge. It has not always been appreciated as demonstrated by the failures of the The 
Hague (2000) and Copenhagen (2009) conferences. But it is clear that the inter-
national process has always been relaunched and ultimately culminated in the 
adoption of a new agreement during COP 21. When everyone is defending the 
legitimate interests of his country, delays in implementing significant actions can 
have consequences for all. And these consequences will be very unequally distributed, 
weighing especially on the poorest countries, despite their little or no responsibility 
in creating the current situation.
The agreement reached in Paris in 2015 is of major importance in the progress 
of the climate negotiations. Fruit of a process started in 2011 with the launch of 
the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, with 
the principal mandate of preparing an agreement for 20159, it fulfils the hope for 
a global commitment by the States and for boosting of measures taken to combat 
climate change. This Agreement commits all States Parties to the UNFCCC to a 
significant reduction in their GHG emissions, but also introduces the necessary 
measures to increase the resilience of Man and his environment to climate distur-
bances. The next step must be implementation.
The Paris Agreement charts the course for the years to come. For the first 
time, it unites all Parties to the UNFCCC. This universal agreement has united all 
Parties in committing to common guidelines for long-term, resilient and low-carbon 
development strategies. The Paris Agreement thus takes into account the necessary 
mitigation efforts by the Parties, by targeting the objective of keeping global 
warming “well below” 2°C above pre-industrial levels, whilst indicating a desire to 
pursue efforts to limit it to 1.5°C. The concerns of developing countries have also 
been incorporated and adaptation now joins mitigation as a central issue in the 
Paris Agreement and Decision 1/CP.21 which is intended to put it into operation.
The Paris Agreement stems from an innovative bottom-up approach by 
UNFCCC, with each Party called on to formulate its own commitments through 
Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC). With this inclusive and 
participative process, the founding principles of the Convention – equity, common 
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities in relation to national 
realities – are confirmed fully and are now ratified in the Paris Agreement. 
Although the commitments must be reinforced every five years, these dynamics 
nevertheless run the risk that all national commitments together are not enough 
to achieve the 1.5°C/2°C objective. Remember that, despite successive warnings 
by the IPCC, which in 2007 was already calling on developed countries to reduce 
9. Decision 1/CP.17
2
3their greenhouse (GHG) gas emissions by 25 to 40% by 2010 over 199010, the 
global man-made GHG emissions have increased unceasingly11. The temperature 
of our planet has already risen by 0.85°C since the pre-industrial period and the 
effect is accelerating. The IPCC indicates that half this rise has been achieved 
during the last four decades12. A report by the UNFCCC Secretariat published 
on 2 May 2016, taking into account the INDC submitted by the Parties up to 
4 April 2016, confirmed that the State commitments would not be enough to put 
our societies on a trajectory compatible with a rise in temperature of less than 
2°C13. Given that the INDC (“forecast” contributions) of most Parties which have 
ratified the Paris Agreement have just been “copied” to become Nationally Deter-
mined Contributions (NDC), an opportunity to raise the ambition bar has already 
been missed. A major challenge is therefore to ensure that the level of ambition 
continues to rise. International cooperation is an initial lever, as is rallying all players 
within the process. This has already led to the adoption of the first legally-binding 
universal climate agreement14.
COP 21 was also a chance for non-State players to reaffirm their commitment 
and to underline their central role other than just as observers of UN negotiations. 
The Paris Agreement thus calls on all States to mobilise and also all players and 
individuals, by recognising the significant, essential role each one must play in this 
collective script. 
The expectation is now that the huge progress made possible by COP 21 is 
confirmed during the Marrakesh Conference. One major aspect will be to define the 
regulations for market mechanisms to reduce the costs to achieve the mitigation 
goals included in the NDC. 
In addition, genuine progress in adaptation in terms of institutional coherence 
and financing also figure among key negotiation elements for COP 22. 
The Parties should also during this conference show real progress in the Pre-2020 
Agenda, significant capacity-building efforts, increased support for developing 
countries and for the transfer of technologies and improve access to sources of 
financing. Maintaining and monitoring international cooperation, commitment, 
financing, transfer of technology and capacity-building will also be central questions. 
It is essential that the “spirit of Paris” is maintained in Marrakesh and that the 
ambitions of the international community are more than ever based on trust in the 
long term, now that the Paris Agreement has officially entered into force.
10. IPCC, 2007
11. IPCC, 2014a, p. 6
12. IPCC, 2014a
13. UNFCCC, 2016d
14. The inherent conditions for the entry into force of the Paris Agreement (55 Parties – 
55% of global emissions) were met on 5 October 2016 and the official ratification of 
72 Parties accounting for 56.75% of global emissions occurred on the same date.
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4A guide to understand, share and increase  
the opportunities to act
The Guide to the Negotiations and its accompanying Summary for policymakers fall 
under the wider context of the support provided by the Institut de la Francophonie 
pour le développement durable, a subsidiary body of the International Organisation 
of La Francophonie (OIF), to French-speaking countries in the international climate 
change negotiations.
Although this guide is intended especially for the negotiators from OIF member 
countries, it has year on year become a reference document translated into several 
languages. We hope that it will be a useful tool for all delegates and that it will 
make an effective contribution to facilitating the search for a consensus for an 
ambitious Marrakesh agreement that is realistically in line with the challenges. 
Aimed at helping negotiators to better understand the challenges of the 
COP 22, this guide provides a retrospective of progress made in Paris (Part I). Part 
II analyses the challenges of achieving objectives, through the lens of the mandates 
of permanent subsidiary bodies. The major issues under debate are then discussed 
in Part III. Numerous diagrams have been added throughout the text in this 2016 
edition to clarify certain notions or throw light on specific issues. Boxes and a wealth 
of icons enhance specific points in the document.
5I.1 Conclusions of the Durban Platform
The Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action 
(ADP) was set up under the seventeenth Conference of the Parties (COP 17) to 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Its 
goal was firstly to develop a protocol, another legal instrument or a wording by 
common agreement having legal force under the Convention applicable to all the 
Parties15 and, secondly, to increase the mitigation ambition level of Parties for the 
pre-2020 period16, in relation to the most recent scientific information supplied 
by the 5th report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). 
The ADP started its work in May 2012 in Bonn by holding the first part of 
its first session at the same time as the 36th session of subsidiary bodies. This first 
ADP session approved the institutional arrangements for the 2012-2015 period, 
adopted its agenda and launch two work streams responsible for reviewing the 
questions relating to paragraphs 2-6 and paragraphs 7-8 of Decision 1/CP.171718.
Having adopted the agenda and mode of governance for the ADP, COP 18 
urged the Parties to continue to prepare elements for the future agreement and the 
pre-2020 work programme. The invitation launched at the 21st session of the COP 
to the Parties to submit their Intended Nationally Determined Contributions 
(INDC) under the 2015 Agreement is one of the main developments in talks under 
the ADP and a key foundation in adopting the Paris Agreement in December 2015.
As planned by the Conference of the Parties at its 20th session in Lima, the 
first negotiation text was prepared in Geneva during the 8th part of the second 
session of the Durban Platform. The 9th, 10th and 11th parts of the second ADP 
session culminated in October 2015 in the draft text for a new agreement, combined 
with two draft decisions on the operationalisation of the 2015 Agreement and the 
launch of a work programme on raising the level of ambition before 2020.
15. Decision1/CP.17, para.2. “Work stream 1” (WS1)
16. Decision1/CP.17, para.6. “Work stream 2” (WS2)
17. UNFCCC, 2012a
18. UNFCCC, 2012b
Part I. 
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At the end of the 12th session of the second part of the ADP, held jointly with 
COP 21, the Joint Chairmen of the Durban Platform concluding the work of the 
ADP culminating in the “Conclusions of Paris”. These contained a draft agreement 
and draft decision on the two ADP work streams; the first operationalising the 
agreement and the second presenting the options with a view to raising the ambition 
for the pre-2020 period. 
The continuation of talks under the presidency of COP 21 led to the adoption 
of the text of the Paris Agreement and decisions on raising the level of ambition 
before 2020. 
Table 1. Chronology of ADP sessions
19. UNFCCC, 2012b
20. FCCC/ADP/2013/2
21. FCCC/ADP/2013/2
Session Place date Outcome/Decisions
ADP 1 Bonn 17-25 May 2012
Adoption of institutional arrangements for the ADP office 
over the 2012-2015 period and launch of work in the two 
ADP work streams 
Additional 
informa-
tion ADP1 
session
Bangkok 30 August-5 September 2012
Discussions on the potential components of the two work 
streams19
COP18/
ADP 1-2
Doha 27 November-  7 December 2012
Adoption of the ADP work programme by the Conference 
of the Parties
ADP 2-1 Bonn 29 April-3  May 2013
• WS1 (Work stream 1) Initiation of round tables to give 
the Parties a chance to progress and fine tune the questions 
regarding the scope, structure and design of the Agreement 
of 2015, the links between the Agreement of 2015 and 
the existing arrangements and the themes of adaptation, 
mitigation, means of implementation and transparency 
of measures and support20.
• WS2 (Work stream 2) Initiation of round tables on  
how the working group could stimulate the action  
to be undertaken to raise the level of ambition by 2020, 
the practical ways of envisaging the level of ambition  
to be predicted before 2020 and the intensification of 
the support to be provided in terms of financing, technology 
and capacity-building and the path to follow21.
ADP 2-2 Bonn 4-13 June 2013
7Guide to the Negotiations - UNFCCC (COP22, CMP12 and CMA1) - OIF/IFDD, 2016
22. Decision 1/CP.19, para. 2a
23. Decision 1/CP.19, para. 2b
24. FCCC/ADP/2014/1
25. FCCC/ADP/2014/2
26. FCCC/ADP/2014/3
COP19/
ADP 2-3
Warsaw 11-23 November 2013
• The COP:
 – requested the ADP to continue to prepare the elements 
of a draft negotiation text with effect from its first session 
in 201422
 – invited all the Parties to initiate or intensify domestic 
preparations for their intended nationally determined 
contributions (INDC)23
ADP 2-4 Bonn 10-14 March  2014
Initiation of targeted consultations open to all covering 
the elements mentioned in paragraph 5 of Decision 1/CP.17, 
among others mitigation, adaptation, financing, technology 
development and transfer, transparency, etc. in order to 
prepare the elements of a draft negotiation text in 
accordance with Decision 1/CP.19, paragraph 2a24.
ADP 2-5 Bonn 4-14 June 2014
Creation of the contact group, with the fundamental work 
objectives of25: 
• Continuing to prepare the components of a draft  
negotiation text for the 2015 Agreement;
• Making considerable progress in determining the  
information that the Parties would communicate  
when presenting their intended nationally determined 
contributions;
• Advancing the work on the level of ambition  
to be predicted before 2020;
 – Stimulating action in the field to remedy  
the ambition gap;
 – Developing common understanding of potential  
options for moving this work forward
ADP 2-6 Bonn 20-25 October 2014
• Continuation of work on the text of a draft decision  
on intended nationally determined contributions26;
• WS1: the contact group developed the components 
contained in paragraph 5 of Decision 1/CP.16, mainly 
the cycle of contributions and commitments, and moved 
forward with the review of what should be set out 
in the 2015 Agreement and what should be subject 
to additional decisions to ensure the most dynamic 
implementation.
• WS2: the contact group focused its attention on the 
contents of a draft decision on enhanced action to be 
provided for before 2020.
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27. Decision 1/CP.20, para. 19
28. FCCC/CP/2014/10/Add.1
COP20/
ADP 2-7
Lima 1-14 December 2014
• The COP decided to continue the technical examination 
of opportunities with high mitigation potential, including 
those with beneficial fallout on adaptation, health and 
sustainable development, in the period 2015–202027
• Preparation of elements of the negotiation text of the 
2015 agreement resulting from the annex to Decision 
1/CP.20 called “Lima Call for Climate Action”28.
ADP 2-8 Geneva 8-13 February 2015
Continuation of work to prepare a negotiation text based 
on the elements suggested for a draft negotiation text 
annexed to Decision 1/CP.20. The negotiation text in Geneva 
adopted at ADP 2-8 served as a basis for the negotiations 
of the 2015 Agreement and eliminated several 
redundancies and duplications, presented solutions and 
divergences better and clarified the proposals as much  
as possible.
ADP 2-9 Bonn 1-11 June 2015
Continuation of work to rationalise and consolidate the 
Geneva negotiation texts and group its elements and 
associated theoretical discussions: preamble, general 
comments/objectives, mitigation, adaptation and loss  
and damage, financing, development and transfer of 
technologies, capacity-building, transparency, timetables, 
implementation of and compliance with provisions and 
the procedural and institutional provisions. The ADP also 
addressed work stream 2 (level of ambition to be planned 
before 2020) and especially its mandate and the elements 
proposed which could make up a decision on work stream2
ADP 2-10 Bonn 4-14 June 2014 Continuation of work on the negotiation text to prepare 
a concise, coherent and simplified text with a view to 
facilitating the negotiations between the Parties on the 
questions of substance and give the Ad Hoc Working 
Group the option of continuing the efforts it was deploying 
to facilitate climate action before 2020.
ADP 2-11 Bonn 19-23 October 2015
COP21/
ADP 2-12
Paris 29 November- 11 December 2015
Adoption of the Paris Agreement and elements of decisions 
on raising the level of ambition before 2020
9Guide to the Negotiations - UNFCCC (COP22, CMP12 and CMA1) - OIF/IFDD, 2016
Diagram 1.  The ADP work programme in a few words29
29. © ENERGIES 2050, October 2016
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I.1.1 Enhanced action before 2020
Instigated under the setting up of the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, 
Work Stream 2 (WS2) aims to remedy the gap between the needs in terms of 
mitigation and the promises of emissions reduction for the period before 2020 with 
a view to contributing without further ado to maintaining the rise in temperatures 
at 1.5 or 2°C over pre-industrial levels. 
Although the ADP WS1, which targeted a post-2020 agreement applicable to 
all the Parties, reached consensus fairly early on, the consideration of the WS2 was 
accepted as a compromise and resulted from the insistence by a certain number of 
Parties, especially the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) during the Durban 
talks. These countries considered that negotiating a future agreement that would 
not go into effect until 2020 could only be accepted if measures to increase the 
mitigation ambition and to enhance adaptation were made beforehand30.
The creation of WS2 conveys the feeling of urgency of some countries that 
must be adopted in face of the rise in temperatures whose consequences could be 
disastrous in developing countries in general, and in particular those that are more 
vulnerable. This feeling was emphasised by the publication of the 5th assessment 
report of the IPCC31 and the 2015 UNEP Report. The UNEP report underlined 
the importance of carrying out mitigation actions before 2020 to remain compatible 
with the scenarios targeting the limit of 2°C by 2100. It is essential that all countries, 
especially the largest emitters of greenhouse gas (GHG), execute their commitments 
made in Cancún as much as possible for 2020 (and ideally exceed them)32.
In addition, according to the article prepared by Rogelj, McCollum, O’Neill, 
& Riahi, in 201333 on “the emission level required in 2020 to limit the rise in temperature 
to 2°C”, exceeding the commitments made for 2020 will improve the changes of 
obtained the major emission reductions required after 2020. Reaching 1.5°C would, 
on the other hand, necessitate a quicker deployment of the required technologies 
by some ten years sooner than achieving the target of 2°C34. On the eve of Paris, 
the G77/China, and more specifically SIDS, accentuated the urgency of acting 
early, more rapidly and as from now35. The G77/China suggested that a work 
programme or mechanism specific to WS2 be adopted in Paris which would force 
developed countries to more specific reduction targets scaled to the increase 
between 2017 and 202036.
30. IISD, 2011
31. IPCC, 2014a
32. UNEP, 2015
33. Rogelj, McCollum, O’Neill, & Riahi, 2013
34. Climate Analytics, 2016b
35. IISD, 2015c, p. 11
36. See G77 WS2 Decision elements text submission (9 June 2015) in ADP.2015.5.InformalNote 
[online] http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/adp2/eng/5infnot.pdf.
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Apart from the goal of raising the mitigation level of ambition, the WS2 
considers simultaneously the financial, technological and capacity building support 
for the mitigation measures. The debates on taking mitigation into account under 
WS2 were initiated and emphasised in 2015 on the insistence of a certain number 
of developing countries. For their part, several developed countries, in particular 
the European Union (EU), Australia, United States, New Zealand, Canada and 
Norway opposed the work of the WS2 encompassing anything other than mitigation 
and the Technical Examination Process(TEP) 37. Several developed countries 
underscored during the 11th part of the second ADP session that adaptation must 
not be included in talks aimed at the WS2.38 
These differing viewpoints on taking adaptation into account continued during 
the talks under the WS2 in Paris. During discussions on the WS2, the developed 
countries requested that the focus be on mitigation, including the role of non-Party 
entities, the institutional anchoring of the current TEP and the links with the 
Convention bodies, whereas the developing countries underlined the acceleration 
of implementation and adaptation39.
The 12th part of the second ADP session closed without reaching consensus 
on the consideration of the questions of adaptation. In the talks under the Paris 
Committee, supervised by the presidency of the COP 21, agreement was nevertheless 
reached on a draft decision to launch, during the 2016-2020 period, a technical 
examination process of adaptation measures. 
Thus, the decisions relating to WS2 include a series of provisions intended to 
increase not just the mitigation efforts and implementation means but also the 
adaptation efforts. These decisions include, inter alia, the ratification of the Doha 
Amendment, compliance with commitments made in Bali and under the Cancún 
Agreements, the technical examination process for both mitigation and adaptation, 
facilitation dialogue and implementation means.
a. Ratification of the Doha Amendment
In Doha, the Parties, meeting under the Conference of the Parties acting as a 
Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP), agreed on an amendment to 
the Protocol providing for GHG reduction targets applicable during a second 
commitment period from 2013 to 2020. The ratification of the Amendment is 
perceived as closely linked to the progression of WS2 and a possible increase in 
ambitions of mitigation pre-2020. Several Parties in 2015 called on the fastest 
37. See Submission from the Umbrella Group: Elements for a Draft Decision under Work 
stream 2 and Suggestions from the European Union and its 28 Member States: Elements for 
a COP 21 Decision on Enhancing Mitigation Ambition Pre-2020 in ADP.2015.5.Informal 
Note [online].
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/adp2/eng/5infnot.pdf
38. IISD, 2015d, p. 9
39. IISD, 2015e.
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possible action three years after the adoption of the Doha Amendment, which 
marks the beginning of the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. 
South Africa, the Like Minded Developing Countries (LMDC), the Alliance of 
Small Island States (AOSIS) and the Independent Alliance of Latin American and 
Caribbean (AILAC) underscore the importance of making progress on the ratifi-
cation of the Doha Amendment40. As at 23 September 2016, seventy countries 
have ratified the Doha Amendment, accounting for 45.8% of the total number 
required for its entry into force41. 
The COP 21 decided to make sure that the mitigation efforts were taken to 
the highest possible level before 2020, mainly by requesting insistently that Parties 
to the Kyoto Protocol which had not yet done so to ratify it and apply the Doha 
Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol42. 
b. Compliance with commitments made in Bali  
and under the Cancún Agreements
In its 21st session, the COP reiterated its resolve as set out in decision 1/CP.19, 
paragraphs 3 and 4, to accelerate the full implementation of the decisions consti-
tuting the agreed outcome pursuant to decision 1/CP.13 and enhance ambition in 
the pre-2020 period in order to ensure the highest possible mitigation efforts 
under the Convention by all Parties; It requested all those Parties which had not 
yet done so to make and comply with mitigation commitments under the Cancún 
Agreements43 and to participate in due course in the current measurement, notifi-
cation and verification processes under the Cancún Agreements, to take stock of 
progress made in implementing mitigation commitments44. 
Reminder of the process which culminated  
in the Cancún Agreements
After the failure in Copenhagen to confirm the main elements of a post-2012 
climate regime, the Cancún Conference resulted in a “balanced set” of decisions 
which the international community greeted with enthusiasm. Underlining the 
need for major reductions in global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and to 
apply urgent measures to accelerate and enhance the implementation of the 
Convention by all Parties, the COP 16 requested the developed country Parties 
to set more ambitious emission reduction targets for their economy as a whole, 
40. IISD, 2015c, p. 11
41. UNFCCC, Status of the Doha Amendment [online]
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/doha_amendment/items/7362.php (last consulted on 
5 October 2016)
42. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 105a
43. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 105b.
44. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 105e.
Continued on page 13
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in order to reduce their global anthropogenic emissions of CO2 and other GHG 
not regulated by the Montreal Protocol to a level compatible with the one stated 
in the 4th assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC)45. With this in mind, the draft GHG emission limitations submitted to 
the UNFCCC Secretariat in 2010 by a number of countries were validated of-
ficially under the Convention. The developed countries submitted their projects 
as emission reduction objectives for their economy as a whole, mainly until 2020, 
whilst the developing countries proposed means of restricting the growth of their 
emissions as action plans.
The COP 16 in Cancún agreed that the developing country Parties would  
take appropriate national mitigation measures under sustainable development, 
supported and made possible by technologies, financial resources and capacity- 
building activities, to ensure that the emissions showed a clear gap by 2020 from 
those potentially produced if policies remained unchanged46. The Cancún Decision 
requires the Parties not included in Annex I to submit their national communi-
cations every four years and their GHG inventories every two years, through 
their updated biennial reports47.
According to the 2015 UNEP report on the emission gap, it is essential that all 
countries, especially the largest emitters of GHG, execute their commitments 
made in Cancún as much as possible for 2020 (and ideally exceed them)48. But 
no country has to date stated its intention to increase the target announced in 
Cancún. For example, the EU announced, in Bonn (ADP 2-9, June 2015), that an 
increase in its ambitions was an option only possible for the post-2020 period49.
Apart from the emission reduction objectives, the Cancún Agreements also  
introduced several new processes and institutions, including the Cancún Adaptation 
Framework, the Adaptation Committee and the Technology Mechanism, which 
includes the Technology Executive Committee (TEC)50 and the Climate Technology 
Centre and Network (CTCN). Whereas the TEC supervises the assessment of 
technological needs and acts as a catalyst and promoter of technological coopera-
tion, the CTCN advises the countries and facilitates the coordination between 
the national and regional technological development networks. Regarding adap-
tation, in 2010 the Parties adopted in the Cancún Adaptation Framework51 in 
order to, inter alia, improve their knowledge on ways of adapting to expected 
climate change and the tools available to encourage resilient development to 
these impacts.
45. Decision 1/CP.16, para. 37
46. Decision 1/CP.16, para. 48
47. Decision 1/CP.16, para. 60.
48. UNEP, 2015
49. Third World Network, 2015. ADP: Conditions for increasing pre 2020 emissions target not 
met – says EU [online] http://twn.ifrik.org/climate-change/adp-conditionsincreasing-
pre-2020-emissions-target-not-met-says-eu
50. Decision 1/CP.16, para. 117
51. Decision 1/CP.16, para. 13
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c. Technical Examination Process (TEP) on mitigation 
It was decided at the 19th session of the COP to accelerate the activities planned 
in the WS2 work plan relating to the provisions of paragraphs 7 and 8 of Decision 
1/CP.17, by launching and intensifying, with effect from 2014, the technical exam-
ination of measurement options with high mitigation potential, including those 
with beneficial fallout on adaptation and sustainable development52. This technical 
examination process for mitigation involves technical meetings of experts in regular 
sessions held on a variety of themes and focused on monitoring work to be carried 
out by the Parties, international organisations and partnerships throughout the 
year. Technical workshops for experts were therefore organised during the sessions 
of the ADP 2-4 (March 2014), ADP 2-5 (June 2014), ADP 2-6 (October 2014 
and ADP 2-9 (June 2015)53. These workshops covered, inter alia, the policies and 
opportunities to intensify the deployment of renewable energy and improved 
energy, opportunities in land use and allocation, the urban environment, possi-
bilities for action in the GHG other than CO2 and carbon storage.
Through the Lima Call for Climate Action, the COP 20 asked the ADP to 
make recommendations in relation to further advancing the technical examination 
process, including the periodic assessment of the technical expert meetings, to the 
Conference of the Parties at its twenty-first session54. For the purposes of the 
Forum dedicated to means of making progress on the technical examination of 
measures of the high mitigation potential and to understand better the potential 
obstacles of implementation, the Parties made the most of a first meeting specifi-
cally aimed at discussing this matter organised in June 2015 to determine which 
specific issues should take priority in the technical expert meetings (TEM) to come 
and secondly, to identify the improvements that it would be possible to make. 
During the talks in Paris, the Parties submitted a compromise text for the 
paragraphs relating to the participation of competent experts in the TEP, to engage 
the operational entities of the financial mechanism in the technical expert meetings 
and involve the two top-level champions to be named to give some impetus to the 
process, in preparing the summary for the policymakers55. In terms of decisions 
made, the COP 21 required the enhancement, during the 2016-2020 period, of 
the current technical examination process for mitigation measures as defined by 
Decisions 1/CP.19 and 1/CP.20 by taking account of the most recent scientific 
data, especially in 56:
• Encouraging the Parties, Convention bodies and international organisations 
to take part in this process, if appropriate in conjunction with the competent 
stakeholders not parties to the Convention, to exchange experiences and 
52. Decision 1/CP.19, para. 5a
53. http://unfccc.int/focus/mitigation/technical_expert_meetings/items/8179.php
54. Decision 1/CP.20, para. 20
55. IISD, 2015e, p.10 
56. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 109
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suggestions, mainly from regional events, and to collaborate in facilitating 
the implementation of policies, practices and measures identified during the 
process in compliance with national sustainable development priorities;
• Setting out to improve, in consultation with the Parties, the access to and 
participation in this process of experts in developing country parties and 
entities not parties to the Convention;
• Requesting the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate Technology 
Centre and Network, in accordance with their respective mandates, to:
 – i) participate in the technical expert meetings and redouble efforts to help 
the Parties to accelerate the implementation of policies, practices and measures 
identified during the process;
 – ii) take stock regularly during technical expert meetings of the progress 
made to encourage the implementation of policies, practices and measures 
identified during the process;
 – iii) provide information on their activities under the process in their joint 
annual report to the Conference of the Parties;
• Encouraging the Parties to use the Climate Technology Centre and Network 
efficiently to seek help in preparing viable draft proposals on the economic, 
environmental and social plans in areas with a high mitigation potential that 
have been identified during the process;
To summarise, following the extension of the TEP on mitigation from 2015 
to 2020 by the Conference of the Parties at its twentieth session57, the Parties to 
the Convention have enhanced it in Paris given the importance of having available 
a mechanism form revising and assessing the effectiveness of the process.
d. Facilitative dialogue
Several developing countries insisted on the need to assess progress made by the 
developed countries in implementing the Convention in the context of the pre-2020 
ambition before finalising the text of the agreement in Paris. This proposal for an 
assessment was rejected by the developed countries on the grounds that it was not 
useful but rather constituted a risk of duplication of efforts when considering the 
mandate being discussed for other processes which they felt were similar. 
Following the talks in the Paris Committee after the closure of the ADP, the 
Parties examined a compromise proposal, including facilitation dialogue for use in 
examining the state of implementation of the Convention and the options for 
improving it further, by involving all the Parties but with stronger emphasis on the 
commitments of developed countries in terms of the pre-2020 efforts58.
57. FCCC/CP/2014/10/Add.1, para. 19.
58. IISD, 2015e, p.12 
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The COP 21 decided to introduce a facilitation dialogue at the same time as 
the 22nd session of the Conference of the Parties to assess the progress made in 
implementing paragraphs 3 and 4 of Decision 1/CP.19 and identify the possibilities 
of increasing the financial resources provided, including for the development and 
transfer of technologies and for capacity-building. Such a dialogue is designed to 
identify the means of raising the level of ambition of the mitigation efforts of all 
the Parties, mainly by identifying the possibilities of increasing the input and 
mobilisation of support and instigating favourable frameworks.
This 2016 facilitation dialogue precedes and has different scope and objec-
tives from those pursued by the 2018 facilitation dialogue decided by the COP 21 
in conjunction with the NDC, mainly the organisation of a facilitation dialogue 
between the Parties to take stock of collective efforts deployed by the Parties to 
achieve the long-term objective stated in paragraph 1 of Article 4 of the Agreement 
and clarify the establishment of intended nationally determined contributions 
(INDC) in accordance with paragraph 8 of Article 4 of the Agreement.
e. Technical Examination Process on Adaptation
By Decision 1/CP.19, paragraph 41, the Conference of the Parties stated that it 
was resolved to raise the ambition level during the period up to 2020 by intensifying, 
from 2014 onwards, the technical examination of prospects for measures with a 
high mitigation potential, including those with beneficial fallout on adaptation 
and sustainable development. Although this decision refers to the beneficial fallout 
for adaptation, considering adaptation during the talks under the SA2 was not 
accepted by all the Parties. For example, several developed countries underscored 
during the 11th part of the second ADP session that adaptation should not be 
included in talks aimed at the WS259.
Despite this opposition to considering adaptation during talks relating to the 
WS2 in Paris, the discussions under the Paris Committee under the supervision of 
the presidency of COP 21 reached consensus. The first signs of consensus on this 
topic were felt when certain Parties opposed to considering adaptation showed 
flexibility later on to launch a technical examination process on adaptation, 
although there was still disagreements over its mode of governance. The views of the 
Parties differed on the content, institutional arrangement and timetable of a TEP 
on adaptation60. The developed countries are happy with it being governed by the 
Adaptation Committee whereas from the point of view of developing countries, a 
joint SBI and SBSTA contact group must be set up with a central role for the 
Adaptation Committee. 
59. IISD, 2015d, p. 9
60. IISD, 2015e, p. 10
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At the end of the work of the Paris Committee, the Parties found mutual 
ground on a TEP for adaptation which gave added value, insofar as there was no 
duplication of work undertaken under the auspices of existing Convention bodies. 
The Parties highlight their rapprochement in using the institutional arrangements 
of the mitigation TEP for a TEP on adaptation, with a key role for the Adaptation 
Committee61. The Parties agreed that the technical expert meeting on mitigation 
could advise the proposed technical expert meeting on adaptation, with the caveat 
that the Parties continue to test and fine tune the elements of the existing technical 
expert meeting62.
The final decision adopted in Paris provides for launching in the 2016-2020 
period a technical examination process of adaptation measures63. This technical 
examination process will identify, wherever possible, the concrete opportunities to 
enhance resilience, reduce vulnerabilities and increase the knowledge and imple-
mentation of adaptation measures. The developing countries welcomed the setting 
up of this new TEP on adaptation, as for them adaptation is as important as 
mitigation. Some perceived these institutional links as potentially being able to 
transform the TEP, from “discussion forums” into “solution spaces”, where the 
mitigation and adaptation technologies and practices will be broadcast globally64. 
The COP 21 has asked the Adaptation Committee to combine the current 
arrangements for the work programmes, bodies and institutions governed by the 
Convention responsible for adaptation, study the means of taking them into account, 
find synergies between them and take the best possible advantage of them65. 
I.1.2 The Paris Agreement – form and legal implications
Created in 2011 in Durban, the ADP commenced work in 2012 and had as its 
main mandate to prepare for 2015 a new protocol, another legal instrument or an 
agreed outcome with legal force by virtue of the Convention, which would be 
applicable to all Parties through work stream 1 (WS1). The talks during the first 
sessions of the ADP that took place in 2012 and 2013 (ADP 1, ADP 1-2, ADP 2-1, 
ADP 2-2 and ADP 2-3) concentrated on the scope, structure, design of the Agreement 
of 2015, the links between the agreement of 2015 and existing institutional 
arrangements and elements outlined in paragraph 5 of decision 1/CP.17, among 
others, the adaptation, mitigation, means of implementation and transparency of 
measures and support. 
One of the main elements of the development of the Paris Agreement was the 
invitation launched in Warsaw by COP 19 to the Parties to engage or broaden 
internal preparations of their intended nationally determined contributions 
(INDC). From this invitation, the “top-down” approach, strongly defended by the 
61. IISD, 2015e, p. 12
62. IISD, 2015f.
63. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 124
64. IISD, 2015e, p. 50
65. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 130
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most vulnerable countries, mainly the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and 
the least developed countries (LDC), could no longer be envisaged to benefit the 
“bottom-up” approach, leaving the States the choice of defining the extent and 
nature of their contributions. The controversial reference to “intended nationally 
determined contributions”, which did not prejudge their legal nature, was presented 
as a amendment submitted verbally in the last minutes of the plenary closing of 
the ADP66. The term “contribution”, as opposed to “commitment”, was the object 
of a division between developed countries and certain developing ones, in particular 
those of the Like Minded Developing Countries (LMDC). The fundamental 
questions such as the legal nature of the 2015 agreement and the means to differentiate 
commitments in an agreement “applicable to all Parties” remained outstanding.
Outside the invitation made to the Parties to communicate their INDC, the 
COP 19 requested the ADP to prepare the elements of a draft negotiation text as 
from its first session in 201467. Thus, in March 2014 during the fourth part of the 
second session of the ADP, targeted consultations open to all covering the elements 
mentioned in paragraph 5 of Decision 1/CP.17, among others mitigation, adaptation, 
financing, technology development and transfer, transparency, etc. were initiated 
in order to prepare the elements of a draft negotiation text in accordance with 
Decision 1/CP.19, paragraph 2a68. 
The first elements of the negotiation text of the 2015 agreement were prepared 
in December 2014 in Lima and contained in an annex to Decision 1/CP.20 called 
“Lima Call for Climate Action”69. During the ADP 2-8 that took place in Geneva 
in February 2015, the Parties produced a provisional text of the agreement more 
than six months before the session that would approve it respecting thus the period 
for adoption during COP 21 of a text of agreement with legal tenure and legally 
binding internationally. The 9th, 10th and 11th parts of the second session of 
ADP enabled the Parties to pursue their work on the basis of the negotiation text 
in order to simplify it, eliminate redundancies and repetitions, present solutions 
and divergences better and clarify the proposals as much as possible. This work 
allowed the preparation of a simplified negotiation text but nevertheless containing 
a certain number of differences on the main key elements of the agreement. These 
differences among other related to: 
• Consideration of the principle of equity and common but differentiated 
responsibilities in the context of the Paris agreement;
• The flexibility to be given to developing countries as related to their increase 
in levels of emission at present in order to meet development needs in terms 
of social and economic issues;
• The long term objective to limit temperature over pre-industrial levels from 
now until 2100, i.e.: 1.5°C or 2°C? 
66. IISD, 2013, p. 34
67. Decision 1/CP.19, para. 2a
68. FCCC/ADP/2014/1
69. FCCC/CP/2014/10/Add.1
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• As the long-term objective of reduction of greenhouse emissions reflected the 
effort on a collective level, several concepts were explored to translate this 
objective: de-carbonisation of the world economy, zero emissions net of carbon 
or even transformation of the economy along the low carbon/low emissions 
development path;
• The level of ambition and nature of mitigation objectives at the national level: 
is it necessary to talk about contributions or commitments of mitigation deter-
mined at national levels and options for implementing conditional components 
of INDC;
• Establishing or not of an international mechanism on loss and damage under 
the new agreement;
• The relation between the new system of transparency of actions and the support 
anticipated and the existing system for transparency;
• After the conclusion of works of the ADP at the 12th session of the second 
part of the ADP in the frame of the COP 21, the results of the work culmi-
nated in a draft agreement contained in what was named “conclusions of 
Paris”. The pursuit of talks under the presidency of the COP 21 enabled the 
adoption of the Paris Agreement.
As opposed to the Kyoto Protocol containing legally binding commitments 
with figures for the Parties registered in Annex B, the Paris Agreement commits all 
Parties to adopt internal measures with the aim of conducting mitigation objectives 
that are self determined. Several discussions brought to light the subject of the 
legal nature or legally binding character of the agreement that did not appear evident 
in the analysis of the text of the agreement. According to the observations of a 
certain number of delegates, the Kyoto Protocol had better intentions but its 
objectives were modest and only some countries had targets of mitigation. Whilst 
the mitigation approach by the NDC represents a more important participation, 
almost universal by the Parties to the Convention, their non legally binding nature 
and lack of collective ambition raised concerns70. Numerous actors expected that 
the Paris Agreement would result in commitments in terms of mitigation and 
financing that would be legally binding. To this, they were reminded that such 
regulations did not necessarily guarantee implementation, regarding previous 
experience, but that they could on the contrary reduce participation, and the level 
of global ambition of the agreement. 
Nevertheless, several considerations testify to the legal force of the Paris 
Agreement71:
• It is an international treaty under the Vienna Convention, subjected to the 
signature and national processes of ratification to guarantee its effectiveness. 
Elsewhere, its general structure is quite similar to a protocol even if it has not 
been clearly defined as such,
70. IISD, 2015e, p. 50
71. Bodansky, 2016
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• As the majority of texts in international law, it contains provisions having 
obligatory force of law, and resolutions that are not binding, defined through 
different language used to translate the obligations: “must” or “should”,
• Several clear legal requirements appear through elements and processes that 
are interdependent in the architecture of the agreement, in relation to the objec-
tives in the long term, the individual obligations of the Parties, the national 
reports and reviews, the processes of harmonisation of temporal horizons of the 
NDC towards a common calendar, the frame of transparency and account-
ability as well as the mechanism aimed at facilitating implementation and 
promoting respect of the obligations of the Parties. All of these provisions 
result systematically in a certain number of obligations for the Parties with 
respect to the international community. 
The sophistication of the architecture of the Paris Agreement can be seen as a 
hybrid model reconciling the efforts that are “top down” and “bottom up”72. This 
architecture turned out to be the most efficient to reconcile the divergent views of 
the Parties and render the agreement acceptable to all, in particular to satisfy the 
American constitutional limitation73 as well as the positions of certain developing 
nations, in particular LMDC. In effect, on one side the United States invoked 
legislative limitations to associate a legally binding agreement in the form of a 
protocol and on the other hand, certain developing countries wished to prevent 
any limiting initiative for a category of countries not adhering to Annex I of the 
UNFCCC. 
Thus, the Paris Agreement was built on a more open and progressive approach. 
However, given that the Agreement must be ratified entirely without reservations, 
several analysts concluded that the legal form is globally binding once in force 
even though it contains elements that are not binding74..
In clarity, distinction is made among the obligations of the Paris Agreement 
between elements that are binding and others that are not. Amongst the non binding 
elements one main one is financing75 and emissions reduction76 whilst as binding 
elements one can find the periodic communication of NDC at regular intervals 
of five years77, transparency of actions and support78. It is important to note the 
subtleness with which although there is an obligation of the Parties to communicate 
their NDC (Art 4.2), the implementation is not legally binding79. In effect, the 
72. See discussion by Bodansky, 2016, p. 18-20
73. Obergassel, et al., 2016
74. See Bodle, Donat, & Duwe, 2016; and Jeyaratnam, Whitmore, Hokpin, & Mountain, 2015
75. See Jeyaratnam, Whitmore, Hokpin, & Mountain, 2015; and Obergassel, et al., 2016
76. Obergassel, et al., 2016
77. Obergassel, et al., 2016
78. IDDRI, 2015
79. See discussion by Bodansky, 2016, p. 13-14
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Agreement only required the Parties to adopt internal measures to mitigate in order 
to comply with the NDC objectives. According to the analysis by Galbraith80, 
regarding article 4.2 of the Paris Agreement only the procedural aspect of the NDC 
is binding and there is no legal obligation concerning the substance of article 4.
I.2 Detailed analysis of the Paris Agreement 
and the operational modes by virtue of 
Decision 1/CP.21
The Paris Agreement resulting from talks under the Durban Platform launched in 
2011 includes 29 articles which can be structured in three parts: 
• The context, the principles, the objectives of the agreement dealing with the 
treatment of transversal questions;
• The main obligations according to the mandate of Durban relative to back-
ground questions, in particular mitigation, adaptation, financing, development 
and tech no logy transfer, transparency of actions and support, and capacity 
building;
• The institutional, procedural and legal issues.
The Paris Agreement elsewhere considers emerging themes such as loss and 
damage and the creation of new mechanisms of cooperation including market 
mechanisms. This agreement is guided by an ascending approach (“bottom-up”) 
sustained by the principle of self determination of mitigation objectives and adap-
tation at the national level through NDC. It is accompanied by Decision 1/CP.21 
aimed at giving it effect and outlining the actions to develop to facilitate entry into 
force and sustain implementation of its regulations.
The Paris Agreement is based on three main objectives indicated in its Article 
2 which are inscribed in the larger context of implementing the UNFCCC, of 
sustainable development and fight against poverty:
• Contain the increase in average temperature of the planet considerably below 
2°C compared to pre-industrial levels and pursue action to limit the increase 
in temperature at 1.5°C compared to pre industrial levels;
• Reinforce adaptation capacity to damaging climate change and promote resilience 
to these changes and to a development of low greenhouse gas emissions so as 
to prevent threats to food production;
• Render financial flows compatible with an evolution profile towards a devel-
opment of low greenhouse gas emissions resilient to climate change;
80. Galbraith, 2015
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Diagram 2.  Paris in a few words81
81. © ENERGIES 2050, October 2016
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Diagram 3.  Articles of the Paris Agreement82
82. © ENERGIES 2050, October 2016
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Diagram 4.  The Paris Agreement in a few words83
    
83. © ENERGIES 2050, October 2016
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I.2.1 Preamble
The preamble of the draft negotiating text from the last session of the ADP before 
Paris contains a certain number of points of divergence. They are, among others, 
references: to vulnerability, and particular situations which many countries in 
development defend, differentiation, binding nature of the agreement, human 
rights, food security, use of lands, forestation, sinks and reservoirs, and carbon rat-
ing. A certain number of delegates underscored one or several concepts or terms 
they consider are outside the scope of the agreement of the Convention, or which 
are not “agreed” or defined internationally84. Concerning considerations of special 
needs, a certain number of countries or groups of countries have insisted in vain 
on the recognition of their specificity in the preamble: Kyrgyzstan requested inclusion 
of vulnerability of mountain zones whilst the African Group let it be understood 
that the exclusion of “African countries” from preamble paragraphs on specific 
needs constituted “a red line”85. 
The continuation of talks of the Paris Committee under the chairmanship of 
COP 21 found a compromise on the preamble, which constitutes the basic structure 
of the Agreement. This preamble contains important issues and at times innovative 
ones of which certain were nevertheless difficult to include in the body of the 
text86. Among others these refer to human rights, food security, rights of indigenous 
peoples, and the participation of the poorest populations. The inclusion of human 
rights in the preamble of the Paris Agreement makes it the first multilateral agreement 
on the environment to recognize them. 
The preamble also includes concepts not traditionally considered to be “climate 
issues”, such as intergenerational equity, climate justice and right to health. In 
spite of this, the Agreement does not grant effect to rights everywhere, which was 
a disappointment in particular for defenders of gender who underscored that the 
final text omitted to mention gender sensitivity that appeared in a certain number 
of previous drafts87.
Outside of the innovations mentioned, the preamble mentions among others:
• Consideration of the principles of the Convention, including the principles 
of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capa-
bilities (CBDR-RC), in light of different national circumstances;
• The importance of conservation and reinforcement of greenhouse gas sinks 
and reservoirs considered in the Convention;
• The importance to monitor the integrity of all ecosystems including oceans 
and protection of biodiversity;
84. IISD, 2015e, p. 6
85. IISD, 2015e, p. 7
86. Bodle, Donat, & Duwe, 2016
87. IISD, 2015e, p. 49
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• The intrinsic relation between climate change, sustainable development and 
eradication of poverty;
• The needs for modes of life, production and sustainable consumption as 
forming part of the climate solution
Regarding these different elements the Agreement recognizes the importance 
of nature as the necessary foundation for the survival of development of the human 
race. It also underscores that human society must play its role in the climate solution 
to the extent that the rights, responsibilities and equity have been considered in 
the answers to climate change.
It recognizes the specific needs of developing countries and the Agreement 
stresses those that are specially vulnerable to the terrible effects of climate change, 
as mentioned in the Convention concerning financing and technology transfer. 
The issue of differentiation whose interpretation is not always unanimous remains 
mentioned in the Paris Agreement and will continue to give rise to debates. In effect, 
developed countries did not wish to continue with the existing differentiation 
(two annexes) whilst developing ones insisted on maintaining it. For developed 
countries, certain developing countries are today in a position to increase consid-
erably their ambitions compared to what they do under the Kyoto Protocol. True, 
the need for developed countries to be at the helm whilst taking into account the 
national circumstances of developing countries has been recognized, but the latter, 
in particular emerging countries, fear that this leads to the creation of new legal 
obligations for them. Thus, without settling the issue of differentiation, the Paris 
Agreement leaves it open for continuing debates on the definition given to these 
principles of equity and the CBDR-RC, according to different national situations.
I.2.2 Article 2: Goal
The preparation of a draft article on the goal of the Agreement has seen disagreements 
not only on the existence of this article but also its contents. On one side, the 
United States prefers not to have any text, and has repeated during talks in Paris 
that the object must be reflected in the different sections of the Agreement88. On 
the other side, there are countries that wish to have this article but cannot agree on 
the content. 
One of the main points of disagreement concerns the definition of the long 
term objective of temperature limitation compared to pre industrial levels from 
now until 2100. The most vulnerable countries, in particular the LDC and SIDS 
in Paris defended the consideration of the objective of limitation to 1.5°C whilst 
the developed countries and some developing countries did not see the need to limit 
the increase to 1.5°C. Regarding the disagreements, certain countries proposed a 
draft decision demanding the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
to produce a special report on the impact of a limitation at 1.5°C, which Saudi 
88. IISD, 2015e, p. 16
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Arabia and others contested, not seeing its « added value » compared to evaluation 
reports of IPCC already in existence. In effect, given that IPCC has not, until its 
last assessment report, examined the feasibility of 1.5°C, certain countries consider 
that there are no scientific results showing the urgency of considering the limitation 
at 1.5°C. Decision 1/CP.21 thus invited IPCC to present a special report in 2018 
on the consequences of global warming above 1.5°C compared to pre industrial 
levels and on scenarios of evolution of global emissions of greenhouse gases. IPCC 
has in the meantime accepted this invitation (see also section III.1).
In relation to the other elements of article 2, Venezuela opposed sustainable 
development stating that it “belongs to a different agenda” and goes beyond low 
emissions of GHG and climate resilience. Saudi Arabia and Pakistan for their part 
opposed the inclusion of “de-carbonisation” and the “neutrality in terms of carbon 
emissions”89. 
Following the work of the Paris Committee, the Parties agreed on a draft of 
this article 2 which was adopted. The objectives of the Agreement thus adopted 
aim mainly for three elements which are mitigation, adaptation and financing. 
The Parties to the Paris Agreement collectively commit to conduct actions awaiting 
the objectives mentioned, with levels of ambition regularly evaluated and reinforced 
on the basis of transparency.
Mitigation 
One of the main compromises reached in Paris concerns the objective in the long 
term of limiting temperature compared to pre industrial levels from now until 
2100 that conciliates the levels of discussion. Even when the first objective of 
going well below 2°C, the agreement recognizes the need to make efforts to reach 
the objective of 1.5°C, it being understood that this will reduce the risks and the 
effects of climate change considerably. 
The SIDS, LDC and other groups of countries have always defended a more 
ambitious objective of limitation in the global average temperature. The emergence 
of scientific research in recent years on the risk encountered with the objective of 
2°C has reinforced this position before and after the Paris Conference. The Paris 
Agreement ratified this long term objective requesting the Parties to pursue the 
actions made to limit the increase in global average temperature at 1.5°C compared 
to pre industrial levels, it being understood that this would reduce the risks and 
effects of climate change. 
The Agreement defines a specific world target of mitigation in very clear 
terms: a balance between anthropogenic emissions and absorptions by sinks must 
be reached during the second half of the 21st century (see I.B.4).
All these targets are clearly more ambitious than what was expected before 
COP 2190.
89. IISD, 2015e, p. 16
90. IISD, 2015e, p. 50 
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Is the objective of 2°C the safety limit that  
would prevent dangerous climate change?
The objective of 2°C has for long been presented as being the safety limit, identified 
by scientists, that would prevent dangerous climate change. According to Knutti, 
Rogelj, Sedláček, & Fischer91, this perception is erroneous because no scientific 
evaluation has clearly justified or defended the objective of 2°C, as being a safety 
level of the warming. 
Dealing with the issue of feasibility of the objective of 1.5°C, certain studies have 
shown in fact that the two scenarios are economically and technically feasible at 
present92. It has in effect been demonstrated that in the context of rapid action, 
identical technologies are required for both options with the sole difference that 
reaching 1.5°C would need a deployment sooner by some ten years compared 
to that of 2°C93. 
For both scenarios, it is clear that there is strong economic motivation to take 
concrete initiatives as soon as possible. In effect, the sooner the efforts are 
made in implementing appropriate technology the lower the costs. 
I.2.3 Article 3: NDC
The range of the INDC has constituted since Warsaw to Paris one of the contested 
issue in negotiations. The Paris Agreement allows the Parties to present their NDC 
under articles 4 (mitigation), 7 (adaptation), 9 (finance), 10 (adjustment and techno-
logy transfer), 11 (capacity building) and 13 (transparency). The implementation 
of the NDC at the national level constitutes one of the first stages to complete in 
order to guarantee the effectiveness of the Agreement. Once the first NDC have 
been communicated, strong expectations are placed on the countries to ensure the 
implementation as well as preparation of next cycles of communication of future 
NDC. The implementation of the NDC and the strategies of development for low 
carbon emissions and resilience to climate change require the commitment of all 
Parties as well as international cooperation. It requires the conversion of NDC 
into policies, strategies, programmes, projects, measures and initiatives that can 
contribute towards the objectives associated with the NDC. 
The Paris Agreement provides the evaluation of collectives progress reached in 
the realisation of the object of the Agreement through periodic world assessments. 
The first world assessment is anticipated in 2023 and should be repeated every five 
years after that except if the COP adopts a different decision.
91. Knutti, Rogelj, Sedláček, & Fischer, 2015
92. Climate Analytics, 2016b
93. Climate Analytics, 2016b
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I.2.4 Article 4: Mitigation
In order to achieve the objective of long term temperature outlined in article 2, the 
Agreement seeks to bring the Parties to reaching a world ceiling of GHG emissions 
as soon as possible, and to operate reductions rapidly following this in accordance 
with the best scientific data available so as to reach a balance between anthropogenic 
emissions by the sources and the anthropogenic absorptions by the greenhouse gas 
sinks during the second half of the century on an equitable basis and in the context 
of sustainable development and fight against poverty. 
The Paris Agreement does not assign mitigation objectives with figures on the 
Parties, nor does it define a global level of emissions to be reached. Rather it stresses 
the national mitigation plans on climate change through the INDC- which must 
be converted into NDC. The Agreement stipulates that the efforts of all Parties 
will represent a progression in time, recognising the need to help developing countries 
so that the Agreement is efficiently applied.
The approach of “Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions” (NAMA) can 
be used in the context of NDC in matters of mitigation. The decision aimed at 
making the Agreement effective notes with preoccupation that the levels of global 
emissions of GHG in 2025 and 2030 estimated on the basis of INDC are not 
compatible with the scenarios of less cost anticipating an increase in temperature 
of 2°C, and also notes that the efforts of reduction of emissions much more impor-
tant than those associated with INDC shall be necessary to contain the increase in 
the planet’s temperature below 2°C or 1.5°C compared to pre industrial levels94. 
Consequently, an effort must be carried out at all levels in order to transform the 
entire economic system into the realisation of the mitigation objectives. The role of 
means for implementation: financing, investments, and innovative instruments 
both domestic and international, capacity building and technology transfer for 
this, shall be determining factors to this effect.
Obligations in terms of reduction of emissions of GHG
The Agreement commits the Parties to communicate their NDC at intervals of 
five years, and to pursue measures of mitigation at the national level in order to 
make their contributions which should not only always progress in comparison to 
previous efforts, but also adjust to take into consideration the results of the world 
assessment which will evaluate and aggregate global progress. Decision 1/CP.21 
aimed at making effective the Paris Agreement invites the Parties to communicate 
their first NDC no later than at the time of depositing their ratification, adherence 
and or approval of the Agreement. The INDC submitted by the Parties before the 
conclusion of the Paris Agreement shall be considered as being their first NDC 
unless said Parties decide differently. 
In order to harmonise the temporal horizons of the NDC, the decision commits 
the Parties, whose submitted INDC comprises a calendar until 2025, to commu-
nicate a new NDC and those whose INDC comprises a calendar up to 2030, at 
least to adjust it and then do so every five years in accordance with paragraph 9 of 
94. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 17
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article 4 of the Agreement. The Conference of the Parties serving as a meeting of the 
Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA) is responsible for examining the common 
calendars for the NDC at its first session.
The Agreement gives very little detail on the elements of the NDC requesting 
developed countries to continue showing the way by assuming the objectives of 
emission reduction in absolute figures on the scale of the economy whilst the 
developing countries must continue to increase their efforts of mitigation and are 
encouraged to move progressively to objectives of reduction. The Ad Hoc Working 
Group on the Paris Agreement (APA) has the mandate of formulating other direc-
tives on the characteristics of contributions determined at the national level for 
examination and adoption by the CMA at its first session95.
Strategies of development for GHG emissions
The Agreement also commits all the Parties to formulate and communicate between 
now and 2020 strategies for development of low GHG emissions in the long term 
considering their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capa-
bilities, in respect of the different national situations and keeping in mind the 
three main objectives defined in article 2.
Summary of the aggregate effect of INDC
The summary report of aggregate effect of INDC produced by the Secretariat 
of the UNFCCC on 2 May 2016 taking into consideration the INDC communi-
cated by the Parties up to 4 April 2016, underscores on one hand that the 
measures currently taken by countries do not allow the realisation of ambitions 
associated with INDC, which would demand taking additional measures. This 
report adds that if, between now and 2030, the Parties do not reinforce the 
mitigation measures beyond what is provided for in the contributions, it will still 
be possible to maintain the increase in temperature under 2°C but with higher 
costs. In effect, according to the scenarios of the 5th report of IPCC, in these 
conditions it will be necessary to bank on rates of reduction of annual emissions 
and costs considerably higher than those in the scenario of reduction at least 
cost, operated as from today or in 2020. Consequently, efforts of reduction of 
emissions higher than those associated to the contributions must be deployed 
after 2025 and 2030 to expect to maintain the increase in temperature under 
2°C compared to pre industrial levels. 
To summarise, even when there is considerable improvement compared to current 
commitments by countries, compared to a scenario without the INDC that would 
lead to warming of + 3.6°C, a considerable effort in terms of ambition remains to 
be done, in order to reach the objective of 1.5°C/2°C. Also, the Paris Agreement 
has provided for a mechanism for the ambition aimed at ensuring that the NDC 
be regularly, and as soon as possible, revised upwards. Besides, it is clear that 
neither inaction nor late action are favourable to reaching these objectives in 
the most economically efficient manner.
95. With the entry into effect of the Paris Agreement on 4 November 2016, the CMA1 
shall take place in Marrakesh.
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Diagram 5.  Operationalisation of Article 4 of the Paris Agreement and Decision 1/CP.21, paragraphs 12 to 3596
96. © ENERGIES 2050, October 2016
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I.2.5 Article 5: Forests
The initial goal of the REDD+ mechanism was to reduce emissions from deforestation 
and forest degradation in developing countries. The mechanism was established by 
Decision 2/CP.13 in 2007 and was developed further by subsequent decisions of 
the Convention. By Decision 1/CP.16, the Conference of the Parties defines further 
the REDD+ activities which target reduced emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation in developing countries and include the role of conservation, sustainable 
forest management and development of forest carbon stocks in developing countries97. 
Decisions 9/CP.19 and 15/CP.19 set out the Warsaw Framework for REDD+, 
which led to more significant progress in implementation aspects of the REDD+ 
mechanism. 
The talks held in Paris to maintain all this progress were heated. To everyone’s 
satisfaction, the Paris Agreement ratified the progress made under the REDD+ by 
inviting the Parties to take measures to apply and enhance, mainly by results-based 
payments, the existing framework defined in the directives and relevant decisions 
already adopted under the Convention98. In the plenary session to adopt the Paris 
Agreement, Panama, on behalf of the Coalition of Rainforest Nations, stated that 
the REDD+ implementation mechanism would allow the State and non-State players 
to participate and serve the communities which depend on ecosystem services 
provided by the rainforests99.
To secure the financing of forest-related mechanisms, Decision 1/CP.21 
recognises the importance of suitable, predictable financial resources, including 
results-based payments, if appropriate, to implement general approaches and 
positive incentives to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation 
whilst encouraging the coordination of the support from, inter alia, public and 
private, bilateral and multilateral sources like the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and 
other sources, in application of the relevant COP decisions. 
I.2.6 Article 6: Cooperation mechanisms:  
market and “non-market” mechanisms
Operating modalities of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement  
and Decision 1/CP.21, paragraphs 37 to 40
A certain number of Parties and observers view Article 6 of the Paris Agreement as 
central in achieving the ambition stated in the Agreement’s objectives and still 
necessary to the contributions of the majority of the different Parties. The article 
sets out three new mechanisms. It offers the countries the possibility of voluntary 
cooperation in implementing mitigation activities (cooperative approaches)100, 
97. Decision 1/CP.16, para. 70
98. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 5, para. 2
99. IISD, 2015c, p. 14
100. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 6, para. 1-3.
35
Guide to the Negotiations - UNFCCC (COP22, CMP12 and CMA1) - OIF/IFDD, 2016
it establishes a “mechanism to contribute to the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions 
and support sustainable development” (frequently called Sustainable Development 
Mechanism, SDM)101 and lastly recognises non-market-based approaches102.
Market mechanisms are not fundamentally new in the Paris Agreement, but 
the international community has gained experience through market mechanisms 
which it created under the under the auspices of the Kyoto Protocol and which 
allow Parties to generate and/or trade emissions reduction units, commonly called 
“carbon credits”. They are the Joint Implementation (JI) and the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM).
Existing flexibility mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol
The Kyoto Protocol flexibility mechanisms include:
• international emissions trading. Countries concerned by the objectives of  
reduction of GHG emissions have the possibility to sell their emission rights, 
if they have surpassed their objective, or to buy some, if they cannot reach it.  
• Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). This allows developed countries to 
purchase carbon credits from mitigation projects implemented in developing 
countries and use these credits against the emission objectives. The CDM is 
monitored by an Executive Board and the allocation of credits is based on a 
very elaborate system of international rules.
• Joint implementation (JI). The JI functions on the same principal as the CDM, 
but relates to the trading of carbon credits between two developed countries, 
generated by projects carried out in one of these countries (the one with the 
lowest marginal costs in emissions reduction, normally a country in transition 
towards a market economy).
A source of inspiration: the history of the CDM and the JI
In 2005 the CMP adopted the modalities and procedures for implementation of the 
CDM and the guidelines for the implementation of the JI during the 1st Conference 
of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP). 
These rules had already been applied previously as they emerged from the 2001 
Marrakesh Accords and had been interpreted by the CDM Executive Board, 
which had registered the first CDM projects in 2003. When they were adopted, 
the Parties also planned that the SBI would recommend amendments to the 
modalities and procedures for a CDM as well as for the JI guidelines for the second 
commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. Thus, certain recommendations were 
adopted by the CMP 10 in Lima while other questions still outstanding were 
examined in Paris to allow the closing of the reform process.
101. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 6, para. 4-7.
102. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 6, para. 8
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The modalities and procedures of the CDM have been undergoing revision 
since 2012 following the adoption of new guidelines in 2010. This process has 
been led by the CDM Executive Board which recommended modifications to the 
modalities and procedures to the CMP on a regular basis. These last years, recom-
mendations relative to projects have put the emphasis on aspects linked to social 
and environmental integrity, to the governance of the CDM and to facilitating 
access to the mechanisms by the countries or regions under-represented or having 
benefited little from these mechanisms.
The negotiation channels in the framework for the various  
approaches, the new market and non-market-based approaches: 
from Bali to Paris
In addition to the existing mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol, the Parties 
expressed their opinions on the introduction of new instruments during the Bali 
Conference (2007): 
• a centrally-governed mechanisms according to the UNFCCC modalities and 
procedures
• a decentralised organised framework allowing bilateral initiatives 
On this basis, the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for 
Enhanced Action (ADP) defined both the New Market Mechanism (NMM) for a 
set of uniform bottom-up rules at UNFCCC level and the Framework for Various 
Approaches (FVA) as defined by the individual parties, as well as the non-market-
based approaches.
The following distinction is made between two instruments – the NMM and 
the FVA:
• the NMM aims to create a unique market system guided by modalities and 
procedures prepared and agreed multilaterally.  The NMM should meet both the 
need to intensify the mitigation measures and enhance host country ownership 
and involvement and to increase the mitigation ambition level. The NMM 
should be a mechanism under the central control of the UNFCCC guided by 
fundamental principles together with detailed rules and institutional procedures 
defined clearly multilaterally. Fundamentally, the negotiations over the NMM 
focused on the objective of achieving genuine, net mitigation globally by 
approaches at project, programme and full sector scale.
• the FVA implies the existence of many mitigation approaches or initiatives 
existing together and which follow common principles established by guide-
lines or internationally-defined standards.  
The negotiations on the NMM were the starting point for the SDM and 
those on the FVA served as basis for the cooperative approaches of Article 6 of the 
Paris Agreement.
37
Guide to the Negotiations - UNFCCC (COP22, CMP12 and CMA1) - OIF/IFDD, 2016
History of the mechanism governed by the UNFCCC:  
from NMM to Article 6 paragraph 4
A work programme was launched in Bali for the non-market-based instruments. 
The idea for such a mechanism was created in reaction to the scepticism of certain 
Parties regarding market mechanisms. To day, the discussions on the non-market-
based approaches remain non-specific, but the principle has been retained in the 
Paris Agreement.
Although for many parties these new tools should play a major role towards a 
new global climate agreement, the discussions had stalled before the Paris Conference. 
There was an implicit expectation that the NMM should cover “broad sections of 
the economy”, but to date no definition has yet been agreed on the exact meaning 
of the term. Negotiations hardly progressed at all on the NMM between COP 17 
and COP 21 due to political deadlock by certain countries, which maintained that 
the development of new market mechanisms could only continue if the Annex I 
countries increased their ambition level and provided the promised climate financing. 
Enthusiasm for the NMM was also limited by the fall in the price of CDM credits 
and quotas in the European trading system. This led to the countries calling for 
the demand for CDM credits to recover before a new mechanism could add new 
credits. In 2012, the COP 18 in Doha gave the SBSTA the task of designing 
modalities and procedures for an NMM. The options proposed for the NMM 
design included variations in credit and trade approaches. However, neither COP 
19 nor COP 20 put forward detailed modalities and procedures for the NMM. 
The developments from this period are described below.
A technical document summarising a workshop held in October 2013 prepared 
by the UNFCCC Secretariat offers a good oversight of points of convergence as 
well as of questions requiring further discussion103. In general, the NMM was going 
to address the following approaches:
• Nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMA) credited
• Sectoral approaches
• Approaches based on political mitigation instruments 
• Net mitigation approaches
• The activities of the REDD+ system
• The approaches founded on projects and programmes, including small-scale 
activities
The submissions by the Parties built up a certain mutual understanding on 
the future role of market mechanisms. Most Parties seemed to agree on a design of 
a mechanism that deals with mitigation activities not limited to individual projects 
and which were going to enhance the mitigation ambition level. The European 
Union (EU) stipulated a mechanisms for credits at entire sector level, i.e. a sectoral 
103. UNFCCC, 2013c
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trading mechanism whereby sanctions would be applied to the host country in a 
failure to comply; trading permits would be allocated ex ante, the responsibility 
for achieving the objectives would be sent to the issuers via a domestic emissions 
trading scheme or strict mitigation policies; gaps could be plugged by acquiring 
quotas abroad and a potential surplus could be sold. On the other hand, a sectoral 
credit approach would imply a voluntary “no-loss” target with no sanction for 
failure to comply. Credits would be allocated ex-post and only when mitigation 
objectives were exceeded.
Other parties also put forward other concepts and approaches. Colombia sug-
gested adopting a discounting approach with a sectoral and sub-sectoral scope104. 
Brazil suggested a sectoral mechanism based on voluntary cancellation of credits 
– a simple approach which could undoubtedly be implemented without major 
transaction costs. Brazil’s proposal was not approved during the COP 19105. Brazil 
however advocated a mechanism founded on the enhanced clean development 
mechanism (CDM+) in a submission prior to the COP 20106, despite acknowledging 
that its proposal would require further in-depth preparation. Ecuador proposed a 
Net Avoidance Emission Mechanism, which would basically allow credits to be 
reclaimed to avoid having to exploit fossil fuel resources. The flagship initiative of 
this type, the Yasuni National Park Initiative, was however abandoned at the end 
of 2013 by Presidential Decree due to a lack of international financial support.
Halfway through 2015, the question of existing and new market mechanisms 
in a new climate agreement became a topic of dissent within the negotiations. 
It was far from clear whether the Paris Agreement was going to recognise market 
mechanisms, even at the most basic level. Several Parties seemed to think that a 
clearer understanding of the form and content of the Paris Agreement and its 
mitigation ambition was needed before being able to decide on the details for such 
mechanisms. Others argued that one of the principal objectives of market mechanisms 
would be to simulate mitigation efforts further and help the Parties to comply 
with their emission reduction goals. 
Despite the deadlock in technical discussions on the NMM, the Parties 
regained confidence in terms of the major role that the markets could still play in 
the Paris Agreement when the INDC published before the COP 21, mainly by 
industrialised countries, showed a desire to commit to significant emission reductions. 
These major commitments required flexibility in how to achieve these contributions, 
however – which market mechanisms could offer (see the draft negotiation texts107). 
The draft texts which emerged during 2015 referred to both existing and new mech-
anisms. This meant that elements of the reformed CDM would be more relevant 
in the new agreement than predicted by certain observers before 2015.
104. UNFCCC, 2011b
105. Brazil, 2013
106. Government of Brazil, 2014 
107. UNFCCC, 2015e
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History of the mechanism not governed by the UNFCCC: from  
the Framework for Various Approaches (FVA) to the cooperative 
approaches of Article 6, paragraph 2 of the Agreement
At the same time as a mechanism under centralised UNFCCC governance, the 
COP 17 envisaged proposing a Framework for Various Approaches (FVA) as a 
platform for recognising the various market-based mitigation mechanisms which 
numerous countries intended to develop individually, partly outside the UNFCCC 
architecture. The COP 17 requested the SBSTA to run a work programme relating 
to the various approaches to improve the effectiveness of the costs of mitigation 
measures. The SBSTA work programme to prepare the FVA was mandated by the 
next COP (COP 18) and since then the SBSTA has been examining the possible 
technical design elements for such a framework108.
Although the number of activities that can currently be covered by the FVA 
is limited (the best known is the Japanese initiative known as Joint Crediting 
Mechanism (JCM)), the Framework for Various Approaches could also include 
the miscellaneous emission trading schemes under development – often supported 
by the World Bank’s Partnership for Market Readiness – and the regional, national 
and even sub-national trading systems (for example, in China, Australia, California 
and the Canadian provinces). Lastly, the credited NAMA have also been envisaged 
under the Framework for Various Approaches (FVA).
The FVA therefore represented an approach to prevent the fragmentation 
of mechanisms, by establishing – under the UNFCCC – a framework offering 
minimum transparency, environmental integrity and comparability of efforts. The 
scope of the FVA remained at the time even less concrete than the NMM, but 
once negotiations started, there was consensus on the need to insist on environ-
mental integrity, not to cover purely national measures and to use the FVA at least 
as a platform for sharing information between the Parties. The next UNFCCC 
illustration give an idea of all initiatives which were envisaged and which could 
potentially emerge under the auspices of the FVA.
108. UNFCCC, 2014b
40
A
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
n
c
l
u
s
i
o
n
s
 
o
f
 
P
a
r
i
s
Diagram 6.  Initiatives envisaged under the auspices of the FVA109
 
Despite the lack of progress, almost deadlock in negotiations on market 
mechanisms during the negotiations in Lima in 2014, the countries little by little 
became aware that market mechanisms could be used as a tool in producing their 
INDC. A substantial number of Parties also predicted a role for market mechanisms 
under the implementation of their INDC. These new dynamics probably had little 
influence on the decisions of the COP 21 in Paris.
109. © ENERGIES 2050, October 2016 – According to UNFCCC, 2013d
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This was the tricky context in which the COP 21 in Paris adopted Article 6 
of the Paris Agreement – a set of new provisions for the future role which both 
market mechanisms and the non-market-based mechanism would play in imple-
menting the Agreement and under the auspices of the UNFCCC in general. To a 
large extent, the conclusions of Paris on these questions seems to reflect the previous 
discussions on the NMM, FVA and non-market-based approaches. Ultimately, the 
magnitude of this article will remain a surprise, even for the most ardent defenders 
of these mechanisms. How was such a reversal possible?
The negotiations on the market and non-market-based mechanisms 
in Paris
The negotiation text only emerged at the last minute at the Paris Conference, 
during the final night of negotiation of the COP 21, slightly before the text of 
the Agreement was submitted to the President of the COP for final approval and 
for submission to the delegates for acceptance on 12 December 2015. Several 
factors can explain why provisions for market instruments were dealt with at the 
last minute:
• The perception – driven by sound reasons – that the topic was extremely 
important for the environmental integrity associated with the Paris Agreement,
• The existence of many lateral connections with other major questions dealt 
with in the Paris Agreement,
• The desire of certain Parties to hold this aspect of the negotiations hostage to 
force concessions on other issues,
• The ideological opposition of certain Parties to including an market instrument 
provision.
The provisions relating to the markets and the non-market based approach 
instruments, which figure in Article 6 of the text of the Paris Agreement, can be 
considered as a major, unhoped for success. Throughout 2015 and even during the 
COP 21, people held out little hope of seeing even just a small reference to anything 
involving the markets.
Article 6 of the Paris Agreement is the subject of a detailed work programme 
in the decision of the COP 21. As always, the preparation of detailed guidelines 
and of the modalities and procedures will involve debates to interpret and develop 
what was agreed in Paris.
Submissions by Parties which have contributed  
to the formulation of Article 6
A number of submissions contributed to the emergence of the final version of 
Article 6, namely a) Brazil (November 2014), b) AOSIS (December 2015), c) EU 
and Brazil (8 December 2015), d) LMDC (9 December 2015), e) Panama (9 
December 2015) and f) Japan (4 September 2015).
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Common principles of all the instruments under Article 6
Article 6.1 provides a general framework for cooperation activities and an umbrella 
for subsequent provisions. It lists activities relating to mitigation and adaptation. 
Sustainable development and environmental integrity are defined as targets to be 
promoted and pursued. Article 6.11 imposes no restriction on the market-based 
approaches.
In accordance with Article 6.1, the cooperative approaches are intended to 
contribute to increased ambition in implementing national contributions. The 
exact definition of the relationship between the market mechanisms and the NDC 
will play a key role in the debate on environmental integrity and must culminated 
in a new definition or an improvement in additionality rules set up during the 
CDM.
Promoting sustainable development is given as the second general principle of 
activities planned under Article 6, paragraph 2. It is also mentioned in paragraphs 
6.2, 6.4 and 6.8, which gives it broader scope in the Paris Agreement than in the 
Kyoto Protocol. Operationalising this requirement without repeating the difficulties 
encountered in the context of the CDM will be an essential task for the forthcoming 
negotiations.
The major difference between the mechanisms provided for in Article 6, para-
graphs 6.2 and 6.4 will be mainly their different degrees of regulations. Article 6.4 
provides for central governance by the United Nations, whereas Article 6.2 simply 
provides for the UNFCCC to direct the process and request transparency. Both 
mechanisms have the same principles: they must contribute to a greater ambition 
and demonstrate robust accounting and environmental integrity.
Note on the absence of the term  
“market” in the Agreement text
The Paris Agreement literally makes no explicit reference to the term “market” 
in that it does not figure in the text. This is neither exceptional nor new: the 
Kyoto Protocol did not refer to this term either. However, the expression 
“engaging on a voluntary basis in cooperative approaches between the Parties 
to achieve their NDC” offers a place to the international cooperation mechanisms 
for mitigation, both market-based and non-market-based.
Analysis of cooperative approaches (Article 6, paragraph 2)
The concept of cooperative approaches is widely open to interpretation. The Parties 
are free to carry out mitigation activities on a bilateral or group basis and transfer 
the mitigation results at their convenience. Cooperative approaches can play a role 
in executing NDC, but this role has not been defined.
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By virtue of the Paris Agreement, cooperative approaches are not subject to a 
specific UNFCCC monitoring process. Having said that, paragraph 6.2 states 
expressly that the transactions take place within an accounting system yet to be 
developed. Huge importance is also given to the transparency of both activities 
and the transfer of mitigation outcomes. Guidelines on these principles must be 
prepared and adopted by the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of 
the Parties to the Paris Agreement. In terms of the central requirements for a 
robust accounting system, the main objectives of paragraph 6.2 would be to ensure 
transparency of mitigation activities, the avoidance of double counting and that 
the cooperative approaches contribute to a higher ambition level.
Analysis of the mechanism established in Article 6, paragraph 4 – 
the Sustainable Development Mechanism (SDM)
The mechanism established in paragraph 6.4, called by some Sustainable Development 
Mechanism (SDM) is placed under the supervision of the United Nations. A complete 
set of rules, modalities and procedures must be developed. This recalls the requirements 
and rules for implementation developed for the CDM. The intention to allow 
private and public entities to participate in the SDM once more and other main 
elements in the mechanism indicate a possibility of basing the SDM on the experience 
of the CDM. The text of the decision accompanying the Agreement even requests 
that the rules, modalities and procedures to be developed are based on “the experience 
gained with and lessons learned from existing mechanisms and approaches adopted 
under the Convention and its related legal instruments”110. Clearly the previous 
sources of experience are the CDM and the Joint Implementation (JI) mechanism 
of the Kyoto Protocol.
This decision gives the SBSTA the mandate to prepare the mechanism’s 
modalities and procedures for submission and consideration during the first meeting 
of the CMA. The text of the decision evokes important principles which must 
be respected, namely that the reductions must be “real, measurable, and long-term”. 
In addition, the reductions must be additional, the activities must have a precise 
scope yet to be defined and they must be verified and certified by Designated 
Operational Entities (DOE), as is the case under the CDM. 
Nevertheless, the SDM is basically a new market mechanism. This is true 
when considering that both the host party and the purchasing party will have 
defined a contribution and that the SDM should contribute to the global net 
mitigation. Contributions to the net mitigation by the host parties can be achieved 
through an explicit agreement or by a mitigation effect of an activity which does 
not mean the issue of negotiable certificates.
110. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 37f
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Key aspects of the Sustainable Development Mechanism (SDM)
• The aim is to promote the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions whilst fostering 
sustainable development (Art. 6.4a)
• The SDM is supervised by an institution under the UNFCCC (corresponding 
to the CDM Executive Board) and the mechanism generates payment of an 
adaptation tax (Art. 6.6)
• Authorisation of public and private entities by the Party (Art. 6.4b)
• Overall mitigation of global emissions (Art. 6.4d) (~ net mitigation)
• The rules, modalities and procedures will be developed by the CRA based on
 – Real, measurable and long-term reductions
 – Definition of the field of activities
 – Additionality
 – Verification and certification by EOD
 – Application of the experience of the Kyoto mechanisms
 – Réductions réelles, mesurables et à long terme
Overall mitigation of global emissions (Art. 6, paragraph 4d)
Paragraph 4d of Article 6 requests the SMD to deliver an overall mitigation in 
global emissions. This seems to suggest that the mechanism should not allocate 
emission credits for all the completed reduction. Such an arrangement was 
explored under the JI, but no consensus was reached on this point.
The overall mitigation of emissions could raise the ambition level beyond the 
sum of NDC of parties participating in the mechanism. Nevertheless, this question 
also relates to the appropriate accounting. The real outcome for the atmosphere will 
only be positive if the accounting system is robust and if the NDC do not produce 
“hot air” (for example, due to underestimated basic items) or if non-additional 
activities have been credited. The introduction of provisions requiring a cancellation 
could be a way of reaching such a contribution to the overall mitigation.
INDC/NDC and market mechanisms
Most Parties have welcomed using market instruments in their NDC and therefore 
are considering using the instruments of Article 6 of the Agreement. Among 
these Parties, 67 were already determined to use the market mechanisms when 
submitting their INDC or NDC to UNFCCC.
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Table 2. Number of INDC or NDC which indicate use  
or non-use of market instruments (as per the IETA  
“INDC tracker”, 9 August 2016)
Number  
of Parties Reference to the market instruments in INDC and NDC
67 Yes
7 Use in long term not at INDC level
17 Use to be considered
53 No reference to market instruments
17+EU Indicate that they are not going to use the market instruments in the implementation  of their INDC or NDC
A vision for the SDM: Re-establish demand and mobilise  
new investments
Faced with the hesitation in using market mechanisms and at the same time huge 
support for their inclusion in the Paris Agreement, a clear vision of the actual role 
of the SDM must be developed. The value of credits in the long term must be certain 
so that the SMD can enhance the mitigation efforts and delivery a high ambition. 
To ensure the good quality of credits and contributions to sustainable development, 
these prices should include premiums for activities which are recognised for their 
contributions to sustainable development.
The public credit acquisition programmes should be expanded and support early 
action by the SDM (for example, the programmes of Norway, Sweden, Switzerland 
and the World Bank called Ci-DEV and PAF).
The SMD represents a market-based instrument, but it can also serve as a tool 
to obtain financing of results-based mitigation measures. For these measures, the 
mitigation units should be cancelled voluntarily by the purchasers of units looking 
for climate financing. This approach is currently only supported by a few interna-
tional institutions, but it is important for the key institutions to break down the 
ideological walls and create the link between the carbon market and climate 
financing. This means that high-quality mitigation activities would be available for 
climate financing and compatible measuring, reporting and verification systems 
(MRV) could be developed whilst transaction costs would drop.
Analysis of non-market-based approaches (Article 6, paragraph 8)
Unlike the cooperative approaches or the SDM, the non-market-based approaches 
do not allow the transfer of mitigation results. The potential implications of this 
and the way in which such approaches could affect international cooperation remain 
a topic for future analyses and consultations. The expectations from measuring, 
reporting and verification approaches (MRV) and any accounting system require 
clarification. 
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Numerous terms introduced into the two paragraphs have no definition 
and no history in international negotiations. This is especially true for the 
term non-market-based approaches which the according to the text should be 
“integrated, holistic and balanced”.
I.2.7 Article 7: Adaptation
The question of adaptation to the inevitable consequences of climate change was 
one of the major issues in Paris. At the request of the developing countries, the 
questions of adaptation were increasingly considered of equal importance and in 
the same way as the questions of mitigation. To this effect, a certain number of 
provisions have been included in the Agreement, which for all that, remain mainly 
qualitative. Considering adaptation among the three primordial objectives of the 
Agreement signifies decisive recognition of the urgency of adaptation. With this in 
mind, the Paris Agreement establishes for the first time a global goal on adaptation 
of enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience to climate change and 
reducing vulnerability to this change. Article 7.4 of the Agreement recognises the 
link between the mitigation ambition level and the adaptation needs but includes 
no quantitative element, mainly in terms of financing.
In terms of main guidelines, the Agreement establishes that action towards 
adaptation should follow an approach which is driven by the countries, sensitive 
to gender equality, participative and totally transparent and which takes into 
consideration vulnerable groups, communities and ecosystems. It should also take 
account of and be inspired by the best scientific data available and, if appropriate, 
traditional knowledge, the know-how of indigenous peoples and local knowledge 
systems, with a view to incorporating adaptation into relevant socio-economic and 
environmental policies and measures, if necessary. In terms of planning, each Party 
should, as appropriate, submit and update periodically an adaptation communication 
which could set out its priorities, its implementation and support needs and its 
projects and measures without imposing an additional burden on the developing 
countries. The communication on adaptation can be incorporated in a national 
adaptation plan, an NDC and/or a national communication. 
Progress of adaptation efforts towards the goal of Article 7 will by analysed 
during the global stocktake every five years. However, the overall assessment of 
individual efforts and needs in relation to such a qualitative long-term objective 
and the lack of precise indicators could prove to be difficult to achieve. Technical 
and methodological work will be necessary during sessions of future talks on this 
question.
I.2.8 Article 8: Loss and damage
Questions of loss and damage have been debated intensely between the various 
groups of Parties in UNFCCC talks. Firstly, there are Parties which maintain that 
certain countries will only be able to adapt partially to the effects of climate change, 
not simply due to lack of means but because some impacts are still unpredictable. 
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The consequences of these unpredictable impacts can be catastrophic with major 
costs. These parties thus support taking into account loss and damage when adap-
tation seems impossible. Secondly, there are Parties which do not wish to separate 
loss and damage from adaptation. 
Numerous developing countries headed by those in Africa, AOSIS and LDC, 
believe that it would be opportune to implement financial and technical processes 
to compensate the economic costs incurred for loss and damage linked to certain 
intense climatic phenomena or that are gradual111 and where adaptation will be 
impossible. Thus, during the 18th session of the Conference of the Parties held in 
Doha in 2012, the negotiators were given the mandate to discuss an institutional 
arrangement by virtue of the UNFCCC to deal with questions of loss and damage 
induced by climate change112.
In Warsaw in 2013, the COP 19 set up the Warsaw International Mechanism 
for Loss and Damage with the goal of dealing with loss and damage associated 
with extreme catastrophes and slow onset events113. The role of the mechanism set 
up under the Convention is to promote the implementation of approaches to deal 
with loss and damage associated with climate change through the following functions: 
development of knowledge and understanding of approaches associated with risk 
management, strengthening the dialogue, coordination and coherence between 
the different stakeholders, development actions and support, including financing, 
technology and capacity building. 
No clear consensus of the Parties emerged before Paris on the question of loss 
and damage114; the Parties recognise the importance of including the issue in the 
talks in Paris but disagreement exists in knowing if the loss and damage will be 
integrated in an agreement that will have force of law or rather form part of a decision 
adopted by the COP115. For example, the groups of countries, following the example 
of AOSIS and LDC, state they are in favour of an option considering loss and 
damage separately from adaptation and even call for the addition of a specific 
chapter to the agreement of 2015116. The EU opposes this idea and has suggested 
rather adding an option to the negotiated draft that lays down that the notion of 
loss and damage should simply not appear in it117.
111. IISD, 2015c, p. 7
112. Decision 3/CP.18, para. 9
113. Decision 2/CP.19
114. IISD, 2015a, p. 7
115. France and Peru, 2015. Aide-mémoire: Second informal ministerial consultations to prepare 
COP21, p. 6-9. Paris, 2-7 September 2015. [online] http://www.cop21.gouv.fr/fr/
file/1276/download?token=mM6nlwjN
116. IISD, 2015c, p. 7
117. IISD, 2015b, p. 6
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Certain countries also wished that an indemnification scheme be instigated 
by the Executive Committee on Loss and Damage118, which met for the first time 
on 24-26 September 2015119. The LDC also suggested placing particular emphasis 
on indemnifying countries affected by slow onset climatic phenomena120. Australia, 
United States, Switzerland and the EU suggested rather limiting considerations 
concerning loss and damage to decisions taken by the COP, including one which 
would adopt the permanence of the Warsaw Mechanism as an integral part of the 
new agreement after 2020121.
Consideration of loss and damage in the Paris Agreement
Considering loss and damage in the Paris Agreement in a separate article from the 
one on adaptation is a major step taking account of residual, potentially irreversible 
impacts of climate change in the vulnerable developing countries.
The Agreement places the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and 
Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts under the authority of the CMA. 
It will monitor its guidelines and may subsequently be enhanced in accordance 
with its decisions.
The Parties should improve the understanding, action and support, especially 
through the Warsaw International Mechanism in the framework of cooperation 
and facilitation, with respect to loss and damage associated with the harmful effects 
of climate change. The work of the Executive Committee during the next sessions 
could fuel this thinking and culminated in concrete progress. 
However, the decision aimed at giving effect to the Agreement states that this 
article specific to loss and damage cannot give rise to nor serve as a basis for any 
liability or indemnification122, thereby appeasing temporarily the concerns of certain 
Parties over the possibility of future compensation and facilitating progress in the 
discussion on this topic.
I.2.9 Article 9: Financing
The provision of financial support and other implementation means is the third 
objective of Article 2 of the Paris Agreement, to make finance flows consistent with 
a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development. 
This provision, according to Bodle, Donat, & Duwe (2016)123, sends a strong 
signal to the private sector to review and refocus its investments. 
118. IISD, 2015c, p. 19
119. http://unfccc.int/adaptation/workstreams/loss_and_damage/items/9073.php#Meeting1
120. IISD, 2015c, p. 7
121. IISD, 2015a, p. 7
122. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 52
123. Bodle, Donat, & Duwe, 2016
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One of the major issues in financing questions was whether or not to enlarge 
the contributors’ club. The developed countries, which have traditionally be required 
to provide financial assistance to the developing countries, have required the 
agreement to state the contribution of a certain number of developing countries 
with economic indicators comparable to those of other so-called developed countries. 
The targeted developing countries are opposed to any obligation in the matter and 
insist on the voluntary nature of any financial contribution made by them. Ultimately, 
the Paris Agreement has not jeopardised the provisions of the Convention which 
restate the primary responsibility of developed countries in providing developing 
countries with financial resources, for both mitigation and adaptation purposes, in 
continuation and with an increase of their obligations under the Convention and 
to existing commitments (mainly the promise of 100 billion made in Copenhagen). 
The “other Parties” are at best invited to provide or continue to provide voluntary 
financial support. 
The Agreement also calls for a balance between adaptation and mitigation in 
the provisions of financial resources, taking into account country-driven strategies 
and the priorities and needs of developing countries, especially those that are 
particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change and have significant 
capacity constraints, such as the LDC and the SIDS.
The Paris Agreement offers the Parties the option of using a broad spectrum 
of sources, instruments and channels, through sundry actions, whilst bearing in 
mind the crucial role of public sources. Under pressure from the most vulnerable 
countries, Article 9.4 also recognises the importance of public and grant-based 
sources for adaptation. The Agreement places greater emphasis on the public sources 
by requesting the developed countries to communicate transparent, coherent 
information every two years on the support provided to the developing countries 
and raised by public interventions. This information will be communicated in 
accordance with the modalities, procedures and guidelines that the CMA will 
adopt at its first session.
Just like for the mitigation and adaptation actions, the global stocktake will 
also take into account the assessment of implementation means. In this respect, 
the developed countries are called on to continue to communicate every two years 
indicative quantitative and qualitative information, mainly on the projected amounts 
of public financial resources for the developing countries. The other Parties which 
provide resources on a voluntary basis are invited to communicate this information 
every two years, also on a voluntary basis. 
Although the Paris Agreement requires individual communications of quanti-
fiable information, it makes no mention of information quantified on the overall 
financing needs. Only the decision accompanying the Agreement, in paragraph 54, 
stipulates that the developed countries intend to continue their current collective 
mobilisation objective until 2025 with a view to concrete mitigation measures and 
transparent implementation. A new quantified collective objective based on a lowest 
level of 1000 billion dollars a year, is provided for before 2025. The modalities and 
parameters to determine such an objective are yet to be determined.
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The Convention’s Financial Mechanism, including its operating entities, is 
called on the fulfil the functions of the Financial Mechanism of the Paris Agreement. 
As such, paragraph 59 of the decision giving effect to the Paris Agreement considers 
that the Green Climate Fund and the Global Environment Facility, the entities 
responsible for operating the Financial Mechanism, along with the Least Developed 
Countries Fund (LDCF) and the Special Fund for Climate Change (SFCC), can 
combine to implement the Paris Agreement. In terms of the potential role by the 
Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund in implementing the agreement, the talks in Paris 
did not reach a final conclusion. Thus, the Paris Agreement leaves the door open 
for developing future arrangements submitted to the CMP and the CMA for 
consideration. Decision 1/CRP-11 also recommends that the CMA considers at 
its first session how the Adaptation Fund can contribute to the application of the 
Paris Agreement, in accordance with paragraphs 60 and 61 of Decision 1/CP.21.
I.2.10 Article 10: Development and transfer of technology
Since the adoption of the UNFCCC in 1992, the development and transfer of tech-
nology has been deemed a core component in its implementation and in achieving 
its objectives.
In 2001, in Marrakesh, the work of the Conference of the Parties culminated 
in an agreement on a “technology transfer framework” which covered technology 
needs assessments, technology information enabling environments, capacity building 
and mechanisms for technology transfer124. The Marrakesh Accords also provided 
for setting up an Expert Group on Technology Transfer (EGTT) responsible for 
defining the means to move technology transfer activities forward by virtue of the 
Convention. 
At the COP 14 in 2008, the Parties launched the Poznañ Strategic Programme 
on technology transfer (PSP) as a step towards increasing the volume of investments 
in technology transfer, to assist the developing countries in meeting their needs 
for environmentally-sound technologies125. The 50 million dollar financing of the 
programme had three goals: help the developing countries in running evaluations 
of technical needs, carry out priority technological pilot projects and broadcast the 
UNFCCC experiences in successful technology transfers126.
The successful examination of the PSP encourage the negotiators to establish 
a Technology Mechanism in 2010 during the COP 16 in Cancun. The Technology 
Mechanism, which became fully operational in 2012, aims to facilitate the imple-
mentation of technological mitigation and adaptation activities. It is broken 
down into two branches: a Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and a Climate 
Technology Centre and Network (CTCN). It has become the kingpin of the 
UNFCCC technology.
124. UNFCCC, 2001
125. UNFCCC, 2010
126. GEF, 2010
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In addition, the modalities and procedures of the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) of the UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol which emerged from the Marrakesh Accords 
also permits a certain number of possibilities of transfer of technologies required to 
reduce GHG emissions by offering a legal framework and a market for the Parties127. 
Three fundamental questions, which have been negotiated for decades, were 
addressed during the COP 21 in Paris. Two of them were the subject of decisions 
in the Paris Agreement and the accompanying decision, mainly enhancing the 
development of climate technologies and transferring them via the Technology 
Mechanism, together with the links between the Technology Mechanism and the 
Financial Mechanism of the Convention; the question of intellectual property of 
climate technologies is still pending.
The negotiations relating to the definition of global and national objectives 
and the identification of relevant indicators for the transfer of technology did not 
reach concrete decisions under the Paris Agreement.
Article 10 of the Paris Agreement notes the importance of technology in 
implementing mitigation and adaptation measures and recognises efforts to deploy 
and disseminate technology, strengthening cooperative action on technology 
developing and transfer and the role of the Technology Mechanism created by 
virtue of the Convention in the Agreement.
It was decided in Paris to strengthen the Technology Mechanism and the 
Technology Executive Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and Network 
were entrusted with supporting the application of the Agreement and undertaking 
new work including, inter alia128:
a) Technology research, development and transfer;
b) Developing and building up of endogenous capacities and technologies. 
A technology framework responsible for giving general guidelines to the work 
of the Technology Mechanism to promote and facilitate enhanced action in technol-
ogy development and transfer, in support of the implementation of the Agreement 
and for the purposes of the long-term vision, was created129. 
Decision 1/CP.21130 entrusted the SBSTA with preparing, at its 44th session 
(May 2016), the technology framework instituted in application of Article 10, 
paragraph 4 of the Agreement and to make its conclusions known to the Conference 
of the Parties so that it can submit a recommendation on this framework to the 
CMA for examination and adoption at its first session, given that the framework 
should facilitate, inter alia:
127. UNFCCC, 2011c
128. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 66
129. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 10.4
130. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 67
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a) The execution and updating of technological needs evaluations and enhanced 
implementation of their outcome, especially action plans and technology 
project ideas, by preparing projects acceptable to the banks;
b) The provision of enhanced financial and technical support in implementing 
the outcome of technological needs evaluations;
c) The evaluation of technologies ready for transfer;
d) The introduction of more favourable conditions and the elimination of obstacles 
to developing and transferring socially- and environmentally-sound technologies.
Given the major role to be played by this new framework in the Paris Agreement, 
it is essential in the implementation of Decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 67 to rely on 
the acquired results and progress made by the previous technology framework 
from the Marrakesh Accords and the work and evaluations by the EGTT and to 
avoid any duplication of missions and efforts between the Technology Mechanism 
and this Technology Framework. 
• In addition, paragraphs 9 and 10 of Article 13 on the Transparency of action 
and support state clearly that:
• The developed Parties must, and other Parties which provide voluntary support 
should, communicate information on the support provided in the form of 
financial resources, technology transfer and capacity building to the developing 
country Parties under Articles 9, 10 and 11.
The developing country Parties should communicate information on the support 
they need and which they have received, in the form of financial resources, technology 
transfer and capacity building under Articles 9, 10 and 11.
It must therefore be emphasised that even if the Parties did not reach agreement 
on a global objective for technology development and transfer or in defining national 
and global monitoring indicators, the work to be carried out under Decision 1/CP.21131 
on preparing guidelines for the Transparency network and for the Global Stocktake132 
will be an opportunity to use the progress made by the Technology Mechanism and 
the Technology Framework to succeed with the necessary evaluations and provide 
relevant recommendations to move the technology development and transfer 
agenda forward.
I.2.11 Article 11: Capacity-building
Capacity-building should be driven by the countries, take into account and satisfy 
national needs and encourage the ownership by the Parties, especially for the 
developing countries, mainly at national, infra-national and local levels. It should 
be inspired lessons learned from experience, mainly capacity-building activities 
performed under the Convention, and represent an effective, iterative, participative, 
131. Decision 1/CP.21, paras. 94-94.
132. Decision 1/CP.21, paras. 99-101.
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transversal and gender-equality sensitive process. The Parties are called on to cooperate 
in order to increase the capacity of developing country Parties in implementing 
the Agreement. The developed countries should enhance their support for capacity- 
building measures in the developing countries.
The Paris Agreement invites all the Parties which assist developing countries 
with their capacity-building to communicate regularly on these capacity-building 
measures or initiatives. The developing countries should regularly provide information 
on progress made in the application of capacity-building plans, policies, initiatives 
or measures to implement this Agreement.
The Paris Agreement provides for appropriate institutional provisions for the 
capacity-building activities which, based on the pre-existing provisions under the 
Convention, help to bring about the application of the Agreement. At its first 
session, the CMA will examine and adopt a decision on the initial institutional 
provisions relating to capacity-building.
I.2.12 Article 12: Public education, training, awareness 
and participation
The Paris Agreement emphasises the cooperation of the Parties by taking measures, 
as appropriate, to improve public education, training, awareness and participation 
and access by the population to information on climate change, given the importance 
of such measures in enhancing the action engaged under this Agreement.
I.2.13 Article 13: Transparency of measures and support
The Paris Agreement establishes an enhanced transparency framework for action 
and support. It includes the preparation and communication of regular reports on 
national GHG inventories, the implementation of NDC, the financial support 
provided and received and the adaptation efforts implemented by the countries.
The transparency framework is based on the provisions for transparency 
already provided for under the Convention and enhances them, given the particular 
situation of LDC and SIDS. The transparency framework must be applied in a spirit 
of facilitation, which can be neither intrusive nor punitive, and which must respect 
national sovereignty whilst avoiding imposing an excessive burden on the Parties.
In terms of obligation, the decision intended to give effect to the Agreement 
provides for all the Parties, excluding the LDC and SIDS, to submit information on 
the transparency of action and support as appropriate, but at least every two years133.
The developed Parties must, and other Parties which provide voluntary support 
should, communicate information on the support provided in the form of financing, 
technology transfer and capacity building to the developing countries.
133. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 91
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To examine the information communicated by each Party, the Paris Agreement 
establishes a technical review of the support provided by the Party in question, as 
appropriate, and on the implementation and execution of its NDC. This review 
will highlight areas for potential improvement for the Party in question and checks 
that the information communicated complies with the modalities, procedures and 
guidelines which will be prepared by the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris 
Agreement (APA)134. The APA is also in charge of setting the year for the first 
review of information provided by the Parties and consecutive reviews and updates, 
as appropriate, at regular intervals. 
In terms of accounting measures, only the case of NDC has been addressed 
in paragraph 31 of Decision 1/CP.21 and the APA has been entrusted with preparing 
additional specific directives, for example for the mechanisms created or for the land 
use and land-use change.
I.2.14 Article 14: Global Stocktake
The Paris Agreement provides for the evaluation of collective progress made in 
executing the purpose of the Agreement through periodic global stocktakes. The 
first global stocktake is anticipated in 2023 and should be repeated every five years 
after that except if the COP adopts a different decision. Prior to the first global 
stocktake, a facilitation dialogue between the Parties is planned for 2018, to take 
stock of collective efforts by the Parties to achieve the long-term objective set out 
in Article 4, paragraph 1 of the Agreement and clarify the establishment of NDC.
The transparency framework and the global stocktake have been described by 
some as “the ambition mechanisms” of the Agreement. The dual obligation of 
declaring and assessing mitigation, adaptation and support measures every five 
years constitutes a collective evaluation of executions and necessary efforts135.
I.2.15 Article 15: Facilitation on the implementation 
and compliance
Apart from the global stocktake, the facilitation mechanism instituted by the Paris 
Agreement to facilitate its implementation and promote compliance with its 
provisions is a significant arrangement. This mechanism will comprise a Committee 
that is expert-based and facilitative in nature and will function in a transparent, 
non-adversarial and non-punitive manner. It will pay particular attention to the 
respective national circumstances and capacities of Parties.
The Committee will operate under the modalities and procedures to be decided 
by the CMA during its first session. The Committee will report annually to the 
CMA.
134. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 92
135. IISD, 2015e, p. 50
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I.2.16 Articles 15 to 22: Institutional provisions and 
final clauses
A mechanism has been instituted under the Paris Agreement to facilitate the 
implementation and promote compliance with the provisions of the Agreement. 
This mechanism comprises a Committee that is expert-based and focused on facil-
itation and functions in a transparent, non-adversarial and non-punitive manner. 
The Committee pays particular attention to the respective national circumstances 
and capacities of Parties. The Committee operates under the modalities and proce-
dures laid down by the Conference of the Parties serving as a meeting of the Parties 
to the Agreement at its first session and will report to it every year.
Just like under the Kyoto Protocol, the Secretariat is going to convene the first 
CMA session on the occasion of the first session of the Conference of the Parties 
planned after the entry into force of the Agreement.
Subsequence ordinary sessions of the SMA will coincide with the ordinary 
sessions of the Conference of the Parties. The CMA can, nevertheless, hold extraor-
dinary sessions at any other time when it deems this necessary or if a Party so 
requests in writing, provided that this request is supported by at least one third of 
Parties within six months of it being communicated to the Parties by the Secretariat.
The SBSTA and the SBI created by Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention act, 
respectively, as the SBSTA and SBI of the Paris Agreement.
The Paris Agreement was opened for signatures at the Headquarters of the 
United nations in New York on 22 April 2016 and will remain open until 21 April 
2017136. It will enter into force on the thirtieth day following the date on which at 
least 55 Parties to the Convention, representing a total of at least an estimated 55% 
of all global GHG emissions, deposit their instruments of ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession137.
As at 5 October 2016, 191 Parties out of 197 have signed the Paris Agreement, 
including 72 Parties, which together account for 56.75% of the total of global GHG 
emissions138, which have deposited their instrument of ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession with the Depositary. Thus, both thresholds in Article 21 of 
the Paris Agreement have been passed, opening the way for the Paris Agreement to 
enter into force on 4 November 2016.
136. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 20, para. 1
137. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 21, para. 1
138. http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9485.php
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Diagram 7.  Process for the entry into force of the Paris Agreement139
139. © ENERGIES 2050, October 2016
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II.1 Issues related to the SBI
II.1.1 Exchange of views focused on facilitation under 
the international consultation and analysis process
During the SB 44 session in May 2016, the Parties to the Convention were able 
to participate in the very first exchange of views focused on facilitation under the 
international consultation and analysis process140. This process, established during 
the COP 17 in Durban in 2011, aims mainly to enhance the transparency of 
mitigation measures implemented by the countries not included in Annex I141 to 
the Convention. Starting from a participative, Party-driven approach, the efforts 
highlighted by the developing countries are firstly communicated via a biennial 
updated report (BUR) and then analysed by a team of technical experts (TTE) 
under modalities which are neither intrusive nor punitive and which respect 
national sovereignty142.
The first exchange of views focused on the BUR of thirteen developing countries, 
namely South Africa, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Azerbaijan, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Brazil, Chile, Ghana, Namibia, Peru, Republic of Korea, 
Singapore, Tunisia and Vietnam143. Most countries taking part in the exchange of 
views underlined, during individual presentations, the need for international 
financial support in their own national processes, mainly in respect of improving 
their national measuring, reporting and verification (MRV) system144.
Following the technical analysis process by the TTE in conjunction with each 
of the Parties in question, each Party received written questions from all their 
counterparts from the Convention based on a succinct report submitted by the 
140. SBI, 2016
141. Decision 2/CP.17, Annex III
142. Decision 1/CP.16, para. 63
143. SBI, 2016
144. UNFCCC, 2016a
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TTE and each party to the SBI145. These questions, received by the thirteen developing 
countries, were reviewed during a meeting in May 2016 and related to numerous 
issues, including146:
• (i) institutional arrangements in place to prepare the BUR;
• (ii) the design of national MRV systems;
• (iii) the national GHG emission inventory improvement plans; and, in association
• (iv) their needs for capacity-building to implement the 2006 IPCC guidelines; 
and
• (v) the ex-post evaluation of the implementation of their mitigation measures.
The exchange of views on Friday 20 and Saturday 21 May 2016147 was an 
opportunity for the thirteen developing countries to answer the questions put to them 
transparently and, for some questions received prior to the exchange of views, in 
writing. This question and answer process gave the Parties a better understanding 
of the noted difficulties and shortcomings confronting these thirteen developing 
countries and was also a chance for them to learn more about the experience lived 
and acquired, the lessons learned from compiling the BUR and the optimum 
practices used148.
It seems therefore that the process has demonstrated its relevance for two 
issues in particular. Firstly, holding a first exchange of views gave the developed 
countries a better understanding and knowledge of the needs of their developing 
counterparts on the implementation of measures to limit their GHG emissions 
and their financing needs to achieve this. The process was then an opportunity, for 
developing countries yet to submit their BUR or where the TTE technical analysis 
with Party feedback was in progress, to find out more about the potential challenges 
and to benefit from the experience acquired by their counterparts. As at 3 October 
2016, the succinct reports from Andorra, Argentina, Lebanon and Mexico were 
also available, but no exchange of views had yet taken place between the Parties149
145. See the Summary and technical reports [online]
http://unfccc.int/national_reports/non-annex_i_natcom/reporting_on_climate_change/ 
items/8722.php
146. See Record of facilitative sharing of views [online]
http://unfccc.int/national_reports/non-annex_i_natcom/reporting_on_climate_change/ 
items/8722.php
147. To see the record of the exchange of views, see [online]
http://unfccc6.meta-fusion.com/bonn_may_2016/events/2016-05-20-10-00-facilitative- 
sharing-of-views-day-1
148. UNFCCC, 2016a
149. See Record of facilitative sharing of views [online]
http://unfccc.int/national_reports/non-annex_i_natcom/reporting_on_climate_
change/items/8722.php
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Updated biennial reports
The Cancún Decision (2010) requires the Parties not included in Annex I to 
submit their national communications every four years, and their GHG inventories 
every two years, through their updated biennial reports (BUR)1. The national 
communications are not however examined specifically, as is the case for the 
Parties included in Annex I. During the COP 17 in Durban in 2011, the Parties 
agreed that the first BUR from developing countries should undergo such an 
examination from December 2014 onwards. The LDC and SIDS should decide 
collectively whether they wished to submit their report produced at their own 
discretion to examination of this type2. As at 22 September 2016, 34 Parties not 
included in Annex I had submitted their updated biennial reports3.
The BUR consists of (i) an update of national greenhouse gas inventories, mainly 
a national inventory report; (ii) information on action taken; (ii) noted needs; 
(iv) needs and aid received in terms of financial, technological and capacity-building 
resources4. 
The BUR are submitted as separate updated reports or as a summary by certain 
parties of national communications during the year where the national com-
munication is submitted by the Party. Once the BUR have been submitted by 
the Parties, a Technical Team of Experts (TTE) starts a technical examination. The 
TTE must submit to the Party in question a summary report within three 
months of it starting its work5.
The Party then has another three months to review the report and formulate 
its comments on its contents. A final period of three months can be used by the 
TTE and the Party in question to draft, together, a final version of the summary 
report. This is then submitted to the SBI for publication on the website of the 
Convention6. The other Parties may use this summary report as a basis for 
formulating their questions prior to a workshop specific to the exchange of 
views intended to facilitate the international consultation and analysis process 
arranged by the SBI at regular intervals7.
1. Decision 1/CP.16, para. 60
2. Decision 2/CP.17, para. 41
3. See the BUR [online] http://unfccc.int/national_reports/non-annex_i_natcom/reporting_on_
climate_change/items/8722.php 
4. Decision 2/CP.17, Annex IV
5. Decision 20/CP.19
6. See the Summary and technical reports [online] http://unfccc.int/national_reports/non-annex_i_
natcom/reporting_on_climate_change/items/8722.php
7. Decision 2/CP.17, Annex IV
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Diagram 8.  Summary of the international consultation and analysis 
process150
Summary of the international consultation and analysis process
2014
First updated 
biennial reports  
(10)
May 2016
32 updated biennial 
reports deposited
May 2016
First exchange of views 
focused on facilitation 
under the ICA process 
(13 Parties)
September 2016
20 technical  
reports published 
by SBI
II.1.2 Modalities and procedures for the operation and 
use of the public registry referred to in Article 4, 
paragraph 12 of the Paris Agreement and Article 7, 
paragraph 12 of the Paris Agreement
To implement the Paris Agreement, the Parties agreed during the COP 21 that all 
would be required to “undertake and communicate ambitious efforts”151 with respect 
to six issues, namely:
• (i) the reduction of their collective GHG emissions152;
• (ii) the building up of their capacities to mitigate climate change153;
• (iii) climate financing154;
• (iv) technology development and transfer155;
• (v) capacity-building of developing countries156; and
• (vi) transparency of action and support157. 
150. © ENERGIES 2050, October 2016 – According to the UNFCCC Status of submission 
table (last consulted on 5 October 2016) [online]
http://unfccc.int/national_reports/non-annex_i_natcom/reporting_on_climate_change/
items/8722.php
151. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 3
152. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4
153. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 7
154. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 9
155. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 10
156. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 11
157. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 13
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It is planned that the efforts be communicated to the Convention Secretariat 
as NDC, which inserts them for the moment158 in provisional public registry159. Under 
the Agreement, the Parties have agreed to the relevance of such a registry, more 
especially the efforts to mitigate the anthropogenic GHG emissions160 and the 
communication of needs in terms of mitigation implementation, support, projects 
and measures161.
Nevertheless, when the Paris Agreement was adopted, the Parties requested 
the SBI to prepare modalities and procedures for the operation and use of the public 
mitigation registry162, whilst giving no instruction to either the subsidiary bodies 
or the Secretariat as to the potential preparation of a public registry listing the 
adaptation efforts by countries. The modalities and procedures of the public registry 
accounting for the mitigation efforts of countries should have been ready for the 
first session of the CMA163. 
An item on the SB 44 agenda therefore provided for addressing with the Parties 
the registry dealing with mitigation efforts, but this quickly became a stumbling 
block as soon as it was time to adopt the agenda for the session164. The disagreement 
seem to stem from the Parties failing to agree on how to interpret the Paris Agreement 
and, at the same time, how to set up such a registry165. In particular, certain concerns 
were raised during the first day of the SB 44 session over the lack of an explicit 
mention of adaptation in the agenda item addressing the NDC registry166.
Thus in Bonn, in May 2016, the developing countries, led by the G77/China, 
made known to the SBI Chairman that they disagreed with the formulation of the 
provisional agenda item dealing with the registry167, maintaining that it would be 
more appropriate to deal with a registry of NDC as a whole, without stating other 
fields of intervention like mitigation and adaptation. Some observers believe that 
one reason for broadening the type of information to be communicated to the public 
registry, rather than preferring a more restricted interpretation of the Agreement168, 
would be to prevent setting up a public registry focusing on mitigation169. These 
observers think that, for the developing countries, it would be more appropriate 
rather to request the Parties to communicate to the public, and therefore transparent, 
registry the relevant information on the six central components of the Agreement 
158. This document was finalised on 5 October 2016.
159. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 30
160. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4, para. 12
161. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 7, paras. 10 and 12
162. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 29
163. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 29
164. TWN, 2016a, p. 1
165. TWN, 2016a
166. IISD, 2016d, p. 2
167. TWN, 2016a, p. 1
168. More especially paragraphs 29 and 30 of Decision 1/CP.21
169. TWN, 2016a, p. 1
62
I
s
s
u
e
s
 
o
f
 
p
e
r
m
a
n
e
n
t
 
s
u
b
s
i
d
i
a
r
y
 
b
o
d
i
e
s
and NDC170 mentioned above. Such an approach would be more representative of 
the exhaustive nature expected from the NDC for use by the countries in “undertaking 
and communicating ambitious efforts”171. 
However, the Umbrella Group and EU countries would rather see a strict 
interpretation of the consensus emanating from Paris172, which is restricted to 
addressing a public registry compiling mitigation elements contained in the NDC. 
These same groups of countries prefer the same approach as the Paris Agreement173 
which urges the Parties to submit adaptation communications rather than requesting 
them to do this, as is the case for mitigation. Where appropriate, these countries 
were thus not in a position to support the amendment proposed by the G77/
China to point 5 on the provisional agenda, resulting in the adoption of an initial 
agenda for the SB 44 session which initially ignored any talks at all about a public 
registry174, until the Parties could agree, during informal discussions, on the most 
suitable way of addressing this topic.
Ultimately, point 5 of the agenda was amended and adopted as follows: 
“Establishment of the modalities and procedures for the operation and use of the public 
registry referred to in Article 4, paragraph 12 of the Paris Agreement”, whereas a new 
point 6 on the agenda was also adopted: “Establishment of the modalities and procedures 
for the operation and use of the public registry referred to in Article 7, paragraph 12 of 
the Paris Agreement”175. 
It goes without saying that consensus does not yet seem to have been reached 
on this issue, whereas, for example, Egypt has suggested, when adopting this new 
agenda, that both the adaptation and the mitigation measures should therefore be 
compiled in one and the same registry176. Whilst the SBI split these two agenda 
items into two separate informal groups177, the African Group instead expressed its 
wish for them to be addressed at the same time by the same co-mediators, with a 
view for just one, not two, NDC registries be set up when the Agreement entered 
into force178. When talks were closed on this topic, the Umbrella Group and EU 
countries reiterated their view that tying these two public registries together under 
the agreement would overstep the scope of the decision taken in Paris179, referring 
especially to the delicate balance between mitigation and adaptation on which the 
Parties managed to agree during the COP 21.
170. TWN, 2016a, p. 1
171. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 3
172. I.e. paragraph 29 of Decision 1/CP.21; see also TWN, 2016a, p. 3
173. Mainly Article 7, paragraphs 10 and 12, of the Convention
174. IISD, 2016d, p. 2
175. FCCC/SBI/2016/L.2
176. IISD, 2016f, p. 2
177. IISD, 2016f, p. 3
178. IISD, 2016c, p. 1
179. TWN, 2016a, p. 3 See also IISD, 2016c, p. 2
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When closing the SB 44, the SBI Chairman suggested two short draft conclusions 
for points 5180 and 6181 of the agenda mentioned above. As it is, the SBI mainly 
noted the positions expressed during the informal discussions held in Bonn in 
May 2016, mainly the links between the work being carried out under these two 
points on its agenda. They will be addressed again during the session of the OS 45, 
on the fringes of the COP 22182
Secretariat’s provisional public registry
Until the modalities and procedures for the operation of a public mitigation 
registry and a public adaptation registry have been adopted by the Parties, they 
have mandated the Secretariat to set up a temporary registry1. The NDC from 
67 countries had been published in it as at 5 October 2016.
All the Parties have their own logins to the registry where they can upload 
documents, including the NDC, which they can subsequently manage themselves2. 
The portal is configured so that a set of documents can be grouped to form one 
and the same NDC3. The Secretariat checks the authenticity of all the documents 
to ensure the security of the Parties and makes the documentation publicly- 
available thirty minutes after completion of the necessary checks4. When the 
Parties update their documentation, previous copies can be kept at the discretion 
of the Parties5.
The public can access the information added to the public registry by going to 
the website home page. Here the documentation communicated by all Parties 
can be accessed via their individual pages6 (see Figure 2 below). The home page 
offers web surfers an immediate search facility with options to browse using key 
words or Parties7 (see Figure 3 below). A description of each Party’s most recent 
version of its NDC is found on its home page along with a list of all documents 
submitted to date8 (see Figure 4 below). The documents appear in chronological 
order of submission – the date is displayed – and are classified by whether it involves 
the NDC from the country, a translation or an additional document, among other 
things9.
1. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 30 The registry can be accessed by clicking on this link:  
http://www4.unfccc.int/NDCregistry/Pages/All.aspx (last consulted on 05/10/16)
2. FCCC/SBI/2016/INF.6, para. 10
3. FCCC/SBI/2016/INF.6, para. 11
4. FCCC/SBI/2016/INF.6, para. 11
5. FCCC/SBI/2016/INF.6, para. 12
6. FCCC/SBI/2016/INF.6, para. 13
7. FCCC/SBI/2016/INF.6, para. 14
8. FCCC/SBI/2016/INF.6, para. 15
9. FCCC/SBI/2016/INF.6, para. 16
180. FCCC/SBI/2016/L.18
181. FCCC/SBI/2016/L.19
182. FCCC/SBI/2016/L.18, paras. 3-4 and FCCC/SBI/2016/L.19, paras. 2-3.
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Figure 2:  NDC Registry (interim) home page
Figure 3:  NDC Registry (interim) search facility
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Figure 4:  NDC Registry (interim) country home page
II.1.3 Scope and modalities for the periodic assessment of 
the Technology Mechanism for the implementation 
of the Paris Agreement (joint agenda with SBSTA)
The development and transfer of technologies assume special importance within 
the UNFCCC as they turn numerous mitigation and adaptation measures into 
reality183. Several decisions encourage the development and transfer of technologies, 
headed by those that created the Technology Mechanism184 (Cancún, 2010)185. The 
aim of this mechanism is to facilitate the reinforcement of technological development 
and transfer to support the climate change mitigation and adaptation policies. 
Recognising the relevance of work carried out to date by the Technology 
Mechanism, the Parties made it a body helping to bring about the application of 
the Paris Agreement186. In this respect, in May 2016 the SBI adopted draft conclusions 
to prepare the scope and modalities of the periodic assessment of the Technology 
Mechanism for the implementation of the Paris Agreement187, for which it 
had received the mandate from the Parties during COP 21188. By enhancing the 
Technology Mechanism, the Parties wish for new work to be undertaken by the 
TEC and CTCN, mainly to develop and build up the capacities and endogenous 
technologies and also to continue with the research, development and demonstration189.
183. UNFCCC Articles 4.1c, 4.5 and 9, in particular.
184. See section I.A.1b
185. Decision 1/CP.16, para. 117
186. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 10, para. 3
187. FCCC/SBI/2016/L.5
188. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 70
189. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 66
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The purpose of this periodic assessment, among other things, is to focus on 
the effectiveness of the support provided to the Technology Mechanism and on 
the appropriate nature of this support190. Overall, this periodic assessment must take 
account of questions dealing with the development and transfer of technologies. 
The assessment must also be performed in consideration of the conclusions that 
will emanate from the first independent review of the smooth operation of the 
CTCN191. The assessment of the Mechanism should also take account of the 
development of modalities of the global stocktake referred to in Article 14 of the 
Agreement, work on the transparency of the action and support referred to in 
Article 13 and the preparation of the technology framework (see box below). It is 
intended that the scope and modalities of this periodic assessment are adopted 
during the COP 25 in 2019. To achieve this, the Parties are invited to indicate 
their positions regarding the scope and modalities of the periodic assessment of the 
Mechanism by 25 January 2017; these positions should be reflected in a summary 
compilation planned for May 2017.
Preparation of the technology framework
In Paris, the Parties adopted the setting up of the technology framework which 
aims, especially, to make available to the Technology Mechanism a tool which 
will provide it with global guidelines on conducting its work1. The SBSTA, which 
is responsible for preparing the technology framework, launched talks between 
Parties on this topic in May 2016 during the SB 44. The intention is that the 
conclusions of work carried out by the SBSTA on the creation of the technology 
framework are submitted for decision by the first CMA2.
The framework should promote the technologies which are ready for transfer, 
the enhancement of enabling environments for and the addressing of barriers to 
the development and transfer of socially and environmentally sound technologies, 
enhanced financial and technical support for the implementation of the results 
of the technology needs assessments and the preparation of bankable projects3. 
Certain Parties have demonstrated an interest in the work of the framework 
also taking other associated issues into account, such as sustainable development, 
questions of gender or global action4.
Nevertheless, certain observers identify a common challenge for all these objec-
tives, which could shortly be confronting the SBSTA, that of allowing the Parties 
to agree on a closed definition for each of these promotion areas5. For example, 
which criteria could the framework use to determine that technologies are 
“ready for transfer” and which it is therefore appropriate to promote? A similar 
issue can apply to the listing of “socially and environmentally sound” technologies, 
whereas the Parties have not, for the moment, defined clearly what they envisage 
in this respect.
190. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 69
191. FCCC/SBI/2016/L.5, para. 3
Continued on page 67
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These same observers believe that the links between the Technology Mechanism 
and the Financial Mechanism which could be used to weave the Technology 
Framework will be critical in carrying out the mandate of the Technology Mechanism 
as an implementation tool of the Paris Agreement6. The Parties have shown a 
willingness to emphasise the transfer of technologies to fulfil the objective of the 
agreement to adopt the technology framework at the first session of the CMA, 
for example. Nevertheless, these observers underline the importance for the 
Technology Mechanism to be able to access sufficient financial resources to 
fulfil its mandate adequately7.
For the success of its work, the Parties seem to agree on the importance, for 
the framework, of focusing the majority of the work of the mechanism on how 
to implement the structural transformations that the Parties wished to encourage 
by adopting the Paris Agreement as well as the long-term vision of the impor-
tance of the development and transfer of technologies enshrined in Article 10 
of the Agreement8. The technology framework should offer its guidelines in the 
context of an overall vision of this theme. In this respect, it seems to create 
consensus among the Parties on the importance of the role of the technology 
framework in a perspective of adding value to the tools and bodies already in 
place, even certain work in progress, rather than creating new institutions.
Among other things, both the framework activities and the guidelines given to 
the Mechanism should at any time prevent the duplication of efforts9. To achieve 
this, the Parties suggested, in May 2016, that the framework should itself establish 
its guidelines by taking account, for example, of past, on-going and future work 
completed under the auspices of the TEC and the CTCN, knowledge acquired 
by the framework for the transfer of technology, work to weave permanent links 
between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism, in addition to 
relevant activities like research and the development and demonstration of new 
technologies, carried out by institutions outside the Convention like the Technology 
Facilitation Mechanism targeting the sustainable development objectives10.
To move its work forward as much as possible on preparing the technology 
framework, the SBSTA requested the Secretariat to prepare “an information 
note on the activities and initiatives of developing and transferring climate technologies 
under and outside the Convention”11.
1. FCCC/SBSTA/2016/L.8.
2. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 67
3. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 67
4. FCCC/SBSTA/2016/L.8.
5. World Resources Institute, 2016, p.19
6. World Resources Institute, 2016, p.19
7. World Resources Institute, 2016, p.19
8. FCCC/SBSTA/2016/L.8.
9. FCCC/SBSTA/2016/L.8.
10. FCCC/SBSTA/2016/L.8.
11. FCCC/SBI/2016/L.8, para. 3
68
I
s
s
u
e
s
 
o
f
 
p
e
r
m
a
n
e
n
t
 
s
u
b
s
i
d
i
a
r
y
 
b
o
d
i
e
s
II.1.4 Preparation of the mandate of the Paris Committee 
on Capacity-building, including its composition
In Paris, the Parties created the Paris Committee on Capacity-building192. In this 
respect, the Parties have launched a five year work plan supervised by the Committee 
for the period 2016-2020. This work plan aims to “increase synergies through cooperation 
and avoid duplication among existing bodies established under the Convention that implement 
capacity-building activities of capacity.”193 This work can also consider entities that 
are dedicated to capacity-building within or outside the Convention. The Parties 
have also requested the SBI to organise annual meetings of the Committee during its 
own sessions194.
The objective of the Committee through its initial workplan will also be to 
assemble a broad range of information relevant to the capacity-building of the 
Parties, including:
• (i) “capacity gaps and needs”195;
• (ii) the “good practices, challenges, experiences and lessons learned from work 
on capacity-building by bodies established under the Convention”196; and
• (iii) “the opportunities to strengthen capacity at the national, regional and 
subnational level”197.
The workplan that will be supervised by the Committee also envisages the 
promoting “the development and dissemination of tools and methodologies for the 
implementation of capacity-building198”, as well as “exploring how developing country 
Parties can take ownership of building and maintaining capacity over time and space”199. 
This effort should allow the Committee to “provide directives to the secretariat to maintain 
an updated window on line [of the Convention] dedicated to capacity reinforcement”200. 
This acquisition and sharing of knowledge should also allow the Committee to “foster 
world global, regional, national and subnational cooperation” in terms of capacity- 
building201, in addition to “fostering dialogue, coordination, collaboration and coherence 
among relevant processes and initiatives under the Convention”202.
192. Decision 1/CP.21, paras. 71-81
193. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 73(a)
194. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 75
195. Decision 1/CP. 21 para. 73(b)
196. Decision 1/CP. 21 para. 73 (e).
197. Decision 1/CP. 21 para. 73 (g).
198. Decision 1/CP. 21 para. 73 (c).
199. Decision 1/CP. 21 para. 73 (f ).
200. Decision 1/CP. 21 para. 73 (i).
201. Decision 1/CP. 21, para. 73(d)
202. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 73(h)
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The Committee should also be called upon to conduct work “in the context of a 
third comprehensive review of the implementation of the capacity-building framework”203, 
that aims to allow developing countries to apply the provisions of the Convention 
and processes emanating from the Kyoto Protocol204. In this respect SBI is responsible 
for preparing a mandate for the Committee. These conclusions were presented to 
the Parties during SBI 44 as a draft decision to be submitted to the COP 22 for 
consideration and adoption205.
Mandate and composition of the Paris  
Committee on capacity-building
Under the draft decision that the Parties were invited to weigh up and potentially 
adopt during the COP 22, the SBI, in its forty fourth session (SBI 44, May 2016, 
Bonn), submitted a draft of a mandate to the Paris Committee on capacity-building 
and suggested that its composition be as follows (twelve members in total)1:
• (i) Two members from each of the five regional State groups of the UN;
• (ii) One member from one of the least developed countries;
• (iii) One member from a Small Island Developing State;
The SBI also suggests that, as a function of the field or annual theme that the 
Committee is called upon to consider during its meetings that “six representatives 
of the bodies established under the Convention and functional entities of the Financial 
Mechanism be invited to participate in all Committee meetings”2. The draft decision 
suggests that “the Committee specify and adopt its modalities and procedures of 
functioning at its first meeting”3, which in principle should take place during the 
forty sixth session of the SBI (May 2017)4. Finally, in the current state of the 
decision draft, the Committee must “establish the annual technical reports on its work” 
to be submitted to the COP5, activities that would mainly cover “the improvement 
of technical exchanges dedicated to capacity-building”6.
In addition, during SBI-44, “the Parties suggested requesting the Committee 
[upon initiating its work], to (i) consider the results of the Durban Forum on 
capacity-building”; (ii) coordinate work of both Convention bodies and entities 
outside it; and (iii) produce tools for use in preparing uniform reports and the 
evaluation which will emerge from the work of the Committee7. The Parties 
also agreed during the talks in Bonn in May 2016 that decisions made by the 
Committee respect the principle of consensus8.
1. FCCC/SBI/2016/L.24/Add.1, annex, para. 2
2. FCCC/SBI/2016/L.24/Add.1, annex, para. 3
3. FCCC/SBI/2016/L.24/Add.1, annex, para. 13
4. FCCC/SBI/2016/L.24/Add.1, annex, para. 6
5. FCCC/SBI/2016/L.24/Add.1, annex, para. 16
6. FCCC/SBI/2016/L.24/Add.1, annex, para. 12
7. IISD, 2016c, p. 2
8. IISD, 2016f, p. 2
203. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 76
204. UNFCCC Articles 4.5 and 5 and Article 10(e) of the Kyoto Protocol.
205. FCCC/SBI/2016/L.24 and FCCC/SBI/2016/L.24/Add.1
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Final Composition of the Paris Committee on capacity reinforcement
It is possible that the talks face a stumbling block during the COP 22 regarding 
the final composition of the Committee. Under the SBI 44, the subsidiary body has 
received submissions from the Parties precisely on this topic. Most of the submissions 
received in this respect in March 2016 proposed a Committee generally composed 
of some twenty members206.
The LDC initially proposed for example, that the Committee also include 
representatives of the Adaptation Committee, the Executive Committee on Loss 
and Damage, the LDC Expert Group, the Technology Executive Committee, the 
Consultative Group of Experts and the GCF207. The Alliance of Small Island States 
(AOSIS) and the G77/China proposed a Committee of sixteen members added to 
the Committee suggested by SBI two members representing countries included in 
Annex I and two members of countries not appearing208. With twenty members 
rather than twelve, the distribution of the Committee suggested by the African 
Group in March was similar to that of AOSIS209. 
The Umbrella Group (except Kazakhstan and Russia) was also in favour of a 
Committee of sixteen members who, on the other hand, would be made up of six 
representatives of Convention bodies whose activities cover capacity-building210. 
The Group also stressed the importance of gender representatives. In the same 
spirit, the Environmental Integrity Group proposed a committee of eighteen seats, 
to be representative of a balance between sexes and including six members of the 
Convention bodies whose activities cover capacity-building as well as functional 
entities of the Financial Mechanism in order to avoid silo work211. In view of COP 22, 
the SBI nevertheless requested the opinion of the Parties concerning “representatives 
of bodies established under the Convention and functional entities of the Financial 
Mechanism that must be invited to the first meeting of the Committee”212.
206. FCCC/SBI/2016/MISC.1
207. FCCC/SBI/2016/MISC.1, p. 5
208. FCCC/SBI/2016/MISC.1, p. 7; and, G77/China, 2016a
209. FCCC/SBI/2016/MISC.1, p. 10
210. FCCC/SBI/2016/MISC.1, p. 35
211. EIG, 2016a
212. FCCC/SBI/2016/L.24, para. 3
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Table 3. Summary of proposals received by SBI as  
at 23 September 2016 regarding the composition  
of the Committee. 
Countries or group  
of countries Opinion on the composition of the Committee
European Union213
One representative of each body listed hereunder for a period of one 
year:
(i) Adaptation Committee
(ii) TEC
(iii) EB of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage 
(iv) LEG
(v) CGE
(vi) Permanent Financing Committee.
• Also stresses the possibility of inviting and consulting representatives 
of other bodies of the Convention or outside of it;
• Underscores that the Parties can also attend Committee meetings;
• Encourage also the participation of observers from various organisations 
in order to encourage a balanced regional representation at the meetings.
Alliance of Small  
Island States214
Representatives of four bodies as below at first Committee meeting: 
(i) GCF
(ii) GEF
(iii) TEC
(iv) Committee of Adaptation
Russia215 Restricts itself to underlining that it would be relevant for the GCF to be invited to the first Committee meeting.
Indonesia216
Eight representatives of organs present at first Committee meeting: 
(i) GCF
(ii) GEF
(iii) TEC
(iv) CTCN
(v) Adaptation Committee
(vi) Permanent Financing Committee; 
(vii) LEG
(viii) EB of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage
213. EU, 2016a
214. AOSIS, 2016a
215. Russia, 2016
216. Indonesia, 2016
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Australia, Canada, United 
States, Japan, Norway, New 
Zealand and Ukraine217
One representative of each body listed hereunder for the 2017:
(i) CGE
(ii) TEC
(iii) CTCN
(iv) Permanent Financing Committee
(v) GCF
(vi) GEF
G77/China218
One representative of each body listed hereunder present at the first 
Committee meeting:
(i) Adaptation Fund Board
(ii) Adaptation Committee
(iii) CTCN
(iv) GCF
(v) TEC
(vi) GEF
(vii) Permanent Financing Committee.
Environmental  
Integrity Group219
Representatives of the following four bodies:
(i) LEG
(ii) Adaptation Committee
(iii) TEC
(iv) CTCN
African Group220
One representative of each body listed hereunder present at the first 
Committee meeting:
(i) Adaptation Committee
(ii) CGE
(iii) EB of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage;
(iv) Permanent Financing Committee
(v) LEG
(vi) TEC
(vii) CTCN
217. Australia, Canada, United States, Japan, Norway, New Zealand and Ukraine, 2016
218. G77/China, 2016b
219. EIG, 2016b
220. African Group, 2016a
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Field or annual theme of the Paris Committee for 2017
During the COP 22, the Parties will also be called upon to consider the first 
annual theme field of the Paris Committee for 2017 whilst the objective of SBI is 
to make a recommendation to the COP22 for examination and adoption221. As at 
9 September 2016, certain Parties had suggested the fields or annual themes outlined 
in the table below:
Table 4: Summary of suggestions regarding fields or annual 
themes of the Paris Committee for 2017 of certain Parties on 
September 9 2016
Countries or group  
of countries Field or annual theme of the Paris Committee for 2017
European Union222
Activities conducted under the auspices of the Convention in the 
context of national capacities of countries to implement the Paris 
Agreement between the different ministries and levels of government,  
in particular insofar as the NDC implementation is concerned.
Alliance of Small  
Island States223
The implementation capacities of mitigation measures of climate 
change as the installation and maintenance of solar and wind  
iturbines, among others. 
Russia224
Building up capacities to implement the Paris Agreement in particular 
concerning:
(i) the preparation of NDC by developing countries;
(ii) the transparency of national notifications;
(iii) the exchange of information between countries; 
(iv) the possible enhancement of GHG emission mitigation efforts  
by countries; and 
(v) the improvement of measuring and verification systems.
Indonesia225
Implementation of a annual workplan extending until 2020:
(i) the annual themes until 2020 would coincide thus with those 
identified in this plan;
(ii) for 2018, the vulnerability to climate change would be the theme, 
in particular considering the workplans already conducted by other 
committees such as the Committee on Loss and Damage and the 
Permanent Financing Committee;
(iii) the CPRC could conduct a two year analysis on capacity-building 
needs in order to inform COP talks potentially.
Australia, Canada, United 
States, Japan, Norway, New 
Zealand and Ukraine226
(i) The implementation of the mitigation section of NDC as an annual 
theme for 2017;
(ii) National planning of adaptation as an annual theme for 2018.
221. FCCC/SBI/2016/L.24, para. 3
222. EU, 2016a
223. AOSIS, 2016a
224. Russia, 2016
225. Indonesia, 2016
226. Australia, Canada, United States, Japan, Norway, New Zealand and Ukraine, 2016
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G77/China227
The development of national and sub-national institutional capacities 
of creation, articulation and capacity-building in order to improve the 
implementation, in time, of the Paris Agreement and the Convention  
in the respect of the principles of equity and the CBDR-RC.
Environmental  
Integrity Group228
The development and improvement of institutions that work towards 
capacity-building, more especially building up national capacities to 
hold high-quality GHG emission inventories.
African Group229
Prioritises the themes that follow, to be dealt with in 2016-2020  
that aim to reinforce capacity among others in terms of:
(i) measures of adaptation and resilience in the face of climate;
(ii) updating of NDC and implementation of their measures;
(iii) development and implementation of legislation aimed at enhancing 
resilience to effects of climate change and promoting low-carbon 
development paths;
(iv) providing climate financing for specific projects;
(v) transparency activities;
(vi) access and use of technology by developing countries;
(vii) indicators of success; and
(viii) guidelines between different bodies working on capacity-building.
II.1.5 Modes of functioning, work programme and  
functions anticipated under the Paris Agreement 
for the forum on the impact of response measures 
implemented (joint agenda with SBSTA)
The Paris Agreement, in the spirit of the Convention, recognizes the importance 
of “taking into into consideration in the implementation of this Agreement the concerns 
of Parties with economies most affected by the impacts of response measures, particularly 
developing country Parties”230, whilst the Paris Agreement aims to “hold the increase 
in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels”231. At the 
time of the adoption of the Convention, the Parties recognised that the impact of 
reaching the objective could have on the countries whose economy depended 
highly on extraction, refining and export of hydrocarbons such as oil232. Since Bali, 
the integration of this issue in the agenda of climate negotiations has resulted 
above all in a demand supported partly by Gulf countries which want it to be 
considered in the same way as adaptation and mitigation233.
227. G77/China, 2016b
228. EIG, 2016b
229. African Group, 2016a
230. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4, para. 15
231. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 2, para. 1(a)
232. Convention, Art. 4, para. 8(h)
233. FCCC/SB/2012/MISC.2 for example.
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This impact of response measures crystallises a strong opposition between 
developed countries and developing countries. The latter desire that concrete measures 
be taken by the first to limit the negative impacts of their measures linked to climate 
change and that this element of the agenda lead to strong decisions. In addition, 
they are calling for supplementary support from developed countries to counter 
the destructive consequences of their measures234. This element of the agenda has 
evolved during the last years towards the creation in 2011 of a Forum operated 
jointly by SBI and the SBSTA235.
In light of this, the Parties decided, at the COP 21, to maintain and improve 
the forum on the impact of response measures implemented whose work will be 
centred on “the provision of concrete examples, case studies and practices in order to enhance 
the capacity of Parties, in particular developing country Parties, to deal with the impact 
of the implementation of response measures”236. The improved work programme of 
the Forum, which will continue to meet twice a year237 under the joint guidance 
of SBI and SBSTA, works in two areas238:
a) The diversification and economic transformation
b) Fair transition for the active population and the creation of decent and quality 
jobs.
The subsidiary bodies must advance the work of the forum improved by the 
formation of special groups of technical experts239, firstly, and by “the assessment 
and analysis of impacts, including the use and development of economic modelling”240, 
secondly. The subsidiary bodies should revise the improved forum work every 
three years as from the COP 23, in November 2018241. This revision should also 
deal with operating modalities of the forum. In the meantime, it is envisaged that the 
improved forum submit for examination its first recommendations to the subsidiary 
bodies at the COP 22 regarding the implementation of response measures for 
which it has been possible to carry out the assessment and analysis242.
In this respect, the Parties instructed the Secretariat of the Convention, in 
Paris, to prepare in the framework of the 44th session of subsidiary bodies a technical 
document that facilitates, for developing countries, “the assessment of various impacts 
that can result from the response measures implemented “, on one hand, and that identify 
also the options of economic diversification that can, at least in part, neutralise these 
impacts243.
234. FCCC/SB/2012/MISC.2 for example.
235. Decision 8/CP.17, para. 3
236. Decision 11/CP.21, para. 2
237. Decision 11/CP.21, para. 3
238. Decision 11/CP.21, para. 5
239. Decision 11/CP.21, para. 4
240. Decision 11/CP.21, para. 6
241. Decision 11/CP.21, para. 7
242. Decision 11/CP.21, paras. 8 and 1
243. Decision 11/CP.21, para. 9
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The Secretariat has thus prepared two technical documents that could help 
guide the work of the improved forum and offer more precise data to the Parties 
regarding the impact of response measures during the talks on the matter under 
COP 22. A first technical document evaluates firstly the impact of response measures, 
in particular by using several economic modelling tools244.
The document identifies seven response measure categories in particular245 which 
may have “impacts on the economic growth, distribution of revenues, employment, 
environment, public health and food security246: 
• (i) carbon taxes;
• (ii) subsidies favourable to low-carbon technology, granted simultaneously 
with removal of subsidies to technologies with stronger GHG intensity;
• (iii) policies on energy reform and green investments;
• (iv) ceiling systems and trading of GHG emission credits and the compensation 
credits at the international level;
• (v) commercial measures such as customs duties and border adjustments for 
carbon;
• (vi) implementation of standards and labelling; and
• (vii) technology cooperation”.
A second technical document deals with the concept of economic diversification 
in the context of response measures247. The document identifies four economic 
sectors where the impact of response measures could be felt more significantly and 
that could benefit from economic diversification248 :
• “(i) conventional fossil fuels (coal, gas and oil);
• (ii) energy-using products that are also exposed to foreign competition (alumin-
ium, iron and steel, cement, chemical products and pulp and paper sectors);
• (iii) tourism; and
• (iv) agriculture “.
• It appears, nevertheless, for the time being, more complex to identify available 
solutions for developing countries wishing to diversify their economies249.
In order to make progress on the forum work, certain Parties have shown an 
interest in having a high level meeting dedicated to economic diversification and 
sustainable development during the COP 22250. During discussions in the contact 
group on response measures that took place in Bonn in May 2016, the G77/China 
244. FCCC/TP/2016/4
245. FCCC/TP/2016/4, para. 36
246. FCCC/TP/2016/4, para. 37
247. FCCC/TP/2016/3
248. FCCC/TP/2016/3, para. 114
249. FCCC/TP/2016/3, paras. 129-155
250. FCCC/SB/2016/L.2/Rev.1, para. 3
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identified numerous fields that could enhance cooperation in terms of acquisition 
of knowledge on the impact of response measures and tools available in order that 
this impact be minimised particular for developing countries, i.e.251: 
• “(i) technical cooperation,
• (ii) cooperation in terms of modelling and evaluation considering priorities of 
developing countries,
• (iii) partnerships with research organisations, and
• (iv) cooperation for equitable transition”. 
One party also suggested, during the talks, that gender equality be identified 
in the description referring to equitable transition252 This proposal has not for the 
time being been retained in the draft conclusions proposed by the Chairmen253.
AOSIS, for its part, stressed a “focus oriented towards action “ for the forum254, 
a proposal that received the support of numerous Parties in Bonn, in May 2016, 
whilst the importance of concrete results, accompanied “by clear schedules for identified 
actions” was raised by these parties255. South Africa for its part wished to orientate 
the talks in terms of identification of vulnerabilities faced by developing countries256. 
These two last elements were dealt with in part by the technical documents prepared 
by the Secretariat, as mentioned above.
The European Union specially stressed the sharing of knowledge so that the 
different actors be called upon to contribute pragmatically and globally to the 
discussion on the impact of response measures. Such an interactive framework 
where exchanges of views and knowledge are encouraged could introduce favourable 
conditions for the identification of themes that could lead to meetings of a special 
group of technical experts257.
During a first meeting of the forum in Bonn in May 2016, the subsidiary 
bodies also prepared the work programme of the forum until November 2018, 
agreeing to have a “workshop on points of view and experiences of the Parties, including 
case studies, in the context of sustainable development” before COP 22258. The workshop 
business will stress:
• (i) diversification and economic transformation, and
• (ii) fair transition for the active population and the creation of decent and 
quality jobs. 
251. IISD, 2015a, p. 2
252. IISD, 2016e, p. 2
253. FCCC/SB/2016/L.2/Rev.1, Annex I
254. FCCC/SB/2016/L.2/Rev.1, Annex I
255. IISD, 2016e, p. 2
256. IISD, 2016e, p. 2
257. IISD, 2016e, p. 2
258. FCCC/SB/2016/L.2/Rev.1, Annex I
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A report on this work will be made available to the Parties at COP 22 which 
could lead to the possibility of forming a special group of technical on these themes. 
These groups would be formed by two members for each of the five regional 
groups represented in the UN and by “two other experts from inter governmental 
organisations having good experience in the technical domain considered”259.
Work programme to be envisaged under the Paris Agreement 
for the forum: possible stumbling block in Marrakesh?
A work programme with a broad rather than targeted range could also create 
a stumbling block regarding implementation for the period covering current 
works up to November 2018, whilst certain Parties in Bonn in May 2016 opposed 
the forum covering too much material and statements simultaneously1.
In this respect, the United States, Saudi Arabia, AOSIS, the G77/China and the 
EU propose that the work programme be limited for the time being to the two 
areas determined in Paris2.
Whilst concentrating the forum efforts around these two areas, AOSIS suggests 
moreover that the work programme take place in two stages: (i) evaluation and 
analysis of current and possible effects on developing nations, in particular the 
SIDS and LDC, of response measures implemented by developed nations in 
particular unilateral measures, and (ii) specific activities to be carried out in the 
work programme3.
The G77/China for its part suggested adding exchange of views and experience 
on (i) support and capacity-building and (ii) measures that can mitigate damaging 
effects of response measures in workshops that could take place under the 
auspices of the forum4.
For its part, the African Group prioritises an expanded work programme covering 
five issues4 : (i) sustainable development with a view to determining the damaging 
effects of response measures for sustainable development in Africa and mitigate 
them; (ii) examination of the impact of response measures implemented, to improve 
mobilisation and transparency in order to reach common answers; (iii) enhanced 
capacity-building; (iv) development of guidelines on the subject of notification 
and examination of response measures; and (v) economic modelling.
1. IISD, 2016c, p. 2
2. Saudi Arabia and United States, 2016, AOSIS, 2016b and EU, 2016b
3. AOSIS, 2016b, pp. 2-3
4. G77/China, 2016c
5. African Group, 2016b
259. FCCC/SB/2016/L.2/Rev.1, Annex II, para. 3
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II.1.6 Scope of the next periodic review of the global 
objective and overall progress towards this objective 
(joint agenda with the SBSTA)
At COP 18 in Doha in 2012, the Parties launched a process for the periodic 
review of the long-term global objective of the Convention. The first phase of this 
process ran from 2013 to 2015. The next review is expected to take place as early 
as the adoption of the sixth IPCC assessment report, which is planned for 2021260, 
or every seven years, at the latest261. To this end, the Parties have requested the SBSTA 
and SBI to issue a recommendation concerning the scope of the next periodic 
review in 2018 at the latest.262.
As for the first review period, the next review process will be led by a joint 
SBSTA/SBI263 contact group and will be based on the conclusions issued by a new 
Structured Expert Dialogue (SED)264. This expert group is responsible for ensuring 
the scientific integrity of the review process. The SEDs265 are an opportunity for 
the Parties to master the most important scientific results, including the IPCC 
reports and other scientific and technical reports, and to ask the IPCC experts 
questions266. For example, at the first periodic review, COP 20 in Lima recognised 
that the 5th IPCC assessment report was the most comprehensive and solid report 
on climate change, offering an integrated scientific, technical and socio-economic 
point of view on relevant questions. It also recognised that this report was the 
scientific basis of the ADP work267.
For the 2013-2015 periodic review process, the Parties had agreed that the 
periodic review aims to periodically assess, as a priority, the appropriateness of the 
long-term global objective of 2°C and the overall progress in achieving this objective. 
The final SED report recognises that the target of limiting the temperature to 2°C 
is “inadequate” for certain regions and ecosystems. 2°C should be the upper end 
of the target. The report also recognises that even though the state of the science 
concerning the 1.5°C target is less robust, this target is a more prudent safeguard268. 
The report also states that current efforts are not sufficient to reach the long-term 
target. It calls for a change in the scale of the effort made. The SEDs thus propose 
to consent to an approach encouraging the implementation of a “buffer zone”, rather 
than the adoption of a specific number. It also recommends filling the knowledge 
gaps for certain regions. This gap has been reported in the most vulnerable regions 
in particular, such as Africa, the Pacific and the Caribbean.
260. http://www.ipcc.ch/activities/activities.shtml
261. Decision 2/CP.17, para. 167
262. Decision 10/CP.21, para. 10
263. Decision 10/CP.21, para. 10
264. Decision 10/CP.21, para. 11
265. The SEDs are available on [online] http://unfccc.int/7521
266. See [online] https://unfccc.int/7521
267. Decision 12/CP.2.
268. FCCC/SB/2015/INF.1, Message 5 [online] http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/sb/
eng/inf01.pdf
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In Paris, the Parties took note of the SED report and its 10 key messages269. 
The conclusions of this report are reflected in the decision of the Parties to convene 
a new SED as part of the next periodic review270. The decision also observes that 
the joint SBSTA/SBI contact group has fulfilled its first periodic review mission271. 
This contact group has been mandated to examine the scope of the next periodic 
review by 2018, and to issue a recommendation to be reviewed at COP 23272. 
In the Paris Agreement, the Parties first adopted a new long-term target for 
the average temperature increase that reflects the SED recommendation to adopt 
a range from 1.5°C to 2°C273, thereby setting a “buffer zone”, as the SED suggested. 
Henceforth, an appropriate long-term target aims to keep the temperature rise 
“well below 2°C [...], recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and 
impacts of climate change”274.
The Parties has also observed, as the SED report substantiates, that “significant 
gaps still exist in terms of both the scale and the speed” of the progress that has already 
been made in strengthening financial and technological support, and in capacity 
building assistance275. Above all, the Parties also highlighted that there are currently 
gaps in reaching the long-term target itself, especially as it implies pursuing “efforts 
to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C” now. This is an additional challenge that 
the next periodic review will confront. Most of the currently existing scientific data 
has emphasised the GHG emissions trajectories that can limit the temperature 
increase to 2 °C, and has given much less attention to scenarios that can limit it to 
1.5 °C276.
In this respect, the Parties are henceforth encouraging the scientific community 
to consider “information and research gaps identified during the structured expert 
dialogue”277, which is right in line with the special report on the 1.5°C that the IPCC 
should be producing by 2018. In particular, this report should address the conse-
quences of a global temperature increase beyond 1.5°C, by considering all the 
regional and local impacts on the GHG emissions trajectories that could limit the 
temperature increase to 1.5 °C by 2100278. By adopting these decisions and suggesting 
that this special report be drawn up, the Parties seem to clearly express that they would 
like updated information to be available as soon as possible, especially with the 
entry into force of the Paris Agreement—and that they would also like the SED 
that will be held at the next periodic review to have access to this information, so that 
it can feed into the first update of the NDCs, which should be taking place in 2025. 
269. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.2, para. 1.
270. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.2, para. 11.
271. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.2, para. 12.
272. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.2, para. 10.
273. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 2
274. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.2, para. 4.
275. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.2, para. 6.
276. IPCC, 2014a, p. 5
277. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.2, para. 8.
278. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, para. 21.
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However, there is still uncertainty about the exact date of the next periodic 
review, and about what its exact scope will be. The SBSTA and SBI are to issue a 
recommendation regarding the scope for the Parties to review by 2018 at the latest. 
However the Parties disagree on the pace of the work on this subject279. Several 
developing countries such as AOSIS, the African Group, the Solomon Islands and 
Peru, have emphasised the importance of including the periodic review in the SB 
46 session agenda for May 2017. Some have noted that waiting for the SB 48 session 
in May 2018 would be inappropriate and would send the wrong message. Norway, 
Switzerland, and the European Union supported the idea of starting the discussions 
at SB 46. Brazil insisted that waiting until SB 48 to start discussions would result 
in a tight deadline, right before COP 23. At COP 23, the joint contact group is to 
submit its recommendation for the Parties to review. 
In contrast, other countries such as the United States, Japan and Australia 
consider that the scope of the periodic review should not be examined prior to 
May 2018. One of the point that these countries highlight is that it would be 
relevant to first examine the modalities of the global stocktake to avoid activity 
overlap, especially concerning the Party facilitation dialogue, to assess the joint 
efforts made to reach the long-term target. This dialogue must also take place in 2018, 
and the SBSTA and SBI should consider this in setting the scope of the next peri-
odic review. Japan also expressed that there is a split between the global stocktake 
and the periodic review activities. Japan argues that the scope of the periodic 
review should be more specific, and not general. Ultimately, the SBSTA and SBI 
decided to continue discussions on the scope of the next periodic review at their 
May 2017 session280.
II.2 Issues related to the SBSTA
II.2.1 Issues related to the SBSTA: Advice on how  
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate  
Change may inform the global stocktake  
as per Article 14 of the Paris agreement
Article 14 of the Paris Agreement tasks the CMA with periodically assessing the 
implementation of the Agreement, to evaluate the collective progress toward achieving 
the purpose of the Agreement and its long-term goals, considering mitigation, 
adaptation, means of implementation and support, and in the light of equity and 
the best available science281. To this end, the Conference of the Parties requested 
advice from the SBSTA on how the IPCC assessments may feed into the global 
stocktake referred to in Article 14 of the Paris Agreement, and has asked the SBSTA 
to report on this issue at the second APA session 282. 
279. TWN, 2016b
280. FCCC/SB/2016/L.1, par. 3
281. Paris Agreement, Article 14.1
282. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 100
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The results of the global stocktake must guide the Parties as they update and 
strengthen their measures and support, based on the modalities set nationally, as 
per the relevant stipulations of the present agreement, and as the Parties intensify 
international climate action.283 The first global stocktake is planned for 2023, and 
should be conducted every five years afterwards, unless the COP decides otherwise.284
At the 43rd IPCC session in April 2016, the IPCC responded to the invitation 
of the COP, presenting its work plan, and adopted a set of decisions mentioning 
the production of three special reports and a methodology report on GHG inven-
tories during its sixth assessment cycle285. The IPCC will review the first special 
report for adoption in 2018. The second and third special reports will also be 
reviewed as soon as possible during the assessment cycle. The methodology report 
is expected to be ready in 2019, the outline of the 6th report (AR6) in 2017, and 
the synthesis report in 2022. 
Given the forecast schedule and the various reports to come, the different 
decisions that the IPCC adopts are important achievements. These decisions dem-
onstrate the key role that the IPCC plays in implementing the global stocktake 
described in Article 14 of the Paris agreement.
The first experience will prepare a special report in 2018 on the impacts of 
global warming of over 1.5°C compared to pre-industrial levels, which should feed 
into the 2018 global stocktake286. This should make it possible to draw important 
lessons to feed into the 2023 global stocktake.
As per the COP21 mandate, the SBSTA examined this issue of the IPCC 
contribution to the global stocktake at the 44th session. Following this review, the 
SBSTA considered that lessons could be drawn from the past, particularly from 
the successes and failures in the activities relating the 2013-2015 review287. According 
to Hoesung Lee, the IPCC Chair, the structured expert dialogue on the 2013-2015 
review made it possible for the Paris review to be truly science based288. Outside of 
the 2013-2015 review process, many recognised that the scientific data available 
gave added value to the phrasing of the Paris Agreement. They are calling call more 
for strengthening the assessment of the available scientific research to inform decision 
making in the global stocktake.
The SBSTA invited the Parties and the organisations with observer status to 
submit their observations on this issue by 12 September 2016 at the latest, as they 
have experience in the matter. The SBSTA decided to continue to review this issue 
at its 45th session (in November 2016)289.
283. Paris Agreement, Article 14.3
284. Paris Agreement, Article 14.2
285. http://ipcc.ch/meetings/session43/p43_decisions.pdf
286. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 21
287. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 21
288. IISD, 2012b.
289. FCCC/SBSTA/2016/L.16
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The 2013-2015 technical review experience
In Cancún, it was decided that the GHG emissions reduction target would be 
periodically reviewed 290 to limit the average temperature increase to below 2°C 
compared to pre-industrial levels, as agreed to in Copenhagen291. The two-year 
review process started in 2013. The process was launched with the Doha decision 
(in 2012), which specified the specific objectives of the review, and its modalities292. 
The Parties thus agreed that the review aims to make it a priority to periodically 
assess the adequacy of the long-term global target of 2°C and the overall progress 
in achieving this objective. It was also decided that the review would take place in 
a joint SBSTA/SBI contact group and draw from the conclusions of a 293Structured 
Expert Dialogue (SED). The final SED report recognises that the objective of 
limiting the temperature increase to 2°C is “inadequate” for certain regions and 
ecosystems. It also recognises that even if the state of the science behind the 
1.5°C target is less robust, this target is a more prudent safeguard294. The report 
also states that current efforts are not sufficient to reach the long-term target. 
It calls for a change in the scale of the effort made. The SED thus proposes to 
agree on an approach that promotes setting a “buffer zone”, rather than the 
adoption of a specific number. It also recommends filling the gaps in terms of 
knowledge for certain regions. This gap has been reported in the most vulnerable 
regions in particular, such as Africa, the Pacific and the Caribbean.
This process was thus very relevant to the Paris Agreement discussions, especially 
in terms of the ambition level, as the IPCC Chair Hoesung Lee noted295 at the 
special event in Bonn in May 2016 on how the IPCC assessments can feed into 
the global stocktake. Although some countries fear that the review may result in 
recommendations for the country commitments under the 2015 agreement that 
are too specific, the results of this process were used to justify the strengthening 
of the long-term 1.5°C global target, which the SIDS and LDCs have passionately 
championed.296
At the same time as the 44th session of the subsidiary bodies, a special event on 
how the IPCC assessments can be used in the global uptake referred to in Article 14 
of the Paris Agreement was held on 18 May 2016 in Bonn. According to the note 
that the SBSTA Chair prepared for this event297, it was advisable to coordinate the 
results of the IPCC work that could feed into the first global stocktake with the 
290. Decision 1/CP.16
291. Decision 2/CP.15, para. 1 and 2
292. Decision 1/CP.18.
293. http://unfccc.int/science/workstreams/the_2013-2015_review/items/7532.php.
294. FCCC/SB/2015/INF.1, Message 5 [online] http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/sb/
eng/inf01.pdf.
295. IISD, 2012b.
296. http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/167_131_ 
130777946613560472-UNFCCC-SBSTA-Bonn-June-2015-.pdf
297. SBSTA/IPCC Special Event.2016.1.InformationNote.rev1 [en ligne] unfccc.int/files/
adaptation/application/pdf/sbsta_chair_information_note_sbsta_ipcc_special_
event_may_2016_rev.pdf
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date of entry into force of the Paris Agreement and with the start date of the global 
stocktake. The purpose of this special event was to improve understanding of the 
information needs for the global stocktake which are relevant to the IPCC. The IPCC 
may then consider these information needs as new approaches and accomplishments 
to be expected in its sixth assessment cycle. 
The IPCC Vice-Chairs introduced the targets, approaches, products and 
schedule for the sixth IPCC assessment cycle. The Co-Chairs of the three IPCC 
working groups presented how their work could be used for the global stocktake. 
The Vice-Chair of the Task Force on National Greenhouse Gas Inventories 
described the relevant methodology work, and the UNFCCC Secretariat described 
the potential methods for feeding the IPCC products into the global stocktake298. 
After this work, the general discussions concerned the lessons from the 2013-
2015 review, synchronising the IPCC cycle with the global stocktake, the research 
on the emissions level that can attain the1.5°C target, and the use of the national 
GHG inventories299. There was then more in-depth debate on four main subjects300:
i. What are the information needs of the global stocktake that the IPCC can 
examine, beyond the 5th Assessment Report (AR5)?
ii. How can the IPCC products published during the sixth assessment cycle be 
tailored to better support the global stocktake? 
iii. How will the IPCC input and other input to the global stocktake be coordi-
nated to ensure complementarity?
iv. What modalities can we use to integrate the IPCC input into the global 
stocktake? What experiences under the Convention can offer lessons in terms of 
modalities for considering the IPCC’s input?
Summary of the discussions on the main themes of the special event301
The information required for the global uptake that the IPCC could review, 
beyond the 5th Assessment Report (AR5)
There were some suggestions regarding the information required for the global 
uptake. Most of the parties consider that the IPCC should be the main source of 
scientific data for the global uptake. A group of Parties reiterated the necessity of 
assessing the feasibility, risks and obstacles of the mitigation pathways compatible 
with the target of pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above 
pre-industrial levels.
298. IISD, 2016a, p. 22.
299. IISD, 2012b.
300. SBSTA/IPCC Special Event.2016.2.SummaryReport [online] unfccc.int/files/adap-
tation/application/pdf/specialevent_summaryreport_online.pdf
301. This summary is drawn from the report of the SBSTA Chair (SBSTA/IPCC Special 
Event.2016.1.InformationNote.rev1) [online] unfccc.int/files/adaptation/application/ 
pdf/sbsta_chair_information_note_sbsta_ipcc_special_event_may_2016_rev.pdf
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Some Parties would like to know how the IPCC could provide data on the 
global targets and progress towards them, and how it could contribute to the NDC 
analysis. The parties also mentioned the need to have more information on capping 
global emissions and the need to understand not only the current situation, but 
also what is required to reach the global targets.
Regarding the overall adaptation objective, the parties have emphasised the 
need for further information on attaining this target from the IPCC. Some Parties 
considered that the IPCC should provide further information on adaptation measures 
and on how to assess the collective progress towards the global stocktake, including 
the global target for adaptation and the effectiveness of mitigation, adaptation and 
financing measures. Several Parties would also like the IPCC to provide methodol-
ogy information related to the adaptation needs of developing countries as well as 
information on adaptation indicators. In response to these various suggestions, an 
IPCC expert stated that this is an important question for Working Group II, and 
that literature is emerging on the pathways and adaptation thresholds. He also said 
that given the specificity of the global adaptation target, case studies will be par-
ticularly useful.
Questions related to loss and damage were also addressed. Several Parties 
asked to have further information on this from the IPCC in its 6th assessment 
cycle. In response to this request, an expert stated that the Executive Committee 
of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage works on its design, 
including how it must be included in the risk assessment concept developed in the 
5th IPCC report. He reassured that the IPCC is available to advise on this subject 
as necessary.
Regarding funding issues, many Parties brought up the need to have further 
information on ways to support mitigation and adaptation, as identified in the 
2013-2015 review. Some Parties requested information on financing and cost and 
advantages, particularly the costs of mitigation and adaptation, and the costs of 
climate change impacts.
Adjust the IPCC cycles and results to better support the global stocktake and  
to coordinate contributions to ensure complementarity
Regarding this second point, some Parties consider that the SBSTA discussions 
should address this issue and give directives. Other Parties reiterate that the IPCC 
has its own procedures for planning its work that incorporates complementarity 
with the work of other bodies. The IPCC experts reassured the Parties that they 
ensure that their work schedule is coordinated with the global uptake, to respond 
to the COP invitation and to incorporate the information needs of the Parties. 
Some comments concerned the need for the IPCC to integrate more local 
information in its 6threport. To this end, the Parties have been asked to strengthen 
their statistical services, which is particularly important for inventory. 
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Regarding the publication date of the special report on the impacts of over 1.5ºC 
of global warming, some parties offered the IPCC to move it up to 2018, to adapt 
it to both the SBSTA discussions in the middle of the year and the 2018 facilitation 
dialogue. In response to this request, an expert stated that the scientific information 
required probably would not be available in time for an earlier publication.
Terms for examining the IPCC input to the global stocktake, and the convention 
experiences that could serve as lessons to this end
The Parties unanimously agree that lessons can be drawn from Convention experi-
ences. The Parties consider that lessons may be drawn from the SEDs, which are 
open to experts and political decision makers, and which take place in some meetings 
over a two-year period during the UNFCCC process. One Party suggested that in 
addition to participating in the technical phase, the IPCC should participate in the 
political phase of the global stocktake as well. 
Regarding the terms for revising the IPCC input, several Parties noted the 
adequacy of the IPCC schedule for the sixth assessment cycle. It was emphasised that 
the schedule remains flexible in terms of incorporating scientific information, 
once it is available.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the IPCC Chair noted that the discussion and suggestions of the 
Parties will help the IPCC to make its products more relevant for decision makers. 
It added that the IPCC envisages three parts to the global stocktake:
i. Aggregation of the efforts of the Parties: The transparency building for the action 
and support as per the Paris Agreement will feed into the global stocktake. 
The IPCC methodology report will be very useful for this.
ii. Progress assessment: The scientific data must be broadened, for example, 
in terms of the understanding of and estimation of the carbon budget and 
indicators of early-warning anomalies for emissions pathways, and in terms of 
infrastructure investment models. There needs to be adaptation units that are 
agreed upon worldwide. The scientific community can play a role in developing 
them or in offering advice regarding this.
iii. Accelerate progress: To make significant progress, the scientific community 
needs to provide information the decision-making framework and process.
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Diagram 9.  Conceptual diagram of the global stocktake302
302. © ENERGIES 2050, October 2016 – Based on the conceptual diagram of the 
UNFCCC Secretariat
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This diagram shows how contributions to the global stocktake are related to 
the entire global uptake process. It emphasises the comprehensiveness, the collective 
nature and facilitation of the global stocktake.
II.2.2 Issues related to the SBSTA – Questions linked  
to Article 6 of the Paris Agreement
Decision 1/CP.21 recommends that the CMA adopts directives, rules, modalities 
and procedures, as well as a framework for new mechanisms drawn up as per Article 6 
of the Paris Agreement303.
• The parameters that contribute to the GHG mitigation mechanism and that 
promote sustainable development are: 
• Voluntary participation authorized by each Party involved;
• Real, measurable, and long-term benefits related to the mitigation of climate 
change (GHG emissions reduction);
• Specific scope of activities; 
• Reductions in emissions that are additional to reductions that would have 
already been made anyway;
• Verification and certification of emission reductions resulting from mitigation 
activities by designated operational entities;
• Experience gained with and lessons learned from existing mechanisms and 
approaches adopted under the Convention;
The type of system to implement to enforce Article 6.4 is still a major question 
for the Parties. The new mechanism could be a continuation of the previous approach, 
through which credits were issued for projects and programmes. In Paris, Brazil 
made a proposal to consider a mechanism whose scale is similar to that of the CDM, 
an “improved CDM” or a “CDM+”304. Conversely, during the preliminary discussions 
for a New Market mechanism, the EU and the Environmental Integrity Group 
proposed a mechanism encouraging action at sector-wide levels305.
Accounting
The existing accounting system under the UNFCCC is differentiated for developed 
parties and developing parties. By virtue of the Convention, industrialised countries 
must submit GHG inventory updates each year, whereas developing countries 
may include these inventories in their biennial update reports that they must submit 
every two years—except for LDCs and SIDS, which may submit their reports at 
their discretion—or include them in their national communications, which are 
submitted every four years. 
303. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 6, para. 1, 4 and 9
304. CEPS, 2016
305. SBSTA, 2014
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The Paris Agreement sets a framework for strengthening the transparency of 
the action and of the support provided to implement these actions. However, it has 
some flexibility that incorporates the various national capacities. In this framework, 
each party must submit a national GHG inventory. The SBSTA is tasked with 
drawing up and formulating opinions on how to apply the provision of the strength 
of the accounting for cooperative approaches, for adoption at the first CMA session. 
According to paragraphs 89, 92b and 94a of Decision 1/CP.21, given the flexibility 
offered as part of the strengthened transparency framework, the developing countries 
must make efforts to be aligned with this to the extent possible, even if they do not 
necessarily strictly follow these directives, especially in the first years of their appli-
cation. The Paris Agreement does not specify how compliance of the accounting 
of a country will be ascertained, but the new transparency system will probably 
look into this (see section I.B.13 in Article 13 of the Agreement as well).
As for the accounting system, the CMA may play an active role in making 
transfers more transparent, via a central registry similar to the existing CDM registry, 
for example306. If the system is more decentralised, the directive could ask parties 
to keep their own registry with double-entry accounting and count based on the 
transparency rules suggested in Article 13, to ensure that the monitoring is sufficient 
to avoid double counting. All of Article 6 requires that the activities of Parties also 
promote sustainable development and ensure environmental integrity. As such, the 
directives, rules and procedures to be drawn up should also provide for modalities 
that ensure and assess these results based on development objectives. 
NDCs and markets
The role of the market-based instruments in the NDCs needs to be clarified, in 
terms of the accounting—especially concerning the possibility of combining climate 
funding and market-based mechanisms to implement political instruments as well 
as mitigation projects. 
Mitigation “results”
Until the decisions shed more light on some questions, it will be useful to define 
the scope of what can be considered as a “mitigation result” that can be transferred 
between countries. Under the Kyoto Protocol, Certified Emission Reductions 
(CERs) from CDM projects are an accounting unit for transferring obligations, 
and also for defining the scope of the international transfers that are accepted. In 
other words, only the transfers involving CERs are accepted in the presentation of 
national GHG accounts. The Parties will also need to examine if other forms of 
cooperation could be considered, as per paragraph 2 of Article 6. For example, the 
Joint Crediting Mechanism, a Japanese initiative that has some similarities with 
the CDM, or the bilateral link between the two exchange systems. The transfer 
concept implies that one or several countries that do not have an absolute target 
for all of their economies may trade mitigation units. This poses problems for the 
objective of avoiding double counting.
306. CEPS, 2016
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The institutional aspect
The Parties must decide on the institutional governance modalities for the new 
mechanism. The CDM is managed by an Executive Board composed of ten repre-
sentatives, including one member from each of the five UN regional groups, two 
members from the parties referred to in Annex I, two members from Non-Annex 
I parties, and one representative from the SIDS. Similarly, JI has a supervisory 
committee to monitor project verification. The new mechanism from Article 6.4 
could directly include one of these institutions. The CDM and JI already have 
procedures for developing projects that are ultimately credited. The Parties may 
decide to transfer part of this set of rules to the new mechanism, or they may 
decide to adopt new procedures.
Developing new rules
The Kyoto Protocol established the CDM in 1997. However, it took four years to 
set the CDM, in the Marrakesh Accords in 2001. It is possible and advisable to not 
take as much time to draw up the rules of Article 6.4, in light of all the experience 
with the CDM and JI. However, as the governments have diverging views on the 
role of market-based mechanisms, it will be difficult to quickly draw conclusions on 
these fundamental issues. The difficulty in reaching a consensus on market-based 
mechanisms has been reflected in the slow progress in their negotiation since 
2011, in the UNFCCC framework, working towards a Framework for Various 
Approaches (FVA) and the NMMs. However, the fact that several countries have 
attached importance to international markets in their NDCs suggests that there 
may be a strong impetus to find a viable system quickly.
The sustainable development component of Article 6 
With its adoption of the 17 sustainable development goals in 2015, the interna-
tional community has a robust base for using the concept of sustainable development, 
in the context of Article 6 of the Agreement, for example. Although the voluntary 
market produced some experience with the co-benefits of mitigation activities in 
terms of the activity programmes and projects, the CDM does not have strict rules 
for analysing the positive impacts of sustainable development and the prevention 
of negative impacts. 
The Parties must thus decide if the SDM and cooperative approach participants 
should analyse the positive and negative impacts of the suggested activities beforehand, 
and if a follow-up of these results will be required.
As the Paris Agreement aims to mitigate GHG emissions, it incorporates part 
of the sustainable development goals. SDM rules could thus require that the 
implemented results of the Agreement be monitored by MRV approaches that 
have yet to be determined. The Parties must decide whether an upstream assessment 
and results follow-up in terms of sustainable development will be mandatory or 
voluntary, and whether the rules will be set up in a centralised manner, or if the Parties 
will be free to set up their own approaches to integrate sustainable development. 
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Finalising the CDM reform and the NMM and FVA negotiations 
The future of the flexibility mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol is also uncertain, 
particularly regarding the integration of elements of the CDM and JI in this new 
mechanism. The Paris Agreement does not mention the CDM or JI. However, 
it does note that the new mechanism must build on the experience of the existing 
mechanisms. Likewise, it is difficult to know if the units produced by the Kyoto 
mechanisms will be eligible after 2020. If they are eligible, it is not easy to ascertain 
whether they should be converted into some type of alternative credit, to comply 
with the framework of the new mechanism.
The negotiators may also decide to transfer the methodologies of CDM projects 
to apply them in the new mechanism, to not incorporate some of these existing 
approaches, or to develop more of them (for example, by developing methodologies 
for sector-level activities). The negotiators may also envisage other methods used 
outside of the UNFCCC.
It will be important to quickly finalise the modalities and procedures of the 
CDM reform (at MOP 12 in Marrakesh) to offer some assurance to market players 
and to show that there will continue to be a programme in the SDM. This would 
also enable the institutional organisation of the designated national authorities 
(DNAs) to continue.
At the same time, it will be important to continue and potentially complete 
the CDM reform, so that lessons from this process can be used to develop the SDM, 
and to start a coordinated and transparent transition from the CDM to the SDM. 
As such, it is also important for the Parties to set the terms of the eligibility of the 
CDM portfolio for the SDM. They may be various levels of eligibility, to restrict 
the supply, and also to ensure CDM project developers that it will be possible to 
continue high-quality projects. It will be interesting to see if, and under what 
conditions, an activity transition from the CDM / JI toward the SDM will be 
authorised. Continuing CDM activities might only be possible if these activities 
fulfil criteria that ensure environmental integrity307. These criteria could be: addi-
tionality, benefits for the host country and contribution to global mitigation of 
global emissions. The last two criteria may require adapting baselines to make them 
more conservative. This approach could make it easier to make the new mechanism 
operational more quickly, and could send a positive signal to the private sector, 
even though it might not settle the fundamental question of the origin of the 
request. Regarding all the rules inherited from the CDM and JI, assigning a mandate 
to the Executive Board to review all of the existing rules in order to identify the 
elements that may be used, and those that must be modified in the Paris Agreement, 
would offer an opportunity to respond to these questions.
At the same time, it is important to make progress on simplifying the method-
ologies (such as the standardised baselines), and to share these results so that they 
can be applied to the SDM. 
307. Voigt, 2016
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II.3 The issues related to the Ad Hoc Working 
Group on the Paris Agreement (APA)
By adopting the Paris Agreement, the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) also decided to run a major work programme 
accompanying it, via Decision 1/CP.21. The UNFCCC decided to establish the 
Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA)308. 
Currently, in the post-Paris context, this new process is the most important 
climate change negotiation round in the various bodies that have been mandated 
to prepare the entry into force of the Paris Agreement and making it operational. 
As such, this process determines the future of the fight against the effects and conse-
quences of climate change, especially for the most vulnerable countries, including 
the LDCs and SIDS. 
For the first time, the States Parties to the Convention have agreed on the joint 
commitment to reach the target keeping the average global temperature increase 
to less than 2°C by 2100, and even to 1.5°C. They thus share the same vision in 
terms of mitigation, as well as a global adaptation target that is yet to be determined. 
Furthermore, these Parties agree to work together and to work to make support, 
transfer, and various other forms of cooperation available, which may be financial, 
technical, technological, or which may build capacity to provide a more effective 
response to climate change, via mitigation, adaptation, loss and damage, deforestation, 
land degradation, etc. in a transparent, evolving and sustainable framework. 
The mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group  
on the Paris Agreement (APA)
• Prepare the entry into force of the Paris Agreement; 
• Prepare and convene the first Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting 
of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA); 
• Prepare draft decisions that the CMA should adopt at its first session. 
The APA shall mainly be guided by the work programme elements that Decision 
1/CP.21 mandates. The APA must detail the stipulations of the Paris Agreement 
and prepare the implementation support for its components, especially: the 
target, mitigation, national contributions, adaptation, loss and damage, financing, 
technologies, capacity building, transparency, the global stocktake, preparation 
for the entry into force, etc. 
This work must be conducted in the negotiation sessions of the APA, as well as 
in the two other subsidiary bodies (SBI and SBSTA) of the UNFCCC. Several bodies 
constituted under the Convention have also been mandated to help implement 
the work programme and to help make the Paris Agreement operational, such 
as the Adaptation Committee, the Least Developed Countries Expert Group, the 
Standing Committee on Finance, the Green Climate Fund, the Global Environment 
Facility, the Technology Executive Committee, the Paris Committee on Capacity 
Building, and the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism 
for Loss and Damage.
308. Decision 1CP/21, para. 7, p. 3
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Diagram 10.  The implementation of the Paris Agreement ... Main mechanisms “for review and adoption” at CMA 1309
309. © ENERGIES 2050, October 2016
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Diagram 11.  Timeline of the implementation of the Paris  
Agreement … The points in the Marrakesh  
agenda and the upcoming Conferences310
LA MISE EN ŒUVRE DE L’ACCORD DE PARIS EN QUELQUES DATES
310. © ENERGIES 2050, October 2016 - See also the UNFCCC Progress tracker (last 
consulted on 5 October 2016) [online]
http://unfccc.int/files/paris_agreement/application/pdf/progress_tracker_08092016_ 
@1500.pdf
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The APA activities, similar to those of the other bodies and groups constituted 
and mandated by Decision 1/CP.21 should be completed, considering and based 
on the existing procedures and modalities, by improving, strengthening and/or 
developing new elements as needed for new measures.
For example, countries could continue to consider the issues of transparency 
within the existing system, via international consultation and analysis for developing 
countries, and assessment and review for developed countries, based on two parallel 
reporting systems—biennial update reports for the former and biennial reports for 
the latter.
In May 2016, at the 44th Session of Subsidiary Bodies and the first APA 
meeting, the States Parties to the Convention unanimously elected two co-chairs 
and a rapporteur to lead the work of the new body, based on the governance rules 
established in 2012 for the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for 
Enhanced Action (ADP), as per the provisions made in Decision 1/CP17311.
Every year, the APA must present a report for the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) on the progress related to the entry 
into force of the Paris Agreement and the provisions made to make its elements 
operational.
II.3.1 The first APA session
The first APA, held from 6 to 16 May 2016 in Bonn, Germany, is an essential step 
for the success of the current negotiation process and for preparing the Marrakesh 
Conference. Although the session got off to a rough start, it was able to finally note 
significant progress on the following fundamental points:
• Adoption of the APA agenda
• Adoption of the mode of planning the APA 1 work
• Election of the APA Bureau
• Agreement on some lines of work of the subsidiary bodies that are important 
for the coherence of the work programme
In fact, prior to and after the APA session in May 2016, countries and country 
groups had expressed reservations regarding the concept note312 jointly presented 
by the COP21 Chairmanship (France) and by the future COP22 Chairmanship 
(Morocco), especially regarding the proposals for priority points that need to be 
added to the draft APA. These Parties consider that the initially suggested agenda 
was focused on mitigation, and that an acceptable agenda should equitably reflect 
all the elements of the Paris Agreement.
311. UNFCCC, 2011a, Decision 1/CP17
312. UNFCCC, 2016b
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As mentioned earlier, other bodies constituted under the Convention were 
mandated just like the APA, and the two other standing subsidiary bodies of the 
Convention were mandated to run the work programme to prepare the entry into 
force and implement the Paris Agreement. Some of these bodies are not directly 
under the authority of the Convention Secretariat, such as the Global Environment 
Facility and the Green Climate Fund, which are mandated to develop provisions 
related to financial issues, and the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN) 
for technological aspects313. 
Thus, for some Parties, the APA agenda should be designed so that negotiators 
can feel confident that all the elements of the Paris Agreement will be treated in a 
balanced and equitable manner, all treated with the same importance. This would 
still be the case even if some elements of the work programme established by 
Decision 1/CP.21 were on the agendas of the two other standing subsidiary bodies 
of the Convention or of other mandated committees and groups. 
Many countries and country groups also asked for explanations and clarifications 
on the content of certain points in the initial provisional agenda, such as the description 
of the elements of the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), the modalities 
for planning and running the global stocktake, and questions relating to transparency 
and compliance.
After APA 1work began on 17 May 2016 in Bonn, and following the speeches 
of countries, country groups and alliances, the expected difficulties in adopting the 
agenda took centre stage for APA 1. The APA Co-Chairs (Saudi Arabia and New 
Zealand) had to spend two days on consultations to reach a consensus on the APA 
agenda. Minor amendments314 were made to the initial draft agenda, which essentially 
consisted of the addition of the following two points:
1. Point 4: New communication guidelines for adaptation, which are included in 
the Nationally Determined Contributions, referred to in Article 7, paragraphs 
10 and 11 of the Paris Agreement.
2. Point 8(c): Assessments of the progress made by subsidiary bodies and bodies 
constituted in the mandate that they have received in virtue of the Paris Agreement 
and Section III of Decision 1/CP.21, to promote and facilitate the coordination 
and coherence of the execution of the work programme, and if necessary, to 
take measures that may be in the form of recommendations.
313. UNFCCC, 2016b, Annex II, pp. 6-11
314. United Nations, 2016.
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II.3.2 The APA agenda
The modifications to the initial APA agenda following the deliberations of the 
Parties made it possible to respond to the expectations of most of the developing 
countries concerning adaptation and coherence between negotiation bodies. 
At the end of the first week, the APA was able to adopt its agenda based on six (6) 
essential points, as the below box explains.
Essential points of the APA provisional agenda
Point 3 Additional directives related to the Mitigation section of Decision 1/CP.21 on:
(a)  NDC characteristics, as paragraph 26 specifies;
(b)  Information to improve the clarity, transparency and understanding of the 
NDCs, as paragraph 28 specifies;
(c)  NDC accounting for the Parties, as paragraph 31 specifies.
Point 4 Additional directives related to communication on adaptation, including 
the adaptation component of the NDCs, referred to in Article 7, paragraphs 10 
and 11, of the Paris Agreement.
Point 5 Modalities, procedures and directives for action transparency and support, 
referred to in Article 13 of the Paris Agreement.
Point 6 Issues relating to the global stocktake referred to in Article 14 of the Paris 
Agreement.
(a)  Identification of the sources of information for the global stocktake;
(b)  Development of the modalities of the global stocktake.
Point 7 Modalities and procedures for the effective operation of the committee 
to facilitate the implementation and to encourage compliance with the stipulations, 
referred to in Article 15, paragraph 2 of the Paris Agreement.
Point 8 Other issues related to the implementation of the Paris Agreement:
(a)  Preparation of the the entry into force of the Paris Agreement;
(b Preparation of the convening of the first CMA session;
(c)  Assessment of the progress made by the subsidiary bodies and the bodies 
constituted under the Convention relating to their work mandated by the 
Paris Agreement and by Section III of Decision 1/CP.21, to promote and  
facilitate coordination and coherence in implementing the work programme, 
and, if necessary, to take measures, including recommendations.
In addition to showing the APA agenda points, Diagram 12 below also shows 
the work of the subsidiary bodies that are mandated to implement the work 
programme.
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Diagram 12.  The areas of work of the subsidiary bodies related  
to elements of the Paris Agreement and the decision 
accompanying it315
315. © ENERGIES 2050, October 2016 - According to UNFCCC, 2016b, Annex I, p. 5
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II.3.3 Planning the APA 1 negotiation work
The second challenge for this first session was to agree on how to plan the work of 
this new body, including the work for the subsequent APA sessions, until the first 
session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the 
Paris Agreement (CMA 1).
Despite the keen interest for and the momentum from the adoption of the 
APA agenda, and the availability of all countries to start negotiating quickly, the 
opening statements following the agenda adoption revealed that most developing 
countries, and some developed countries, would like the negotiations to take place 
with a minimum number of formal and informal groups to accommodate small 
delegations in particular, and avoid a situation where similar or related subjects 
(financing, technology, transparency, etc.) are discussed in parallel in different 
groups, as the negotiators of the delegations, who are usually specialized in certain 
subjects, cannot be in more than one meeting at a time. 
It is truly a challenge to optimise time without forgetting any element in 
quantitative or qualitative terms—when countries, country groups, and alliances 
may have different priorities and concerns, and when there may be restrictions in 
terms of time and space. 
This second challenge also required two days of informal consultations to 
reach a consensus on planning the APA work, keeping in mind that some coun-
tries, country groups, and alliances considered it was important to have the time 
and space required to meet and coordinate their positions as the negotiations 
evolved. 
The States Parties to the Convention accepted the proposal of the APA 
Co-Chairs to continue their work in a single contact group316 that must consider 
the six essential point of the agenda, to handle the issue of funds, review progress, 
determine the path to take, and review the draft conclusions. Informal consultations 
will be organised to examine the technical aspects more closely, prior to the next 
contact group meeting.
The final report of the first APA session details the elements to consider at its 
next session in Marrakesh. In particular, it stated how its work should be organised, 
and the consistency of this work317. The APA Co-Chairs will be sure to make progress 
and cover all the elements in points 3 to 8 of the agenda 318at the resumed session 
of the first APA session at COP 22.
316. IISD, 2016a.
317. UNFCCC, 2016b, para. 14-25, pp. 4-6
318. United Nations, 2016
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II.3.4 Making progress on the work of the subsidiary bodies
All the negotiators at the Bonn session in May 2016 considered that the issues 
under negotiation needed to make progress in the most optimal fashion possible, 
whether this would be under APA 1, SBI 44 or SBSTA 44, especially the issues 
from the Paris Agreement and/or Decision 1/CP.21.
The objective was to finalise as many points on the agenda as possible, or at 
least take them to the most mature stage possible in the negotiations, so that they 
do not take up a lot of time or space in Marrakesh. In light of this, there were many 
reminders of the importance of making COP 22 a meeting that is action-oriented 
and that implements, rather than just a continuation of negotiations, so that the 
Paris Agreement can be operational as soon as possible.
In Bonn in May 2016, there was more of an exchange of viewpoints than a 
negotiation of the wording of the elements in APA 1. There were several reasons 
for this, namely:
• The very large amount of time spent on concluding the agenda and work 
planning;
• The fact that many countries, country groups, and alliances requested expla-
nations and clarifications concerning how to interpret the Agreement and 
Decision 1/CP.21, which required and led to an exchange of viewpoints. 
Thus the below pending questions319 must be taken up at the second part of 
the first APA meeting. The APA exceptionally suspended its work in Bonn to take 
it up again in Marrakesh, in a more substantial fashion320:
• New directives regarding the Decision 1/CP.21 section on mitigation, and 
more specifically, on Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). 
• New directives on adaptation communication, as a component of the NDCs 
that Articles 7.10 ad 7.11 of the Paris Agreement, for example. 
• Modalities, procedures and directives for the support and action transparency 
framework
• Questions regarding the global stocktake
• Modalities and procedures so that the committee operates effectively, aiming 
to facilitate the implementation and encourage compliance with the stipulations
• Other issues related to the implementation of the Paris Agreement, such as: 
 – Preparing the entry into force 
 – Preparing the CMA 1 meeting
 – Assessment of the progress made by the subsidiary bodies and by the 
constituted bodies and groups in their their work mandated to them by the 
Paris Agreement and by Section III of Decision 1/CP.21, to promote and 
facilitate coordination and coherence in implementing the work programme, 
and, if necessary to take measures, which may include recommendations. 
319. IISD, 2016a.
320. UNFCCC, 2016b, para. 34, p. 7
101
Guide to the Negotiations - UNFCCC (COP22, CMP12 and CMA1) - OIF/IFDD, 2016
Note that two other subsidiary bodies of the UNFCCC handle other elements 
of the Paris Agreement, and have made significant progress. This significant progress 
has been noted, in particular via the conclusion of some elements of the two standing 
UNFCCC bodies. Draft texts (decisions and/or conclusions) were finalised and 
prepared 321 for COP 22, namely concerning: 
• The results of the International Assessment and Review process: draft decision 
FCCC/SBI/2016/L.12/ Add.1 
• The review of the guidelines to prepare the National Communications of 
developed countries (Annex I countries of the Convention): draft decision 
FCCC/SBI/2016/L.22 
• The provision of financial and technical support for the National Communi-
cations of developing countries (non-Annex I countries of the Convention): 
FCCC/SBI/2016/L.11 
• Drawing up modalities and procedures for the operation and use of a public 
registry referred to in Article 4.12 (NDC registry) of the Paris Agreement: 
FCCC/SBI/2016/L.18
• Drawing up modalities and procedures for the operation and use of a public 
registry referred to in Article 7.12 (adaptation communications registry) of 
the Paris Agreement: FCCC/SBI/2016/L.19
• Guidance on how the IPCC assessments may feed into the global stocktake 
of the Paris Agreement. FCCC/SBSTA/2016/L.16
• Methodological questions related to the Kyoto Protocol - land use, land-use 
change and forestry (LULUCF): FCCC/SBSTA/2016/L.6
II.3.5 Stakes of APA 1-2 in Marrakesh
Based on the results and the progress of negotiations of the May 2016 session, 
what could be the stakes for APA 1-2 in Marrakesh, at the 22nd Conference of the 
Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change?
APA has two types of stakes. The first stake is moral; the second stake is operation. 
Morally speaking, there is no doubt that the main stake is to keep the clearly 
positive spirit of COP 21 in Paris, and to bolster confidence the multilateral 
process. The agreement that was obtained is so complex and sensitive that this 
positive dynamic needs to continue and even be strengthened in Marrakesh, to 
keep the balance and the consensus obtained, and to ensure that conclusions and 
decisions follow them.
321. UNFCCC, 2016, In-session documents May 2016 - APA [online]
http://unfccc.int/meetings/bonn_may_2016/in-session/items/9555.php
UNFCCC, 2016, In-session documents May 2016 - SBI [online]
http://unfccc.int/meetings/bonn_may_2016/in-session/items/9553.php
UNFCCC, 2016, In-session documents May 2016 - SBSTA [online]
http://unfccc.int/meetings/bonn_may_2016/in-session/items/9554.php
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As for the operational stakes, they are as important and decisive as the moral 
stakes. The Marrakesh conference must be action-oriented and the implementation 
of the Paris Agreement, as the French chairmanship of COP 21 and the Moroccan 
chairmanship of COP 22 have already announced, and as indicated in the roadmap 
of the two designated champions322. 
Below are the main operational stakes: 
The stake related to the ratification process and the early entry into force 
of the Paris Agreement: 
As the depository of ratification instruments, the United Nations Secretary-General 
launched the process for ratifying the Paris Agreement on 22 April 2016. At the 
closing of COP 21, all States Parties to the UNFCCC wanted and requested this 
ratification process, which was recorded in the decision accompanying the Paris 
Agreement. When the Agreement was open for signature, 178 countries signed 
the Paris Agreement. 17 of these countries submitted their ratification instruments 
on this occasion as well. This process reached its dual threshold target earlier than 
expected, which implied the triggering of the effective entry into force of the 
Agreement.
In fact, as of 5 October 2016, 72 countries had ratified the Agreement, repre-
senting 56.75% of global emissions. On top of this, China and the United States, 
two of the most important world players in the fight against climate change, agreed 
to accede to the Agreement in 2016323. Approximately one month afterwards, 
India and New Zealand then ratified the Agreement, bringing the greenhouse gas 
emissions covered to 51.89%, just under 3% of the threshold. On 4  October 
2016, the European Parliament voted to ratify the Paris Agreement, thus validating 
the approval of the Council of Ministers of the European Union, which met on 
30 September 2016. On 5 October, the conditions for the entry into force were 
fulfilled when Austria, Bolivia, Canada, France, Germany, Hungary, Malta, Nepal, 
Portugal and Slovakia, as well as the European Union, submitted their ratification 
instruments to the Secretary-General. 
The Paris Agreement will enter into force 30 days after the date that the double 
threshold is reached—after ratification by at least 55 countries representing at least 
55% of global emissions, or on 4 November 2016. The first Conference of the 
Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA 1) will 
thus be held in Marrakesh, at the same time as COP 22 and MOP-KP 12.
This feat for climate diplomacy was possible due to the strong political support 
for the Paris Agreement and the personal commitment of the United Nations 
Secretary-General, who convened two major meetings in New York in 2016 to 
support the ratification. The last meeting was on 21 September 2016, which 
enabled 31 Parties to submit their instruments of ratification. 
322. UNFCCC, Newsroom, 2016b
323. USDS, 2016
103
Guide to the Negotiations - UNFCCC (COP22, CMP12 and CMA1) - OIF/IFDD, 2016
This is thus an important stake for the Marrakesh conference, which should 
determine the options to be implemented to continue and to execute the work 
programme that should draw up the rules, modalities, procedures, directives, and 
mechanisms to make the Paris Agreement operational. This was initially assigned 
to the APA, in cooperation with standing subsidiary bodies and bodies constituted 
under the Convention and designated for this purpose. New modalities should 
determine the continuation, duration, and conditions for the existence of the 
APA, as well as the decision-making elements that it must prepare for CMA 1. 
This is additional to what the other subsidiary bodies or expert groups and committees 
mandated in Decision 1/CP.21 must accomplish. 
In this case in particular, it is important to consider the potential role and 
position of the countries which have not yet ratified the Paris Agreement and 
which will not be Parties to the Agreement, on the date of its entry into force and 
of the convening of the first CMA session. Would they be included in the continu-
ation of the technical procedures and rules, by assigning them the status of observer 
members to the CMA? Would they really play a role in the decision-making process? 
They could, in the event that the CMA 1 is suspended and the APA mandate is 
extended, or in the event that the subsidiary bodies are mandated to continue the 
APA work. 
In Bonn in May 2016, during the discussions on the potential early entry into 
force, many countries supported a quick entry into force of the Paris Agreement to 
keep the COP 21 spirit alive. Other countries called to prioritise the ratification of 
the Doha Amendment. Some countries were concerned about the future of the 
APA—should it be suspended? Continued? Should the CMA be suspended and 
relaunched later?
This issue would require the COP 22 to take on additional work, given the 
preparation and adoption of decisions concerning the APA and CMA. 
Do also note that even in the event of an early entry into force, the NDC 
implementation schedules, as specified in the communications of the Parties (from 
2020), are still valid. The current priorities are to draw up the modalities and proce-
dures, and to prepare the implementation, especially appropriate and adequate 
climate financing. 
The stake related to the finalisation and submission of Nationally Determined 
Contributions: 
Paragraph 22 of Decision 1/CP.21324 invites Parties to “communicate their first 
nationally determined contribution no later than when the Party submits its 
respective instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval of the Paris Agreement, 
or accession to it; if a Party has communicated an intended nationally determined 
contribution prior to acceding to the Agreement, that Party shall be considered to 
have satisfied this provision unless that Party decides otherwise”. 
324. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 22, p. 4
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In this same Decision, the APA is asked to draw up new directives for the 
characteristics of the NDCs, and information that should clarify and explain 
them, which the CMA should review and adopt325. The main challenge here was 
to make as much progress as possible in drawing up these new directives, with a 
view to an early entry into force of the Paris Agreement.
In other words, many countries are concerned about the future directives for 
the NDCs. Most of these countries have submitted their national contributions 
based on what they have understood and evaluated. For many countries, this is the 
very first experience in quantified GHG emissions reduction commitments and 
adaptation actions, with adequate support, which must be upheld.
The issue related to the coherence of the process: 
Regarding the coherence of the process for the preparation and implementation of 
the Paris Agreement, there were interesting discussions at APA 1 in Bonn. The 
objective was to avoid repetition and duplication by the various subsidiary bodies 
and groups and committees of experts mandated to prepare draft conclusions and 
decisions for APA 1 and during the following APAs. 
This important element was added to the APA 1 agenda, based on the initial 
proposal made by the African Group. It will enable Parties to regularly examine 
the coherence of the preparation and of the implementation of the elements of the 
Paris Agreement and the decision that accompanies it, via three subsidiary bodies, 
as well as other committees and bodies constituted under the UNFCCC.
The stake is thus to ensure that each element (adaptation, mitigation, financing, 
transparency, capacity building, loss and damage, etc.) is given appropriate attention 
in quantitative and qualitative terms, in terms of space and time at COP 22 and at 
the subsequent negotiation sessions.
The stake is also to allow Parties to examine the ways to strengthen coordination 
and ensure balanced progress326 in the bodies mandated by the Paris Agreement 
and the decision that accompanies it. This should consider the time that will be 
devoted to the negotiations, to the priorities that some countries, country groups 
and/or alliances shall request, the potential early entry into force of the Paris 
Agreement, and the first CMA. 
Conclusion: 
The APA is a new body based in Paris that works closely with other subsidiary 
bodies. The bodies that have been constituted have been mandated for the imple-
mentation of an ambitious work programme aiming to prepare the entry into 
force of the Agreement, as well as to draw up the directives, rules, and procedures 
that should enable the Paris Agreement to be completely operational. With the 
start of this work in Bonn in May 2016, and the decision-making concerning 
325. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 26 and 28, p. 5
326. IISD, 2016a.
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the planning of its work, including the work programme, the APA should make 
progress on fundamental questions starting from the second part of its first session 
in Marrakesh. The APA negotiators are dealing with a particularly challenging 
situation, with the confirmation of the entry into force of the Paris Agreement on 
4 November 2016, whose implications include but are not limited to administrative, 
organisational, and procedural aspects for the APA. The negotiators should incor-
porate the crucial stakes of the APA, to decide what its future process should be.
Measures must be taken to manage the early and rapid entry into force of the 
Paris Agreement, and ensure that progress is made in drawing up the required rules 
and procedures, and modalities and directives. However, we need to be realistic, and 
the options to be considered in a spirit of consensus must be finalised and imple-
mented as soon as possible. 
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III.1 Pursuing efforts towards 1.5°C 
The Copenhagen Accord was concluded at COP 15 in 2009. It referred to 
an assessment of the ultimate target of the Convention by 2015, which could 
incorporate scientific work on a 1.5°C increase. However, this was mainly a target 
that deserved to be taken into consideration in the future.
In particular, this concept has gained ground via an accumulation of scientific 
knowledge, mainly based on GHG emissions trajectories that can limit the tempera-
ture increase to 2 °C327, dangerous disturbances to the climate system which would 
result from this, and the many potential consequences of this warming, such as a 
significant rise in sea levels and massive population displacement, desertification 
of certain regions, and their consequences—malnutrition and famine, a massive 
increase in natural disasters such as storms, cyclones, floods, etc.
The Paris Agreement is the first to set a target to limit global warming to 1.5°C. 
The Parties also recognised that the 2030 emissions trajectory from the INDCs 
submitted by the parties must be decreased by 28% to reach 2°C by 2100. The 
Parties also recognised that more scientific data is required to establish a least-cost 
trajectory to achieve the 1.5°C target328.
To fill these knowledge gaps, the Parties invited the IPCC to present a special 
report in 2018 on the consequences of global warming of over 1.5°C compared to 
pre-industrial levels, and the related pathways of the evolution of global greenhouse 
gas emissions.329 The IPCC accepted this invitation at its 43rd meeting330. There is 
no doubt that this is a major challenge, with the current commitments of the Parties 
leading to an average temperature increase that could reach approximately 2.7°C331 
to 3.5°C332 at the end of the century, according to two independent analyses.
327. IPCC, 2014a, p. 5
328. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, para. 17.
329. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, para. 21.
330. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, para. 20.
331. Analysis of Climate Action Tracker at 8 December 2015 on 158 INDCs representing 
185 countries [online] http://climateactiontracker.org/assets/publications/briefing_
papers/CAT_Temp_Update_COP21.pdf. 
332. Analysis of Climate Interactive at 18 May 2016 [online]
https://www.climateinteractive.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Stronger-Pledges- 
May-2016.pdf.
Part III 
The main subjects under debate
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In Paris, several developing countries emphasised that it is was important for 
them to limit the global temperature rise to 1.5°C, rather than 2°C, as their populations 
are dealing with various repercussions of the warming that has already happened. 
The ALBA333, AOSIS334, Coalition for Rainforest Nations335, African Group336 and 
LDC Group337 have all made 1.5°C one of their main objectives for Paris. The African 
Group and AILAC have also suggested that an increase of over 1.5°C should 
involve developed countries offering more funding to developing countries, which 
would probably be confronted with the most harmful effects of global warming338. 
However, limiting the global temperature increase to 1.5°C is a major challenge. 
This is partly because most of the scientific work to date has examined the options 
to limit the increase to 2°C. This is also partly because there is barely a decade left 
before we cross the threshold of an average global temperature rise of 1.5°C, compared 
to pre-industrial levels339. 
With a view to this, and to have better tools to pursue efforts aiming to limit 
the average global temperature rise to 1.5°C by 2100, the Parties decided to “convene 
a facilitative dialogue among Parties in 2018 to take stock of the collective efforts of 
Parties in relation to progress towards the long-term goal”. However, it is plausible that 
continued efforts in this direction could hit a stumbling block. On the other hand, 
for instance, an independent analysis published in May 2016 suggests that reaching 
the 1.5°C target would imply that developed countries would actually need to 
reduce their GHG emission by 45% by 2030, compared to their 2005 emissions 
baseline. This means that the efforts currently proposed in the NDCs of some of 
these countries would need to be intensified 340. 
For example, the analysis suggests that the European Union should increase 
its effort in its NDC by 22% for the 2025-2030 period, reducing its GHG emissions 
by 62% in 2030 compared to the 1990 baseline, in contrast to the 40% reduction 
that is currently planned. As for the United States, its NDC effort is based on its 
2005 emissions. The analysis suggests that limiting the global temperature increase 
to 1.5°C would require the ambition of the United States to be almost 2.5 times 
higher, with an emissions reduction of 60% by 2030, instead of 26%. As for all 
the other developed countries, their cumulative effort implies an increase of their 
collective GHG emissions by 2% compared to the 2005 baseline. The analysis also 
suggests that reaching 1.5°C would require them to actually reduce their emissions, 
333. ALBA, 2015
334. AOSIS, 2015
335. Coalition for Rainforest Nations, 2015
336. African Group, 2015
337. https://unfccc.int/files/bodies/awg/application/pdf/submission_by_nepal_on_
behalf_of_ldc_group_on_views_and_proposals_on_the_work_of_the_adp.pdf
338. African Group, 2013; IISD, 2015c, p. 5 for AILAC, Mexico and the Dominican 
Republic
339. Reuters, according to data from the UK Met Office’s Hadley Centre, 2016, [online]
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-climatechange-impacts-conference-idUSKCN11S1FE
340. Climate Interactive, 2016
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by 60%, over this same period. Finally, according to this same scenario, China would 
need to cap its GHG emissions in 2025 rather than in 2030. The rest of the devel-
oping countries would be asked to cap their emissions in 2027. 
In addition to this independent analysis, there is the more recent “Emissions 
Gap Report” that the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) published 
in 2015. This report highlights that limiting the global temperature increase to 
1.5°C would most likely require global GHG emissions to be neutral by 2050341. 
This is 20 years earlier than a scenario where the increase would be restricted to 
2°C. It is thus plausible that the Parties will face major challenges at the facilitation 
dialogue of the Parties in 2018, to take stock of the collective efforts to reach the 
long-term target. With the planned 2018 publication of the IPCC special report on 
reaching 1.5°C as well, it is plausible that the facilitative dialogue will incorporate 
the results of this work. However, the IPCC may face various challenges in compiling 
this special report, which the below box examines.
IPCC Special Report on 1.5°C
Consequences of global warming of over 1.5°C 
For several developing countries, it is essential to improve scientific knowledge 
of the consequences of a global temperature rise of 1.5°C. Their populations 
are already suffering the major impacts of the global warming that is already 
happening. These consequences are mainly climatic or hydrological phenomena 
that may be intense or slow, such has hurricanes, floods, or longer droughts. 
These phenomena are already becoming more frequent. The global temperature 
has risen by approximately 0.6 ° between 1986 and 2005 compared to the pre-
industrial era2. In the past, the IPCC has highlighted that there are already  
anthropogenic disturbances to the climate 3. 
These consequences already entail a high economic and social cost, mainly for 
developing countries. One analysis considers that in 2013 alone, natural disasters 
caused nearly 120 billion US dollars in damages, in addition to affecting the lives 
of nearly 100 million individuals4. The IPCC has thus set a major and important 
challenge—to better understand how the climate system could respond to a 
temperature rise that is more subtle than the 2°C increase compared to the 
pre-industrial baseline. The idea is to provide concrete scientific tools to States 
at the next facilitative dialogue on reaching the objective enshrined in the Paris 
Agreement, if the Parties would like to execute the most ambitious part—limiting 
the increase to 1.5°C. Some observers consider that this mandate of the Parties 
to the IPCC demonstrates the will to finally define what society considers as a 
dangerous interference to the climate system. These observers also add that 
the 1.5°C limit represents the least risk that is socially acceptable5.
341. UNEP, 2015. Emissions Gap Report
Continued on page 110
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Related global GHG emissions pathways
In its most recent synthesis report, the IPCC highlights that there is currently 
little work analysing emissions trajectories that limit the temperature increase 
to 1.5°C6. However, the IPCC has identified three action areas that could limit 
the temperature increase to 1.5°C: (i) immediate action on mitigation; (ii) rapid 
implementation of all emissions mitigation technologies that are currently available; 
(iii) development that encourages low-carbon energy demand. As for UNEP, in its 
2015 “Emissions Gap Report”, it highlighted that a recent study evaluated scenarios 
related to current and forecast pathways which would make the 1.5°C target possible7. 
However, these scenarios imply a rapid increase in the pre-2020 ambition and 
an economy that is completely carbon neutral by 2050 as well8. These scenarios 
also forecast a 50% chance of limiting the temperature increase to 1.5°C by 
2100, and highlight that the increase would most likely surpass this threshold in 
any case, and then fall back to 1.5°C, if sufficient efforts are made. UNEP notes 
that there is currently very little data available to evaluate these pathways, with 
an over 2/3rds chance of limiting the temperature increase to 1.5°C. To reach 
this, it seems that global GHG emissions would need to drop by 12% by 2030 
compared to the 1990 threshold—knowing that these emissions actually increased 
by 36% between 1990 and 2014. 
1. Decision IPCC/XLIII-7, para. 1. [online] http://www.ipcc.ch/meetings/session43/p43_decisions.pdf.
2. IPCC, 2014a
3. See IPCC, 2007; IPCC, 2012; IPCC, 2014b
4. CRED, 2014
5. Nature Climate Change, 2016a
6. IPCC, 2014a
7. UNEP, 2015
8. UNEP, 2015
Table 5: Examples of differentiated consequences  
of a temperature rise of 2 °C versus 1.5 °C342
Increase of 2 °C Increase of 1.5 °C
Extreme weather events linked to the temperature 
are 5 times as frequent 
Extreme weather events are 2.5 times as frequent 
65% increase in extreme weather events related 
to precipitation
45% increase in extreme weather events related 
to precipitation
Drop in water resources in subtropical regions: 
17% decrease in half of the territory covered  
by the Mediterranean Basin 
Drop in water resources in subtropical regions:  
9% decrease in half of the territory covered by  
the Mediterranean Basin 
6% drop in global wheat production every time 
the temperature rises by 1°C. In tropical regions, 
increase in local rice and soy yields. 
6% drop in global wheat production every time 
the temperature rises by 1°C. In tropical regions, 
increase in local rice and soy yields.
Nearly all coral reefs in temperate waters are 
threatened with long-term degradation.
Less coral reefs threatened with long-term 
degradation.
342. Schleussner et coll., 2016
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Diagram 13.  Evolution of the Convention target and incorporating the 1.5°C343
343. © ENERGIES 2050, October 2016
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Diagram 14.  Projected rise in the global temperature by 2100, 
based on emissions pathways from 1990 to 2030344
344. © ENERGIES 2050, October 2016 - Based on information from the Synthesis Report 
on the aggregate effect of INDCs from the UNFCCC Secretariat. See UNFCCC, 
2016d
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III.2 National considerations related  
to the implementation of the NDCs
III.2.1 From INDCs to NDCs ... an unprecedented process 
in the implementation of international climate 
change agreements
a. Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) in the 
heart of the Paris Agreement
The Kyoto Protocol (KP) is part of the international negotiation process concerning 
(the fight against) climate change by virtue of the UNFCCC, and was the first 
international climate agreement that was legally binding. It was adopted on 11 
December 1997 and entered into force on 16 February 2005345 The industrialised 
countries committed to quantitative reduction targets for their GHG emissions 
for the 2008-2012 period, compared to a 1990 baseline346. For this first commit-
ment period, developing countries (LDCs) did not have quantitative targets347, 
which was in line with the CBDR principle stated in Article 3, paragraph 1 of the 
UNFCCC348.
At the end of the 18th Conference of the Parties (COP) in 2012 in Doha, the 
Parties to the UNFCCC began the second commitment period under the KP349. 
As of now, this only covers approximately 15% of global GHG emissions for the 
2013-2020 period350. Despite significant progress from the KP, this second stage is 
considered as a failure. This assessment is due to the fact that few States have 
renewed their commitments, and also because the targets are still differentiated. 
Thus only developed countries and economies in transition are subject to reduction 
commitments351.
345. UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol [online] http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php
346. The Parties referred to in Annex I (developed countries) that have ratified the protocol 
were to reduce their emissions of six GHGs by 5% compared to a 1990 baseline during 
the 2008-2012 period, as per Article 3, paragraph 1 of the Kyoto Protocol
347. National Assembly of the French Republic, 2016, p. 3
348. United Nations, 1992a, UNFCCC, Article 3 para. 1, p. 5
349.  UNFCCC, 2014a
350. National Assembly of the French Republic, 2016, p. 4
351. Moreover, a very small number of countries have fulfilled their commitments, and 
some countries have even questioned their commitments in the process as a whole. 
For example, Canada withdrew in 2011, and the United States never ratified the 
Protocol.
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Over the course of the years, several Parties have questioned this differentiation, 
in light of the contributions of each Party to current global emissions. This differ-
entiation is due to the historical responsibility of the industrialised countries in 
anthropogenic GHG emissions. In terms of accounting, the situation has changed 
since the Kyoto process was launched, and developing countries (as a whole) 
contribute more to global CO2 emissions than developed countries352. However, 
behind this aggregate figure are the different situations of each Party at the national 
level. Developing countries also need to develop, fulfil basic needs, and improve 
the quality of life of their citizens. It is thus essential for everyone to be involved 
in reducing GHG emissions, and to have a new agreement—in hopes that the global 
temperature rise can be kept to sustainable levels. At the same time, the adaptation 
and resilience of developing countries must be taken into consideration353.
With the failure of the second KP commitment period, and the need to bring 
together all of the contracting parties under a new global climate agreement, the 
Parties to the UNFCCC re-examined how they approach the fight against climate 
change (see Section I.A.2). 
The implementation of a bottom-up approach in the national mitigation 
contributions aimed to ensure that all States Parties (developing and developed 
countries) are involved in a collective process. The addition of the commitments made 
by the States should make it possible to limit the average temperature rise of 2° C.
In practice, the process of drawing up the INDCs was to result in a participatory 
and inclusive process—by calling upon all the resources of each country, so that 
the commitments would be built together, and based on a feeling of ownership, to 
make it easier to transform commitments into concrete projects and implement 
them, with measurable impacts.
The contributions of the States were reported to the UNFCCC Secretariat all 
throughout 2015, prior to COP 21. 
352. World Resources Institute, 2009; “Developing Nations Surpass Industrialized Countries’ 
Emissions in 2005” 
353. World Resources Institute, 2014
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Diagram 15.  The INDCs, an innovative and inclusive process for  
implementing the first universal climate agreement354
354. © ENERGIES 2050, October 2016
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b. From INDCs to NDCs, a process at the core of the Paris Agreement
The dynamic of drawing up INDCs was a key vector in COP 21 and in drawing 
up the Paris Agreement. It enabled all players to participate in a proactive dynamic 
that considers the reality of each player. From an official point of view, mitigation 
is the initial entry point for the INDCs. However, the developing countries, just 
like the economies in transition, emphasised what is realistic in terms of adaptation, 
in addition to their potential contributions to the global GHG reduction effort. 
Some of them have structured their INDC documents so that they begin by intro-
ducing adaptation stakes and the objectives of low-carbon development, with 
mitigation co-benefits. In their INDCs, developing countries were also able to bring 
out their needs in terms of financing (via the Green Climate Fund, for example), 
and in terms of North-South and South-South capacity and technology transfer, 
as part of the so-called “conditional” targets, which go beyond their “unconditional 
targets”355. This innovative approach was decisive in obtaining the Paris Agreement, 
the first universal climate agreement, which applies to all Parties. 
As for the execution of the commitments included in the national contributions, 
the agreement adopted in Paris asks that the provisional INDC action plans (“intended 
contributions”) be transformed into concrete action. The national contributions must 
thus be replaced by Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) (see Section I.B).
The capacity of each country is considered and re-asserted in the Paris Agreement, 
reflecting equity, common but differentiated responsibilities, and different national 
contexts356. The industrialised countries must thus take the lead “by undertaking 
economy-wide absolute emission reduction targets”357. For developing countries, the 
climate ambition must be integrated into development goals, particularly via 
adaptation measures with mitigation co-benefits358. This being said, developing 
countries are encouraged to “enhanc[e] their mitigation efforts”359 for low carbon 
development. To enable them to take the most ambitious measures, “in accordance 
with Articles 9, 10 and 11” of the Paris Agreement, they will receive financial and 
technical support.360 
III.2.2 Realistic implementation of NDCs in each country
a. States must cooperate to reach targets 
INDCs are the result of an inclusive and participatory process that is unprecedented 
in the history of the UNFCCC. The INDCs reflect a shared understanding of as 
well as a shared ambition of the fight against climatic disruptions and the sustainable 
development of our societies. The connection between development and the climate 
355. Not conditional on external support
356. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 2
357. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4, para. 4
358. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4, para. 7
359. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4, para. 4
360. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4, para. 5
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was also reasserted. In fact, the Paris Agreement and the Adoption Decision confirm 
that development takes priority over measures required to mitigate climate change, 
especially concerning two specific points: (i) universal access to energy, particularly 
in Africa via renewable energy deployment361; (ii) food security, which is recognised 
as a “fundamental priority” in the preamble of the agreement362.
As such, the national ambitions related to the implementation of the NDCs 
reflect the objectives of the States based on their actual situations, as well as the goal 
of showing more solidarity in the world, making the world resilient and sustainable. 
Having said that, the participation of all States in the Paris Agreements must involve 
their cooperation to reach the objectives, which is just as important. Concretely, 
this involves in capacity transfers (financially and technologically speaking) for 
developing countries.
Overall, the INDCs of developed countries include mitigation, whereas those 
of developing countries are more targeted towards adaptation, loss and damage, 
capacity building and sustainable development—in addition to mitigation. Support 
for funding and technology transfer is mainly in the conditional targets of devel-
oping countries. Overall, in their INDCs, the themes that developing countries 
have highlighted are adaptation (according to the latest UNFCCC figures, 137 
Parties included adaptation targets363), financing, and capacity building. However, 
industrialised countries have not highlighted this. This is despite the fact that 
implementation will require close collaboration amongst States: Whether the targets 
are conditional or unconditional, developing country targets may not be upheld 
without appropriate technical and financial support. The process of making the 
Green Climate Fund operational shall be a key part of the implementation in this 
framework.
In terms of financing, since Copenhagen in 2009, the developed countries 
have committed to mobilising 100 billion US dollars for climate projects from 2020 
onwards 364. This amount is henceforth a lower threshold, and by 2025, a new 
target will need to be set, “taking into account the needs and priorities of developing 
countries”, “in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 3, of the Agreement”365.
Article 9 of the Paris Agreement thus states that “developed country Parties 
shall provide financial resources to assist developing country Parties with respect to both 
mitigation and adaptation in continuation of their existing obligations under the 
Convention. “366. It also states that the latter must report quantitative and qualitative 
information on funding allocated to developing countries every two years367. Article 9 
also specifies that “such mobilization of climate finance should represent a progression 
361. Decision 1/CP.21, Preamble of Decision 1/CP.21
362. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Preamble of the Paris Agreement
363. UNFCCC, 2016d
364. European Parliament, 2014, p. 2
365. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 54
366. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 9, para. 1
367. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 9, para. 5
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beyond previous efforts”368. Going beyond just the developed countries, “other Parties 
are encouraged to provide or continue to provide such support voluntarily”369.
In practice, beyond the ins and outs of the registered commitments, the ambition 
to mobilise 100 billion dollars annually is only mentioned in the introduction of 
the official documents, and is not an integral part of the text of the Agreement. 
This is because the industrialised countries did not want this target to become binding. 
This also allows them to be flexible in adjusting their contributions based on their 
national budgets. This was also one of the red lines of the negotiations for developed 
countries. Although this is not binding and there are no official instruments, 
financing perspectives are firming up.
On the other hand, for the moment, little progress has been made toward 
mobilising 100 billion dollars annually by 2020, despite the implementation of 
the promising Green Climate Fund. The targets and their tools are yet to be defined. 
The contribution of the Marrakesh conference to make these targets a reality, and 
their effective implementation, constitute significant progress in the fight against 
climate change, necessarily involving the perspective of increasingly stronger cooper-
ation with the States. 
b. The goal of monitoring the implementation of objectives:  
increasing the ambition level of the NDCs and the MRV approach
As of 5 October 2016, 163 INDCs were submitted to the UNFCCC370, covering 189 
Parties (the European Union presented a single INDC on behalf of all its Members). 
These contributions represent 96% of the Parties to the UNFCCC and a total of 
95.7% of global GHG emissions371.
However, even if the current commitments are fully met, they will not be able to 
keep warming “well below 2°C”, the target set in the Paris agreement372. Paragraph 19 
of Decision 1/CP.21 asked the Secretariat to prepare an assessment report on the 
contribution of INDCs to combating climate change. This report was released in 
2016 and takes into account all the INDCs submitted as of 4 April 2016. According 
to this document, entitled “Updated synthesis report on the aggregate effect of intended 
nationally determined contributions”373, an expected surplus of global GHG emissions, 
averaging 8.7 GtCO2e and 15.2 GtCO2 in 2025 and 2030 respectively, compared 
to a scenario that is compatible with a 2°C pathway. Increasing the ambition 
related to converting INDCs into NDCs is thus an important corollary to reaching 
the targets. If this does not happen naturally, the follow-up process established by 
the Paris Agreement shall be used to this end.
368. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 9, para. 3
369. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 9, para. 2
370. UNFCCC, INDCs as communicated by Parties [online]
http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/INDC/Submission%20Pages/submissions.aspx
371. UNFCCC, Newsroom, 2016a
372. The Paris Agreement recorded the target of keeping warming “well below” 2°C.
373. UNFCCC, 2016d
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In this framework, to reach the Paris Agreement targets, as per Decision 1/
CP.21, each Party must report and renew its NDCs every 5 years374. The Parties 
may modify their NDCs at any given time, as long as the level of ambition is 
increased375. In addition to all this reflection, the implementation of the NDCs 
must absolutely be clear and transparent.376This is at the core of the current process. 
As such, Measuring, Reporting and Verification (MRV) are key and should be fully 
integrated in the implementation of NDCs, to monitor them—and in increasing 
the level of ambition in achieving the targets. It is true that the level of ambition 
is currently not enough. However the process of converting INDCs into concrete 
action plans is still crucial, and must be complemented by assessment and monitoring 
indicators as per the MRV approach. 
The INDCs are converted into NDCs when the Parties submit their instruments 
of ratification of the Paris Agreement. The contributions then become concrete 
action plans that are legally binding as soon as the Agreement enters into force.
In line with the submission of the instruments of ratification, the number of 
NDCs increases at the same time377. These NDCs are recorded in an interim public 
registry under the UNFCCC Secretariat (as per Article 4, paragraph 12 of the Paris 
Agreement)378. The modalities and procedures for the operation and use of a public 
NDC registry was one of the key questions of the Bonn Conference on climate 
change, which was held from 16 to 26 May 2016379.
The conversion of INDCs into NDCs is henceforth legally binding (which is 
encouraging progress). However, once the Paris Agreement enters into force, this 
must be put into perspective, as this process, to put it crudely, copy-pastes the 
INDCs into NDCs. This is the first failure in increasing the level of ambition—
which is necessary. 
374. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4, para. 9
375. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4, para. 11
376. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4, para. 8
377. As per paragraph 22 of Decision 1/CP.21, which “invites Parties to communicate their 
first nationally determined contribution no later than when the Party submits its respective 
instrument of ratification, accession, or approval of the Paris Agreement. If a Party has 
communicated an intended nationally determined contribution prior to joining the Agreement, 
that Party shall be considered to have satisfied this provision unless that Party decides otherwise”
378. UNFCCC, NDCs Registry (interim) [online] http://www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/Pages/
All.aspx
379. IISD, 2016a, p. 9.
This conference included the 44th sessions of the Subsidiary Body on Implementation, 
which is responsible in particular for determining the modalities and procedures for 
the public NDC registry.
The SBI plenary session examined this point (FCCC/SBI/2016/INF.6) at its plenary session 
on Monday 16 May, under the heading “CDN registry referred to in Article 4.12 of the 
Paris Agreement” on the provisional agenda. It was also examined by the plenary session 
on Friday 20 May, and SBI decided to continue reviewing this question at SBI 45.
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In the process of implementing the Paris Agreement, the ratification of China 
and the United States, the two main global emitters, on 3 September 2016380 was 
an important step. The high-level event on the ratification of the Paris Agreement 
that the United Nations Secretary-General held on 21 September 2016, on the 
sidelines of the 71st session of the General Assembly was also a strong signal sent 
to all of the contracting Parties. 
Based on the statements and national indications provided at the high-level 
meeting on the opening ceremony for the signature of the Paris Agreement, held 
in New York on 22 April 2016, it was very likely that many countries (at least 58 
States) will have ratified the Paris Agreement by the end of 2016. Thus as early as 
this event, rapid and early entry into force was clearly possible.
It was fundamental for the EU to ratify the Agreement, to ensure that the two 
thresholds in Article 21 of the Paris Agreement would be reached. The European 
Commission submitted its proposal for the ratification of the Paris Agreement to 
the European Parliament.381 The European Commission pleaded to have the Paris 
Agreement implemented as soon as possible, which must lead to the accession of 
individual Member States, which are asked to take the measures required to submit 
their instruments of ratification to the EU at the same time.
As of 4 October, the European Parliament approved the ratification of the 
Paris Agreement by the EU, following its adoption by the council of European 
ministers on 30 September. As of this date, seven Member States (Hungary382, 
France383, Austria384, Slovakia385 and Germany386, Malta387 and Portugal388) had already 
completed all the national formalities for ratification. These countries, as well as 
the European Union, submitted their instruments to the depositary, the United 
Nations Secretary-General, on 5 October, with 3 other countries (Bolivia, Canada 
and Nepal). On the same date, the two thresholds (55-55%) required for the entry 
into force of the Paris Agreement were met, with the ratification of 72 Parties, 
representing 56.75% of global emissions.
Beyond this rapid ratification, the challenges of ambition, implementation 
and monitoring of targets are still core issues and should not be underestimated. 
380. United Nations Treaties Depositary, Status of the Paris Agreement [online]
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7- 
d&chapter=27&clang=_en
381. European Commission, 2016
382. Climatechangenews, 2016a
383. Climatechangenews, 2016b
384. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-07/09/c_135499491.htm 
385. https://www.euractiv.com/section/climate-environment/news/slovakia-becomes-
fourth-eu-country-to-ratify-the-paris-climate-agreement/
386. http://phys.org/news/2016-09-german-lawmakers-ratify-paris-climate.html
387. http://www.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/L-Union-europeenne-ratifie-l
388. http://www.lorientlejour.com/article/1010246/portugal-le-parlement-ratifie-laccord- 
de-paris-sur-le-climat.html
121
Guide to the Negotiations - UNFCCC (COP22, CMP12 and CMA1) - OIF/IFDD, 2016
Monitoring and the challenge of  
implementing targets linked to NDCs
A set of interconnected articles in the Paris Agreement implements a binding 
legal architecture to reach the level of ambition in the mitigation targets linked 
to the NDC. This includes the targets limiting the long-term global temperature389 
and the matching mitigation targets390, and the requirement for all Parties to 
progressively increase their mitigation targets to collectively reach the level of 
ambition of the Paris Agreement. This dynamic should be strengthened by a renewal 
of the NDCs in five-year cycles that are increasingly ambitious, and informed by 
scientific assessments.391
The Paris Agreement thus creates two cycles:
The first cycle commits the Parties to present their NDCs when they accede392 
to the Paris Agreement, if they have not already done this via their INDCs, or 
if they would like to modify them393. Each future contribution should constitute 
progress compared to the previous contribution, and also reflect common but 
differentiated responsibilities and the respective capacities of each country, in 
light of the various national contexts. Parties whose INDCs have a 10-year 
schedule are asked to report or update these contributions394.
The second cycle consists of a first global stocktake of collective efforts that will 
be conducted in 2023395. This will then take place every five years, with a facilita-
tive dialogue in 2018396. All the Parties must present a report using a shared 
transparency framework, and support shall be provided to developing countries 
to enable them to fulfil their commitments in terms of drawing up reports397.
To reach the targets, with a realistic view of the future, the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change is asked to “provide a special report in 2018 on the impacts 
of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse 
gas emission pathways”398.
389. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 2, para. 1
390. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4, para. 1
391. Nature Climate Change, 2016b, p. 830
392. Ratification or equivalent process 
393. , Decision 1/CP.21, para. 22
394. IISD, 2016a, p. 3.
395. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 14, para. 2
396. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 20
397. IISD, 2016a, p. 3.
398. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 21
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III.3 Ambition and sectoral approaches
III.3.1 Ambition
During the UNFCCC negotiations, one of the most important challenges to 
reaching the Convention objectives was ambition—especially concerning GHG 
emissions reduction, the financing required for developing countries to truly partici-
pate, cooperation in environmentally sound technology development and transfer, 
and institutional capacity building for developing countries, and particularly for 
LDCs and SIDS. 
To clearly grasp the ambition related to the sectoral approaches in the Paris 
Agreement and the decision that accompanies it, a distinction must be made 
between the stipulations and costly measures in the Paris Agreement and Decision 
1/CP.21 for the post-2020 period and for those relative to the pre-2020 period, 
which are also set in Decision 1/CP.21.
First of all, it is worth recalling that only an ambition compatible with the 
studies that will be led by the IPCC as well as by several other institutions, will 
make it possible to reach the target of limiting global warming to 2°C, in terms of 
GHG emissions mitigation, financing adaptation and mitigation measures, and 
deploying environmentally sound technologies. 
The issue of ambition has also been at the core of negotiations since the adoption 
of the Convention, in accordance with the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities.
In fact, the right from the adoption of the Convention, it set up arrangements 
and measures to make the commitments of all Parties effective, particularly the 
commitments of developed countries and other Parties included in Annex I. However, 
the various COPs which followed the COP in Berlin in 1995 have observed that 
progress has been relatively modest in terms of reducing GHG emissions, deploying 
environmentally sound technology, and financial support, for mitigation as well as 
adaptation. 
Likewise, although the Kyoto Protocol (adopted in 1997, followed by entry into 
force in 2005) set a relatively low emissions reduction target just for the Annex I 
countries (-5% compared to a 1990 emissions baseline) in the first commitment 
period from 2008 to 2012, it was able to set up flexibility mechanisms, and the 
CDM in particular. The CDM enabled the participation of many country entities 
from both Annex I and non-Annex I, which significantly contributed to reaching 
the target set for this period.
The international community observed that binding Kyoto Protocol targets 
alone would not be enough to reach the Convention target due to the weak target 
(related reduction target), and due to the participation. As such, the international 
community set up several other mechanisms to lead the Parties to adopt low-carbon 
emission strategies. At COP 15 in Copenhagen, this resulted in the establishment 
of an arrangement anticipating voluntary commitments from developed countries that 
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are not Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, and then the establishment of arrangements 
for Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) for developing countries. 
This concept was launched in Bali (COP 13), and its framework was clarified at 
subsequent COPs in Copenhagen (COP 15 in 2009), Cancun (COP 16 in 2010), 
and Durban (COP 17 in 2011). 
Likewise, the procedures for reporting GHG inventories more frequently 
were set up (biennial reports for developed countries and biennial update reports 
for developing countries)
Based on the IPCC work, which showed that the target of the first commitment 
period was weak and that the level of ambition had to be raised, the KP Annex I 
Parties were asked to make GHG reduction commitments of between 25 and 40 
% compared to a 1990 baseline by 2020. The results of COP 18 did not make it 
possible to endorse this target, and the expected reduction of the countries that 
accepted to participate in this 2ndKP commitment period will have difficulty 
reaching 18%.
Thus, although the measures provided for in the Paris Agreement and Decision 
1/CP.21 did not guarantee a GHG emissions reduction level compatible with IPCC 
demands, they will be able to monitor and update targets and measures to reduce 
the gap. Thus the Paris Agreement contains key elements that retain the possibility 
of staying under 2°C, as well as a sustainable mechanism for progressively strength-
ening the collective ambition (see Section 1.B). The Paris Agreement was hailed as 
an ambitious agreement.
Beyond the legal measures, the impact on reputation and the possibility of 
isolating a country from the international community is also a powerful way to 
persuade countries to pursue implementation399.
As for the ambition in the pre-2020 period, Decision 1/CP.21 encourages the 
Parties to promote the voluntary cancelling of units delivered under the Kyoto 
Protocol, including certified emission reductions which are still valid for the second 
commitment period, without double counting, by Parties and other sectors, without 
double counting. At the same time, the Decision recalls the need to ratify the Doha 
amendment (2nd commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol)400, to comply with 
the Cancun commitments, to submit the first biennial update reports as soon as 
possible, to participate in the current Measuring, Reporting and Verification (MRV) 
processes to take stock of the progress in implementing mitigation commitments.
The same Decision provides for arrangements and measures for the post-2020 
period (see section I.A.1).
399. Descôtes, A.M., 2015
400. Decision 1/CMP.8
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III.3.2 Sectoral approaches
Sectoral approaches were not specifically negotiated in the Paris Agreement. However, 
the arrangements that were set leave ample room for their implementation, especially 
to raise the ambition, for both the pre-2020 and post-2020 period.
During the negotiations that were held since the adoption of the UNFCCC, 
it became clear early on that sectoral approaches would be an effective path to fight 
against climate change, by setting binding targets by sector, at both the national 
and international level. These targets should enable the massive deployment of 
ecologically sound technology. In fact, not all sectors contribute to GHG emissions 
in the same way, and planning for each specific industrial sector would make it 
possible to set precise GHG emissions reduction targets and sectoral efficiency 
targets. The sectoral approach would thus make it possible to involve sectors in a 
way that is proportional to their environmental impact, and to intensify action 
toward the sectors identified as the highest emitters.
In the discussions, developed and developing countries clashed with each other 
due to the obstacles to international trade that sectoral targets at the international 
level would lead to. The clash was also due to the fact that adopting sectoral norms 
for GHG emissions would create commitments that developing countries would 
be subject to.
The GHG emissions inventories of the Parties are drawn up based on the IPCC 
directives, which are drawn from various sectors of the economy [Energy, including 
transport; Industrial Processes and Product Use (IPPU); Agriculture, Forestry, and 
Other Land Use (AFOLU) and Waste]. This facilitates the implementation of national 
mitigation measures at the sectoral level. 
Differences also emerged on proposals concerning transnational approaches 
which would neglect the emissions reduction commitments of developed countries, 
which concern their entire economy.
Right from the start, in Article 4.1 c), the Convention invites all Parties to take 
into account their “common but differentiated responsibilities and their specific national 
and regional development priorities, objectives and circumstances. Promote and cooperate 
in the development, application and diffusion, including transfer, of technologies, practices 
and processes that control, reduce or prevent anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases 
not controlled by the Montreal Protocol in all relevant sectors, including the energy, transport, 
industry, agriculture, forestry and waste management sectors”.
Article 1.b of the Bali Action Plan 1.b “Decides to launch a comprehensive process 
to enable the full, effective and sustained implementation of the Convention through 
long-term cooperative action, now, up to and beyond 2012, in order to reach an agreed 
outcome and adopt a decision at its fifteenth session, by addressing, inter alia: Enhanced 
national/international action on mitigation of climate change, including, inter alia, 
consideration of: […] Cooperative sectoral approaches and sector-specific actions, in 
order to enhance implementation of Article 4, paragraph 1(c), of the Convention”. 
Likewise, Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) leave ample room 
for using sectoral approaches at the national level. 
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Several meetings and forums have been organised at both the regional and 
international level, within the UNFCCC framework and its Kyoto Protocol, to 
explore the best paths based on sectoral approaches, especially concerning transna-
tional sectoral approaches led by industry, which aim to link a sector with a broad 
international or sectoral base. However, these meetings and forums have resulted 
in consensus. Some of them have limited the scope of these approaches to making 
the cooperation in technology development and transfer more dynamic, similar to 
the implementation of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone 
Layer. However, the UNFCCC and its instruments are much more complex, in 
reality. 
The deliberations continued until the Accra meeting in 2008, where the Parties 
agreed that sectoral approaches should not lead to binding commitments for devel-
oping countries, and that it is up to each country to decide whether it would like 
to implement sectoral policies.  
Only some sectoral commitments of developed countries or developed country 
groups, especially in the fields of energy and clean technology transfer and improve-
ments to the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol are 
behind the results. The improvement of CDM procedures made it possible to go 
from methodologies for specific projects to standardised baselines and activity 
programmes covering certain sub-sectors.
Likewise, several policies and Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) 
led by developing countries embrace the concepts of sectoral or sub-sectoral approaches 
at the national and/or regional level. 
In the framework of the Paris Agreement and Decision 1/CP.21 which 
accompanies it, we can retain that:
• The decisions that resulted in establishing NDCs leave ample room for imple-
menting sectoral initiatives at the national, regional, and international level. 
In fact, the stipulations of the Paris Agreement and the Decision that accom-
panies it, as well as the analysis of the first INDCs submitted by the Parties 
prior to the COP 21 show that:
 – The commitments (INDCs) of some developed countries cover their entire 
economy (this is mandatory). These commitments identified specific targets 
in certain sectors such as renewable energy, energy efficiency, and so on.
 – Several developing countries presented contributions based on sectors, 
particularly for the implementation of NAMAs and Technology Action 
Plans that result from the specification of their technology needs, which 
incorporate the efforts of non-state actors.
 – Developed and developing countries have left ample room for sectoral 
cooperation to contribute.
• Decision 1/CP.21 recognises the important role of non-state actors;
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• The sectoral initiatives presented in Paris in the Solutions Agenda had 
earned some legitimacy at the end of COP 21;
• The Energy, Renewable Energy, Energy Efficiency, and Agriculture and 
Forestry sub-sectors are huge mines of potential regional and international 
cooperation.They already have made significant progress.
• Market-based and non-market-based cooperative approaches (Article 6) 
leave ample room for developing transnational sectoral approaches;
• Developing new market mechanisms may offer the opportunity to develop 
such approaches, depending on the rules that will be set;
• Large sectors such as International Civil Aviation and the International 
Maritime Organisation have already developed modalities and procedures 
to manage emissions, and to launch market mechanisms that they would 
like to base on the rules defined by the UNFCCC.
At the end of COP21, it is hoped that the principle of an ambitious NDC, 
linked to developed countries covering their entire economy—which should be 
the way forward for developing countries—will make it possible to implement 
much more sophisticated sectoral approaches at the national, regional, and 
international levels.
Encouraging the participation of non-sate actors, current initiatives and 
initiatives that will arise from sharing experiences in technical expert meetings, 
new rules that will be drawn up in voluntary cooperation mechanisms for inter-
national transfers of mitigation results; as well as the increasingly important 
role of the technology mechanism, will enable sectoral approaches in the high-
est emitting sectors, such as Energy, Cement Manufacturing, Aviation, Trans-
port, Agriculture, etc.—in addition to the commitments covering all the entire 
economies of the Parties—to play a decisive role in achieving the objectives of 
the convention.
III.4 Issues regarding climate finance
The challenges of climate finance arising from the UNFCCC and its legal instruments, 
the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement, have become both increasingly 
important and highly sensitive. This is even more evident when placed within the 
context of the Convention principles, related to common but differentiated respon-
sibility as well as in terms of the respective capabilities of countries, the balance 
and the historic nature of overall climate change. 
In Paris, in December 2015, the international community ratified401, a pledge of 
$100bn made by the developed countries to the developing countries in Copenhagen 
401. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 53
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in 2009, as the minimum climate finance threshold to be achieved by 2020402. 
This will need to be increased after 2025 as comprehensive commitments are gradu-
ally implemented in terms of mitigation, transparency and adaptation measures or 
the enhancement of adaptive capabilities for the benefit of the developing countries, 
and especially for the most vulnerable countries. 
These climate finances from various sources and in different forms, are explained 
in the analysis of Article 9 of the Paris Agreement (see section I.B.9) and the paragraphs 
relating to the Decision accompanying it403.
These publicly-, privately- and innovatively-sourced climate funds (bi-lateral 
and multi-lateral), expected to reach $100bn per annum, should be, to a large 
extent, funnelled or distributed under the framework of the Convention’s finance 
mechanism and of the various entities comprising it, mainly the Green Climate 
Fund (GCF), and to a lesser extent, the Global Environment Facility and/or other 
UNFCCC funds as well as those of the Kyoto Protocol, according to pre-existing 
processes and procedures, or according to procedures to be developed in Marrakesh 
and at a later stage.
Despite some disappointment being expressed by the Group of 77 and China, 
regarding the question of climate finance during COP 21, and as previously with 
the majority of past Conferences of the Parties of the UNFCCC, the Paris Agreement 
nevertheless allowed:
• for the consolidation of the links between mobilising and providing financial 
resources in line with the priority needs of the developing countries404.
• the delivery of parity regarding financial provisions and increasing them for 
adaptation and mitigation, by ensuring the priority of public funding in the 
form of adaptation grants. 
• that developed countries be required every two years to communicate qualitative 
and quantitative information on the mobilisation and provision of funds, as 
well as projections and increases of public financial resources for the benefit 
of developing countries for mitigation, adaptation, the transfer of technologies 
and capacity-building405.
402. In Copenhagen, in 2009, during COP15, $100bn was pledged per annum between 
2013 and 2020 to fill the gap identified by several international institutions including 
the World Bank, the United Nations Environment Programme, etc. In the new texts, 
the $100bn annual pledge is still effective, but will be difficult to achieve given the 
level of financial contributions to the current funds (the Green Climate Fund, the 
LDC Fund, the Adaptation Fund, the Special Fund for Climate Change and the 
Global Environment Facility). Added together, they do not amount to $100bn in a 
replenishment cycle (four to five years on average). Because of this, the $100bn target 
per annum seems even more unachievable, even if all the contributors involved are 
working on it. 
403. Decision 1/CP. 21, paras. 52-64
404. Decision 1/CP.21, Paris Agreement, Art. 9 para. 4-5
405. Decision 1/CP.21, Appendix, Paris Agreement, Art. 9, para. 5; and Decision 1/CP.21, 
para. 56
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Since the 16th UNFCCC Conference of Parties in Cancun (Mexico, 2010) 
the issue of climate finance has gone through various twists and turns. A positively 
controversial change, more influenced by purely economic and financial imperatives 
of the main donors/contributors, and by the change in the economic conditions 
of some developing countries (with similar GDPs, sometimes higher than those 
of the developed countries), than by the necessity and the urgency of effectively 
combating the effects, the impacts and consequences of climate change from 
which the most vulnerable countries and populations suffer. Proof of this is that 
little substantial climate financing, matching the priorities and needs identified, 
reaches the most vulnerable countries, particularly financing for projects and 
actions identified in the national adaptation plans (NAPs) and/or in the National 
Action Adaptation Plans (NAAPs) of the Least Developed Countries or financing 
adaptation, which is nevertheless a question of survival, for Small Developing 
Insular States. 
Therefore, Paris COP 21 left a good deal of unsolved financial issues or issues 
needing to be pursued to be duly considered. These should be the subject of 
intense negotiations in Marrakesh (COP 22) and indeed beyond. 
Finally, it is worthwhile remembering that negotiations on climate financing 
are happening and will happen under the Standing Committee for Finance, the Green 
Climate Fund Board, the Global Environment Facility Board and the technical 
bodies set up under the Convention, the Paris Agreement, and the Kyoto Protocol.
III.4.1 Standing Committee for Finance (SCF): 
The main technical regulatory body on finance issues to combat climate change, 
the Standing Committee for Finance (SCF), was established to assist the development, 
the organisation, the coherence and the coordination of the operational entities of 
the UNFCCC finance mechanism. 
Standing Committee for Finance
Since its inception, the Convention’s finance mechanism suffered from a lack of 
coordination and the absence of a regulatory body until the establishment of the 
Standing Committee for Finance. The decision to set it up was made at the 16th 
UNFCCC Conference of the Parties in Mexico, in 2010, under the Cancun 
Agreements406. In Durban, a year later, the COP agreed its structure, its function 
and its mandate, of which one of the most important elements is preparing reports 
and formulating recommendations to the COP regarding the regulation and the 
improvement of the Convention’s finance mechanism. Some of the activities for 
which the COP is responsible are:
• organising an annual information and communication exchange forum on the 
finance issues of the process, bringing together the players involved; 
406. UNFCCC, 2010. Decision 1/CP.16, para. 112, p.18
Continued on page 129
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• submitting to the COP guideline proposals and recommendations aimed at 
the operational entities of the UNFCCC finance mechanism;
• preparing a bi-annual assessment of all the climate financing flows with the view 
to learning relevant lessons and improving the procedures and activities linked 
to adaptation and mitigation financing activities;
• finally, to support the Paris Agreement and its implementation407.
The SCF created and implemented an ambitious workplan for 2016-2017408. 
Amongst other guidelines received from409the COP were: 
• to continue to cooperate more closely with all the competent stakeholders 
and all the Convention bodiess affected by climate financing; 
• to continue, through implementing its workplan aimed at measuring, notifying 
and verifying the support provided outside the bi-annual assessment, to review 
financial flows as well as to cooperate with the Convention bodies, the inter-
national institutions and the relevant multi-lateral and bi-lateral bodies; 
• to report at the twenty-second session of the Conference of the Parties on the 
progress of its workplan and to present its bi-annual assessment. 
In September 2016, in Manila (Philippines), the SCF410organised its fourth 
forum on the topic “Financial Instruments for the risks of loss and damag”. This forum 
was just as extensive as the previous ones which had tackled equally important topics411.
This year’s edition has allowed for a review412of the specific climate finance 
instruments which could be potentially used to solve the risks of loss and damage.
The participants discussed the potential opportunities, challenges, limitations 
and gaps in terms of climate finance availability, mobilisation, accessibility as well 
as the use of climate financing to tackle the consequences and the impacts resulting 
in loss and damage due to climate change. The debates also dealt with: 
• transfer of risk schemes;
• social protection schemes: 
• obligations towards disasters and resilience; 
• financial contingencies. 
407. Decision 1/CP 21
408. UNFCCC, 2015b. Appendix X, p.42
409. UNFCCC, 2015c. Decision 6/CP.21, p. 10-11
410. UNFCCC, 2016e
411. UNFCCC, Forum of the Standing Committee on Finance [online]
http://unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/standing_committee/
items/7552.php
412. UNFCCC, 2016h
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The participants in the fourth forum also exchanged points of view on the roles 
and functions of the various players, as well as the ways and means to strengthen 
the links and the collaboration between public and private sector participants. 
It is worthwhile highlighting413that amongst the elements to be retained from 
this COP forum, given they were taken into account, were the following: 
• the need for an integrated approach to assume the risks related to loss and 
damage, taking into account financial issues such as those relating to policies, 
to the capabilities and the implications for the players involved, notably those 
in the private sector; 
• the need to develop an intelligent concept and a combination of financial 
instruments to enable an approach which responds to the diversity of circum-
stances and national capabilities in order to mobilise necessary and useful 
supports to tackle the risk of loss and damage;
• the need to design a tool, an instrument or an appropriate solution to tackle 
the risks of loss and damage, taking into account the relevance, durability, 
approachability and accessibility of the financial instruments; 
• the need to engage and share knowledge, experiences and know-how amongst 
those involved in relation to actions and activities connected to risks of loss 
and damage. 
The outcomes of this forum are important for the negotiations on the guidelines 
that the COP will issue to the SCF and indeed to other operational entities of the 
Convention’s finance mechanism, notably the GCF. They will make up an important 
part of the report that the Standing Committee for Finance will make at COP 22. 
Finally, the SCF held its 14th meeting414in Bonn on 3-5 October 2016 with 
an extensive agenda tackling issues including: 
• the second bi-annual assessment report on financial flows for the climate 
• the current year COP forum report and the topic for the next 2017 edition. 
• general guidelines and recommendations that the COP may provide to the 
various operational entities of the convention’s financial mechanism. 
• the examination of the transparency (MRV) of the financial supports. 
• the potential revision of the SCF functions, particularly in relation to the 
Paris Agreement.
This meeting facilitated the refining of the draft proposals for the conclusions, 
decisions and appendices to the COP 22 negotiations on climate finance. 
413. UNFCCC, 2016f
414. UNFCCC, 2016g
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III.4.2 Green Climate Fund (GCF):
Within the structure of the Paris Agreement on climate change and everything 
around it, the Green Climate Fund is at the core of the action when this involves 
supporting the implementation of measures to combat the effects of climate 
change, particularly in developing countries. It is nevertheless important that 
other funds or facilities, such as the Global Environment Facility and the special 
funds established under the UNFCCC and its legal instruments (SCCF, LDCF 
and AF) continue to play their respective roles in supporting the reinforcement of 
climate change measures in developing countries. 
In its report to the COP 22415, the GCF confirms that over $10bn has been 
secured since its launch. Up till August 2016, it had signed financial agreements 
with over forty contributors for over $10bn. It has already spent over $425 million 
dollars in operations to combat climate change (adaptation and mitigation) and in 
preparing countries, since it started operating on behalf of developing countries. 
Green Climate Fund
The creation of the Green Climate Fund (GCF) initiated in Copenhagen in 2009, 
and agreed at the COP 16 in Cancun in 2010416. Designated as the second entity 
responsible for the functioning of the UNFCCC finance mechanism, it was man-
dated in Paris to support the implementation of the Paris Agreement. The strategy 
of the GCF is firstly to channel, then to catalyse the funds made available by the 
developed countries, as well as from other countries in a position to do so, in order 
to implement climate solutions in developing countries. The Green Climate Fund 
should collect funds aimed at financing the pre-2020 measures and activities in 
the most vulnerable countries as well as collecting a portion of the $100 billion 
dollars promised annually from 2020 onwards. These funds will be allocated 
equitably between mitigation and adaptation projects. From the funds allocated 
to adaptation, at least half will be set aside for African countries, small island 
developing states (SIDS) and least developed countries (LDC). Barely operational, 
the GCF already announced in November 2015 its funding of its first projects 
for a total of $168 million dollars. And it continued its activities through additional 
funding of over $256 million dollars for adaptation and mitigation projects, agreed 
at its thirteenth session (June 2016).
Source - Guide to 2015 negotiations, updated 
415. UNFCCC, 2016h
416. UNFCCC, 2010. Decision 1/CP. 16, paras. 102-111, p. 18
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The adoption of the Paris Agreement enabled the GCF to overcome important 
steps in facilitating procedures and in financing projects. Some points worth 
remembering: 
• Programming and support in preparing countries to avail of GFC financing 
as well as planning adaptation: developing countries had access to (1) one 
million dollars per annum for their national preparation support programmes 
for GFC financing. Since July 2016, countries can apply to the Funds for 
financing of up to (3) million dollars to formulate their National Adaptation 
Plans and other adaptation processes. This is an additional measure to the 
revised programme supporting preparation and it contains three other options, 
which can be requested by the developing countries, within the framework of 
the preparation mechanism (readiness)417. 
• Preparation facility for GFC projects: The project preparation facility is 
made available to accredited entities and limited to $1.5m dollars per project, 
on condition that the Designated National Authority/National Focal Point 
does not object and based on a concept note. The GFC Board adopted an 
updated list of preparation support measures eligible for financing through 
the simplification of the legal formalities between the GFC and the relevant 
country. For this purpose, the Secretary of the GFC also produced a guide on 
country ownership for the countries to help them in managing the GCF 
process.
• GFC project finance procedures: countries can access climate finance often 
very rapidly and in a very simplified manner, notably in terms of: 
 – Simplified procedures418 for micro and small financing proposals which 
represent minimum risks419. The simplification process essentially relates 
to the level of detail required for study documents and other documents 
needed to set up the projects. 
 – Project Preparation Facility (PPF) a GFC finance window of $1.5m was 
allocated for the benefit of developing countries to finance the preparation 
of their eligible projects (see box below) and particularly for micro and 
small-scale projects. Countries who wish to, can, with the assistance of one 
of the entities accredited420 by the GFC, prepare a project preparation 
application, which the entity will submit to the GFC. 
417. GCF, 2016a
418. GFC, 2016b
419. GFC, 2016c
420. Any demand or request for financing from the GFC must go through a GFC-accredited 
entity. The list of contacts and accredited entities can be consulted on the GFC website 
(www.greenclimate.fund). 
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Activities eligible for financing by the GFC project preparation 
facility
• Pre-feasibility and feasibility project design and studies; 
• Environmental, social and similar type projects;
• Risk assessments;
• Identification of the programme and the project level indicators:
• Pre-contractual services, including review of tender documents:
• Consultancy and/or other services for the financial structuring of the activity 
proposed; and,
• Other project preparatory activities as required and with adequate justifications.
• Project applications: The GFC Board approved in 2016 and up to August 
2016421, nine projects for a total of $256.6m. The breakdown of approved 
projects are as follows:
 – Asia: 3 projects for a total of $86.6m 
 – Latin America: 2 projects for a total of $70.7m 
 – Africa: 2 projects for a total of $43.3m 
 – Island states: 1 project for a total of $36m 
 – Eastern Europe: 1 project for a total of $20m 
Last year, just before COP 21 took place, the GFC approved eight adaptation 
and mitigation projects for an approximate $168m.
• Asia: 1 project for a total of $40m 
• Latin America and the Caribbean: 2 projects for a total of $28.2m 
• Africa: 3 projects for a total of $44.9m 
• Island states: 2 projects for a total of $54.6m 
On 30 September 2016, the GFC published a list of ten projects for approval 
during the 14th meeting of the Board on the 12-14 October 2016: one project in 
Asia, two projects in South America and the Caribbean, five projects in Africa and 
two draft proposals by the private sector through two programmes: The UGEAP 
(Universal Green Energy Access Program) and the SEFF (Sustainable Energy 
Financing Facilities).
421. This guide was finalised (5 October 2016) before the potential public consultation on 
the outcomes from the 14th (October 2016) and 15th (December 2016) GFC Board 
meetings. The results and conclusions of the last two GFC Boards were therefore not 
taken into account.
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• The GFC and the Paris Agreement: The COP and CMA will guide and 
direct the modus operandi of the GFC strategic plan and its Secretariat’s work 
programme. The issue in the future will be to see how the GFC can support the 
application as well as the measures to implement the Paris Agreement and receive 
from the COP and CMA the directives and guidelines for its functioning, its 
organisation, its processes and procedures, etc. when required. 
• The relationship of the GFC with the UNFCCC thematic bodies: it has 
been decided to organise an annual meeting between the GFC (Board and 
Secretariat) and the thematic bodies of the Convention on the fringes of the 
COP in order to coordinate and energise the relations, the interactions and the 
links with the different entities. This meeting will be sanctioned by a report 
to be attached to the GFC report at the COP/CMA for it to be considered 
during negotiations.
• GFC coherence and complementary function with various entities 
 – The GFC Board has developed an operational work framework on its 
coherence and complementary function in relation to the COP.
 – On the fringes of its meetings, the GFC Board will hold an annual discussion 
to strengthen the complementary function of climate finance providers, in 
terms of projects and activities. 
With regard to the early achievements of the GFC for the benefit of developing 
countries, it is in the interest of these countries to: 
• develop and submit eligible projects and initiatives rapidly to the GFC. 
• take advantage of the simplified procedures to manage the process better. 
• and to keep in mind, within the framework of all climate funds, including the 
GFC, two essential elements: the first is having to go through certain accredited 
entities or implementation agencies and the second is that, in the majority of cases, 
climate funds operate on a first-come-first-served basis, except for allocation- 
based funds or per-country threshold systems. 
The main financial issues reviewed during the 44th session of the subsidiary 
bodies in May 2016 related to: 
The activities under the LDC fund: Despite the promises made in Paris at 
COP 21 and the efforts by the LDC experts (LEG), it is still just as necessary to 
pursue, in an appropriate manner, a vision that is more focussed on adaptation422 
and on access to resources in order to implement planned activities combating climate 
change, assisting and supporting the LDCs mainly by:
• achieving tangible results in the enhancing of adaptation capabilities;
• enhancing the resilience of the LDCs and reducing their vulnerability to climate 
change.
422. IISD, 2016a 
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• developing robust and good quality NAPs;
• providing technical guidelines and advice to countries on how to access GFC 
financing in terms of the formulation process and the implementation of the 
NAPs;
• implementing adaptation priorities identified, thanks to GFC financing and 
other sources. 
Nevertheless, the LDC Funds continues to lack finance to deal efficiently 
with the attempts to implement the priority needs identified in the NAPs, NAPAs, 
of the LDCs.
For example423, on the 31 March 2016 the LDC fund had only $9.8m available, 
whereas the financial needs, related to the draft proposals submitted by the LDCs 
to implement the priorities identified in their NAPAs, in addition to the formulation 
of the NAPs themselves, came close to $226m needed by 34 projects on the one 
and the same date. This demonstrates a significant issue with the availability 
and the mobilisation of the financial resources required, faced with increasing 
vulnerability over time. If measures are not implemented as rapidly as possible, the 
problems and difficulties encountered on the ground by the populations involved, 
the ecosystems, the infrastructures, and the most affected facilities, will not be able 
to wait. 
A draft conclusion424, accepted by the States Parties in Bonn, in May 2016, 
will be submitted to the COP 22 for adoption. 
Adaptation Fund: An important player in financing adaptation in developing 
countries, for a number of years this fund has encountered serious financing avail-
ability problems, particularly due to the weak performance of the carbon market, 
which supplies the AF through a debit mechanism. The third AF review launched 
in Lima in 2014 aims to ensure: 
• the efficacy, the durability and the adequacy of the Fund and its operations;
• an understanding of the progress achieved to date and the lessons learned 
about the Fund’s function and its implementation;
• taking into account:
 – the provision of long-lasting, predictable and sufficient financial resources;
 – the mobilisation of financial resources to finance concrete adaptation projects 
and programmes managed by the countries and based on needs;
 – the points of view and priorities of the developing countries, admissible 
Parties; and,
423. IISD, 2016a
424. FCCC/SBI/2016/L.6
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 – lessons learned from the application of the access procedures to the Adaptation 
Fund, the project approval procedures, the outcomes and the impacts of 
the adaptation projects approved, the preparation programme for direct 
access to climate financing and the pilot programme for regional projects.
• the planning and the coherence of the project and the complementary nature 
of the Adaptation Fund with other adaptation financing institutes; and,
• the institutional arrangements of the Adaptation Fund.
The Marrakesh Conference should recommend a draft proposal to adopt the 
terms of reference to conduct this third review. In relation to issues surrounding 
institutional arrangements, Marrakesh should respond to these questions allowing 
the Adaptation Fund to serve the implementation of the Paris Agreement on the same 
level as the other operational entities of the Convention’s finance mechanism.
Paragraph 59 of the decision to implement and operate the Paris Agreement 
takes into account that “the Adaptation Fund can contribute to the application of the 
Agreement, subject to the relevant decisions of the Conference of the Parties serving as 
the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol and the Conference of the Parties serving 
as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement”. This issue was approved by the 
CMP 11 in Paris and needs to be discussed by the CMA at its future sessions, 
given that the Adaptation Fund is an entity derived from the Kyoto Protocol.
A draft proposal425relating to this point, will continue to be reviewed and 
discussed during the Marrakesh COP with the purpose of adopting it.
Procedures for the compatibility of planned financial resources secured 
through public interventions pursuant to Article 9.7 of the Agreement: This issue, 
examined by SBSTA 44 and recorded in a draft proposal426, will continue to be 
discussed at COP 22. It means finding the most suitable options in terms of the 
compatibility of the financial resources. This can be achieved through past experiences 
and current best practices. The States Parties agreed a work programme to conclude 
the negotiations on this topic. A work programme was set up and the first activity, 
in the form of a workshop, will take place during the SBSTA 45 in Marrakesh.
To supplement these points, and if the reader is interested in further information 
regarding climate financing and the UNFCCC negotiation processes, please refer 
to the reports and conclusions of:
• the long-term financing workshop427;
• the workshop on the links between the technology mechanism and the financial 
mechanism428;
• the workshop on exploring funding and the use of the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) by the international climate ffinancing institutions429. 
425. FCCC/SBI/2016/L.10
426. FCCC/SBSTA/2016/L.5
427. IIDD, 2016b
428. IISD, 2016b
429. IISD, 2016d
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III.4.3 Climate financing in Marrakesh: 
In Marrakesh, the UNFCCC States Parties will have to debate and negotiate several 
issues regarding climate finances, as had been the case over the last three or four years. 
On the fringes of these negotiations, which will involve sessions with the 
subsidiary structures of the Conference and Meetings of the Parties in Marrakesh, 
three important events will take place, notably: 
• A workshop on substantial finance issues and procedures (under SBSTA 45)
• A special event examining the 2016 bi-annual review on the MRV of the supports 
within the framework of the SCF work programme. 
• A first annual meeting of the GCF with the thematic structures linked to the 
finance mechanism of the UNFCCC.
The events planned in Marrakesh, including the discussion on financing facil-
itation, the pre-2020 target and its implementation, should help in providing 
insights into the $100bn pledge, and respond to the concerns of a number of 
developing countries. The latter are concerned that the pre-2020 action could be 
eclipsed by negotiations on the post-2020 period430, which will delay or prevent 
mobilising and providing the required climate finance.
The topics being negotiated in Marrakesh, in terms of climate financing, 
depending on the bodies under which they fall, can be summarised as follows:
COP 22431: 
• Agenda point 10a) - Long-term climate finance: 
Developing countries will once again endeavour to maintain and to push 
forward the issue of long-term climate finance, by trying to obtain the development 
and the implementation of a work programme which will allow for visibility and 
predictability in the medium and long term on securing and on the availability of 
climate finance from developed countries. This would allow the developing countries 
to be able to plan their actions and activities better in terms of adaptation and 
mitigation measures supported by international financing.
With regards to developed countries, they are expressing the practical difficulties 
preventing them from going outside international and/or community budgetary 
planning regulations, general finance and budgeting allocations, and climate finance, 
in compliance with their specific obligations to the UNFCCC. Two years’ projections 
would be the maximum feasible timeframe from their point of view. 
To date, this issue has been dealt with through workshops on long-term 
financing.
430. IISD, 2016a
431. http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2016/cop22/eng/01.pdf
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The elements linked to the supports which should be delivered to finance 
the activities and actions to combat climate change during the pre-2020 period 
is furthermore being reviewed and negotiated under the long-term finance 
issue.
• Agenda points 10 b): Report and review of the SCF functions 
• Agenda points 10 c) d): Report and guidelines for the financial entities of the 
convention (GCF and GEF): 
Regarding the supports and guidelines to the GCF and GEF, the countries 
will review and negotiate the status of the implementation of the preceding 
guidelines given by the COP. Moreover, they need to work to improve the use 
of the available financial resources, by soliciting greater simplification of the 
procedures and accessibility to funds, greater transparency on the finance 
received and the finance provided, and links to significant actions (adaptation 
and mitigation). 
But this time, for the Marrakesh COP 22 and its successors, the reviews 
and the guidelines should be made within the framework and spirit of the Paris 
Agreement on climate change and the need to be ready to support its imple-
mentation and operation for and by all countries. The door has even been 
opened to countries other than developed countries with the capability to con-
tribute financially to do this on a voluntary basis. 
• Agenda point 10 e): 6th review of the UNFCCC finance mechanism 
• Agenda point 10 f ): Initiation of the process to identify the information 
required from the States Parties in compliance with Article 9, paragraph 5 of 
the Paris Agreement 
Other financial issues, linked to the function and to organisation of the 
UNFCCC Secretariat will be discussed and negotiated under point 17 of the 
COP 22 agenda. 
CMP 12432:
• Agenda point 7 a): Adaptation Fund Board report
• Agenda points 7 b): 3rd review of the Adaptation Fund 
APA 1-2433:
The APA 1-2 agenda does not include specific points related to finances, never-
theless climate finance will be reviewed, discussed and negotiated under the 
points relating to mitigation, adaptation and the transparency of the overall 
outcome under the APA agenda. These will consider principally: 
432. http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2016/cmp12/eng/01.pdf
433. http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2016/apa/eng/03.pdf
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• The process to identify information in compliance with Article 9.3 of the 
Paris Agreement on securing climate finance from a variety of sources; 
• the transparency of the financial support; and, 
• consideration of the implementation resources, including climate finance, 
for the global stocktake.
SBI 45434:
• Point 4 c) – Financial support and technical support for the communica-
tion of theStates Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention; 
• Point 13 – Terms of reference to review SCF functions; and; 
• Point 17 – UNFCCC budgetary, financial and administrative issues 
SBSTA 45435:
• Agenda point 13 -The procedures for the compatibility of the financial 
resources planned and secured through public interventions pursuant to 
Article 9.7 of the Agreement. 
CMA 1436: 
With the entry into force of the Paris Agreement on 4 November 2016, the first 
Conference of the Parties serving as a meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agree-
ment (CMA 1) will take place in Marrakesh, in conjunction with the 22nd 
session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 22) and the 12th session of the 
Conference of the Parties serving as a meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto pro-
tocol (CMP 12). It will consider, in later sessions, depending on the status con-
ferred on it and its agenda, various questions, including those potentially related 
to climate financing, related to Article 9 of the Paris Agreement or to the para-
graphs related to it in the accompanying Decision. It could consider for exam-
ple the questions entrusted by the Paris Agreement or the accompanying Deci-
sion to the COP or the GFC Board.
434. http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2016/sbi/eng/09.pdf
435. http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2016/sbsta/eng/03.pdf
436. Following the entry into force of the Paris Agreement, three (3) days before the opening 
of COP 22, the Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC published a notice on behalf of 
the Parties and the observer Governments, international organisations and organisations 
participating as accredited observers, convening CMA 1. The Presidency of the COP 
21 jointly with the designated Presidency of the COP 22 (agreed with the office of the 
COP) will propose a draft agenda for the CMA’s first session. This could be symbolic 
if it took place at the end of COP 22, but could be more substantial and more decisive if 
it took place at the beginning of the session. This will depend on the timeframe allocated 
(according to the processes and procedures of the UNFCCC) for the notification by 
the UNFCCC Secretariat of a provisional agenda for CMA 1 It may also take place and 
be suspended to allow the procedures under the APA to be pursued, before resuming 
in 2018 for example. 
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Finally, it is imperative to link climate finances with the entry into force of 
the Paris Agreement. The ratification by China and the USA of the Paris Agree-
ment on the eve of the G20 held in September 2016 and by India a month later 
are very positive signs and indicators of its rapid and imminent entry into force. 
The other positive signal from the same G20 will be the inclusion in its agenda for 
the first time of the issue of green finance, including finance to combat the effects of 
climate change. The importance of this issue and the position of priority it has 
taken was dictated by the summary report on green finance437developed and sub-
mitted by the G20 specialist study group. A summary analysis438of this report 
reveals the reaffirmation by the G20 of the need to secure more climate financing, 
which must be channelled through the GFC and other financing channels. It also 
affirms the need to explore the possible involvement of the private sector, particu-
larly banks and investment funds in combating climate change, notably through 
market mechanisms.
Conclusion: 
In addition to their significant number, financial issues require a great deal of 
attention in terms of the quality and the content in dealing with them. Regular 
monitoring by the same negotiators is crucial to ensure success. This crucial question 
should allow for operational and concrete progress in mobilising financing, in its 
provision by the developed countries and the accessibility to climate finance by all the 
developing countries and particularly the LDCs and SIDS to tackle the immediate 
and medium-term consequences of climate change.
All these elements require a great deal of preparation by countries, groups of 
countries and alliances in the negotiations, as well as an efficient and continuous 
coordination.
Mobilising and ensuring sufficient availability, predictable and long-lasting 
climate finance would contribute extensively to the mitigation of the effects of 
climate change, particularly in the most vulnerable countries, and would certainly 
improve the resilience of populations and ecosystems. 
III.5 Adaptation
Adaptation has always constituted the greatest factor in climate negotiations for 
developing countries. It will be even greater in the years to come following a new 
and promising context established by the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. The 
Paris Agreement offers an enhanced framework aimed at raising the significance of 
the issue for all countries, developed and developing, and to reinforce international 
cooperation so that it is substantially taken into account.
437. G20 Green Finance Study Group, 2016
438. Tetsuya Ishii, Kentaro Tamura, Naoki Mori, Eric Zusman and Mark Elder, 2016 
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Reminder of main expectations of COP 21
The agreement which was expected in Paris in 2015 was of major importance 
in the progress of the climate negotiations. Fruit of a process started in 2011 
with the launch of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for 
Enhanced Action, with the principal mandate of preparing a legal instrument for 
2015, it holds out hope for considerable boosting of measures taken to face up 
to climate change. It involved obtaining a commitment from country Parties to 
the Convention to reduce their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions considerably 
and introduce the necessary measures to increase the resilience of populations 
and ecosystems to changes in the climate. The Paris Agreement now plots the 
road map for the post-2020 period. At the same time, the 21st Conference of 
the Parties (COP 21) was a chance to start plugging the gap immediately between 
the commitments made by the countries and the reductions in GHG emissions 
that were really necessary to prevent global warming from reaching perilous 
levels. As such, the commitments and measures taken for the period 2016-2020 
are just as important. In effect, the commitments that were included in the Parties’ 
INDC submitted before COP 21, were leading us to increases in temperature 
estimated between 2.7°C439 to 3.5°C440 at the end of the century according to 
independent analysis. In both cases, the path followed would lead to warming 
that was well above predictions of the scientific community which had quantified 
the need to contain warming at 2°C, and even 1.5°C. These figures were thus 
fixed as a barrier by the UNFCCC Parties. Beyond that ceiling, the climate system 
would suffer dangerous disorders that could lead to a substantial rise in sea levels 
and displace huge numbers of populations, turn certain regions into desert with 
consequent malnutrition and famine and increase natural catastrophes such as 
storms, cyclones, flooding, etc. 
(Source: IFDD, 2015 - Guide to the negotiations - COP 21)
Fear by all developing countries before and during COP 21 was that an agree-
ment be reached centred around mitigation, taking away importance of adaptation 
and the necessary support to accompany it. Such fear subsisted in spite of the proposal 
made by the Group of African Countries for the adoption of a global adaptation 
objective to be linked directly to the global mitigation objective441, which was sup-
ported later by the Group of LDC, SIDS, LMDC and also ALBA, etc. 
In spite of decisions and mandates of Paris, contributing to consideration of 
adaptation, several main adaptation issues must still be considered. The following 
box reminds us of priority questions that prevailed during deliberations of COP 
21 in Paris, which must be taken up during the COP 22 in Marrakesh. 
439. Analysis of Climate Action Tracker on 1 October on 108 INDC representing 135 
countries [online] http://climateactiontracker.org/assets/publications/CAT_global_
temperature_update_October_2015.pdf
Figure taken up by Christiana Figueres, Executive Secretary of UNFCCC, in a declaration 
[online] http://newsroom.unfccc.int/unfccc-newsroom/indc-synthesis-report-press-release
440. Analysis of ClimateInteractive on 21 October 2015 [online] 
https://www.climateinteractive.org/tools/scoreboard
441. African Group, 2013.
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Main adaptation issues in Paris, during COP 21
How to improve collaboration with the NWP and the other institutions involved 
in the adaptation issues, such as the Adaptation Committee? 
How to ensure the diffusion of relevant knowledge products developed by the 
Adaptation Committee so as to orient planning and actions in adaptation and 
put at the public’s disposition a compilation of good practices and available 
tools? How to engage the centres and regional networks in these activities? 
How to integrate approaches and tools for taking into account the dimension of 
the genre and local, indigenous and traditional knowledge and practices in the 
NAP? 
How to evaluate the progress of countries in the development of their NAP and 
incite Parties further to share their experiences, notably across the Web portal 
dedicated to the NAP?
How to increase the predictability and the amount of financing for the preparation 
and implementation of NAP, including for countries that are non-LDC? 
What is the role to be played by the NAP in the INDC of developing countries? 
Are the NAP guidelines based sufficiently on real situations of LDC, notably as 
regards the financial capabilities of these countries and the international support 
available? 
Should the mandate of the LEG be renewed and what should be its role? 
The work of the LEG, are they sufficiently integrated and coordinated with those 
of other agencies and programmes, particularly as regards adaptation? 
How to encourage the LDCEG to take more responsibility in matter of financial 
and technical capacity building of countries? 
Should it furnish support to the access of sources of financing for the formulation 
and the implementation of the NAP? 
Should the LDCEG be given a greater mandate authorising it to negotiate support 
with financial institutions towards the LDC and other developing countries which 
do not manage to mobilise resources directly through technical and financial 
partners? 
IFDD (2015) Guide to the Negotiations - COP 21 
Paris was a real success on Adaptation, just like the Cancun Conference, if not 
more, dedicating an entire article to adaptation, with provisions contained in the 
twelve paragraphs of this article (see section I.B.7). 
Thus, obtaining a global objective for adaptation constitutes a positive result 
of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change442. This objective places adaptation 
once again in the centre of climate preoccupations on which the international 
community must settle in the future of the fight against global warming.
442. See World Resources Institute, 2015; and, Magnan A., 2016. IDDRI
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In Marrakesh, the State Parties will have to consider the various adaptation 
issues. Even if the result is globally positive for COP 21 in Paris, there still remain 
many practical modalities and actions to be ironed out for an effective implemen-
tation of provisions regarding adaptation, in particular in terms of access to financial 
resources.
The Bonn session of subsidiary Convention bodies443 in May 2016 allowed 
countries to exchange views, discuss and enter into negotiations on the issue of 
adaptation, in particular the provisions under the Paris Agreement and the accom-
panying decision. The discussions covered the following items:
• APA 1
 – New guidelines for communications on adaptation, including among others, 
as a component of NDC under Articles 7.10 and 7.11 of the Paris Agreement, 
and
 – Questions regarding the global stocktake.
• SBI 44
 – Establishment of modalities and procedures for the operation and use of a 
public registry under Article 7.12 (registry of communications on adaptation) 
of the Paris Agreement;
 – National adaptation plans; and
 – Third review of the Adaptation Fund
There was also the question of adaptation in two technical meetings of experts, 
covering respectively:
 – Improvement in implementation of adaptation measures; and
 – Efficient policy frameworks and institutional arrangements for planning 
and implementation of adaptation. 
• SBSTA 44
 – Nairobi Work Programme on adaptation and
 – Agriculture.
Moreover, in the framework of the work programme as a whole, other aspects 
of the mandate regarding adaptation were considered by different specialised groups 
of the Convention, just like: 
• Establishment of modalities of recognition for adaptation efforts by developing 
countries in accordance with Article 7.3 of the Paris Agreement by the Adaptation 
Committee and the Group of Experts from LDC.
443. Subsidiary bodies of the Convention: Implementation Body (SBI), Body for Scientific 
and Technological Advice (SBSTA) and Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement 
(APA)
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• Examination, in 2017, of institutional arrangements regarding adaptation under 
the Convention, in order to improve coherence of their work and activities to 
respond to expectations of countries, by the Adaptation Committee. 
• Consideration, by the Adaptation Committee, of methodologies for assessing 
adaptation needs to assist developing countries without placing a burden on 
them.
• Revision, by the Adaptation Committee, the Group of Experts of LDC and 
other institutions of the adequacy and efficiency of adaptation actions and 
support provided in accordance with Article 7.14(c) of the Paris Agreement. 
• Accelerating support for LDC and other developing countries in order to 
formulate their national adaptation plans according to Decisions 1.CP/16 
and 5.CP/17, by the Green Climate Fund.
When viewing adaptation questions as a whole, it is clear that taking mitigation 
into account is still relative, taking account of the problem is still fragmented, mainly 
reflected by the increase in the number of forums for dealing with the issue. In this 
respect, for introducing coherent management, appropriate monitoring and, 
under effective implementation of commitments and the enhanced Paris mandate, 
it is important that each delegation or, failing that, group coordinator ensures 
permanent consideration that is stable and continuous in terms of negotiations on 
these problems.
In Marrakesh, at the COP 22 the question of adaptation will be dealt with in 
the different forums of negotiation of the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement, as indicated in 
the following provisional agendas444:
• COP 22 agenda
 – Report of the Adaptation Committee (agenda item 6))
 – Implementation of paragraphs 8 and 9 of Article 4 of the Convention 
(agenda item 14)
a) implementation of the of Buenos work programme Aires on Adaptation 
and Response Measures (Decision 1/CP.10)
b) questions relating to the LDC.
• CMP 12 agenda
 – Issues relative to Adaptation Funds (agenda item 7) 
a) report by the Adaptation Fund Board 
b) third review of the Adaptation Fund445 
444. UNFCCC, Meetings, Marrakesh Climate Change Conference - November 2016 [online]
http://unfccc.int/meetings/Marrakesh_nov_2016/meeting/9567/php/view/documents.php
445. Item included and reviewed also by the SBI 44 (May 2016)
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• APA446 agenda
 – Additional guidelines connected to communication on adaptaiton, mainly, 
as an element of the NDC, in line with Article 7 of the Paris Agreement 
(Agenda item 4)
• SBI agenda
 – Development of modalities and procedures for the operationalisation and 
use of a public registry referred to in Article 7.12 of the Paris Agreement 
(agenda item 6)
 – National Adaptation Plans (agenda item 9)
 – Report of the Adaptation Committee (agenda item 10)
• SBSTA agenda
 – Nairobi Work Programme on the impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to 
climate change (agenda item 3) 
 – Report of the Adaptation Committee (agenda item 4))
 – Issues relative to Agriculture (agenda item 7)
 – Modalities for the compatibility of financial resources provided and secured 
through public interventions pursuant to Article 9.7 of the Paris Agreement.
The key issues for COP 22 should be to find answers or at least to try to carve 
out a path indicated for concrete implementation of adaptation actions, as provided 
for in the Paris Agreement and its accompanying Decision. 
Challenges and issues of Adaptation: 
• Can countries agree, considering the important and new situation taken by 
adaptation in the Paris Agreement on a vision447, understanding and common 
interpretation of what adaptation should become in face of climate change 
for all countries?
• Maintaining the differentiation between developed and developing countries 
regarding support for adaptation, in particular making available means for 
implementation has always been a demand from developing countries. What 
evolution can be expected or anticipated on new regulations concerning adap-
tation in the Paris Agreement in particular in terms of the global objective 
(quantifiable or not) of national communications on adaptation and the global 
stocktake?
446. Adaptation elements will also be addressed by the APA under the items relating to the 
NDC, Transparency and the global stocktake, as for mitigation.
447. Magnan A. (2016). IDDRI
146
T
h
e
 
m
a
i
n
 
s
u
b
j
e
c
t
s
 
u
n
d
e
r
 
d
e
b
a
t
e
• What practical modalities and procedures must be developed and prepared 
on issues of adaptation?
• How to ensure appropriate and predictable public financing for adaptation 
projects and programmes in developing countries, especially the most vulner-
able ones?
• What transparency for the support provided by developed countries for the 
benefit of developing countries by adaptation actions? 
• The modalities for dealing with adaptation – and its consideration could 
potentially be far wider than mitigation – given its strong dependence on 
national and local characteristics, i.e. “national realities”. It is especially 
important to decide who is going to pay, what aid will be forthcoming and for 
whom, without forgetting the monitoring and assessment processes.
• How to ensure that adaptation be considered equitably and adequately as is the 
case with mitigation in the framework of the global stocktake? How to evaluate 
qualitatively and quantitatively the expectations of the global adaptation objective 
and the progress recorded by the countries? 
• Finally, how will the issue of « vulnerability » closely linked to adaptation be 
dealt with and what chances will it have so that the climate community (sci-
entific, political, economic, etc.) can agree on a same understanding, even 
definition and use acceptable to all?
III.6 Role of non-State actors and evaluation  
of commitments
III.6.1 Context: Some commitments from States Parties 
are still inadequate
The Paris Agreement is already historic, as it involves for the first time all the States 
Parties at the UNFCCC. The CPDN has played a key role in the preparatory 
process and the arrangement of this agreement: each Party has therefore been able 
to determine their level of commitment, depending on their national realities, in 
accordance with one of the founding principles of the UNFCCC, “common but 
differentiated responsibilities”448. Facing the deficit of state ambition described 
above, the multi stakeholder collaboration, including the contribution of non-State 
actors, proves to be more vital than ever, in order to increase the level of ambition 
and reduce the gap between our goals and the actions required to reach them.
448. United Nations, 1992a, UNFCCC, art. 3 paragr. 1
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III.6.2 Acknowledgement of the role of non-State actors
Non-State actors... at the heart of the climate agenda…
If the national governments have been the main actors in the multilateral negotiations 
on climate since the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, non-State actors have 
continued to play a key role in environmental issues since the beginning. Agenda 21, 
which was adopted at the time, does indeed recognise that “one of the fundamental 
prerequisites for the achievement of sustainable development is broad public participation 
in decision-making”449. In this sense, it identifies nine “major groups” including 
non-government organisations (NGO), local communities and even commerce 
and industry450.
Since, community organisations have pushed for the adoption of more ambitious 
agreements on climate, at the same time as implementing an array of solutions in 
favour of production methods and consumption patterns that are more favourable 
for the environment, including low-carbon modes.
…and to the rescue of ambition
More than ever, non-State actors have become indispensable in the fight against 
climate change, by innovating every day and, around the world, numerous initiatives 
continue to emerge, adapted to suit local contexts. The COP21 has reaffirmed that 
theirs has become a central role. 
The decision to adopt the Paris Agreement mentions them on several occasions: 
• in the preamble, by including them in the necessary mobilisation under the 
same title as the Parties to the Convention “Agreeing to uphold and promote 
regional and international cooperation in order tomobilize stronger and more 
ambitious climate action by all Parties and non-Party stakeholders, including 
civil society, the private sector, financial institutions, cities and other subnational 
authorities, local communities and indigenous peoples (…)”451
• in the body of the Decision, the Conference of the Parties “welcomes the efforts of 
non-Party stakeholders to scale up their climate actions, and encourages the registration 
of those actions in the Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action platforms452”453
449. United Nations, Agenda 21, Chapter 23, preamble, paragr. 23.2 line 1 [online]
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/Agenda21.pdf 
450. United Nations, Official text of Agenda 21 [online]
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/Agenda21.pdf
451. Decision 1/CP.21, Adoption of the Paris Agreement
452. The NAZCA Platform (see above)
453. Decision 1/CP.21, paragr. 117
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The decision that operationalises the Paris Agreement even dedicates Chapter V 
to them. “Non-Party stakeholders”454. The action of non-State actors “including those 
of civil society, the private sector, financial institutions, cities and other subnational 
authorities”455 is underlined and they are invited to scale up their efforts, both in 
order to find ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) and also to build up 
resilience in the face of adverse effects of climate change456.
Local and subnational dimensions of adaptation are also showcased457, clearly 
recognising the role of cities and local governments going forward.
International recognition of local and regional governments
From 1947, local government networks benefit from consultative status in the 
capacity of non-government organisations (NGO) in the eyes of the United  
Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).458 Knowing that, the reason 
that NGOs have played a role in United Nations debates for the first time, is 
due to the bias from ECOSOC. “In 1945, 41 NGOs were granted consultative 
status by the council; by 1992 more than 700 NGOs had attained consultative status 
and the number has been steadily increasing ever since”459
In 1992, local authorities were recognised as one of the nine “major groups” of 
Agenda 21. Ever since, local governments have been recognised and included in the 
largest international meetings and by the UN, such as Beijing+10, the Millennium 
Summit of World Leaders+5 and even the World Water Forum, etc.460 The 
role of local and regional governments is more and more recognised on the 
international scene, demonstrating their essential participation in the sustainable 
development of our societies, including as part of the fight against climate change.
Local and regional governments… a demand for results in the fight 
against climate change
Starting from 2007, local and regional governments have published a “Local  
Government Climate Roadmap”461. The objective has stayed the same and it is about 
participating in the implementation of an ambitious climate regime on the post- 
Kyoto agenda.
454. Decision 1/CP.21, p. 19
455. Decision 1/CP.21, paragr. 133
456. Decision 1/CP.21, paragr. 134
457. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Article 7
458. UCLG, 2016, p. 10
459. CSONET, NGO Branch, Introduction – Introduction to ECOSOC Consultative Status 
[online]
http://csonet.org/index.php?menu=30
460. UCLG, 2016, p. 10
461. To find out more: Local Government Climate Roadmap, Official site [online]
http://www.iclei.org/index.php?id=1197
Continued on page 149
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In 2010, local and regional governments were recognised for the first time as 
“government stakeholders” within the Cancun Agreements at COP16462. They have 
since been implicated as official stakeholders within the Conference of the Parties 
of the UNFCCC.
Beyond climate negotiations, local authorities form the essential bridge between 
the international sphere, national governments, communities and citizens. They 
have a crucial role to play in the new global climate partnership. Regarding this 
the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon, announced: “As the world strives for a 
more sustainable path in the years ahead, particularly beyond 2015, local voices and 
local action will be crucial elements in our quest”463.
From a practical point of view, local governments have a strictly limited territorial 
seat, which often allows them (by virtue of their expertise, decentralisation and 
subsidiarity principle464) to implement ambitious climate policies according to 
local geographic, social and economic realities. A further example is the mobili-
sation of Regions as demonstrated at the recent Mediterranean Forum, which 
took place in Tangier on 18th and 19th July 2016 (MedCOP Climate 2016)465.
III.6.3 The commitments of non-State actors
An abundance of initiatives… the commitments of non-State actors 
as so many opportunities for action
a. Existing initiatives
As part of the climate negotiations, the mobilisation of non-State actors has been 
encouraged by the setting up of the Lima-Paris Action Agenda (LPAA)466. This 
initiative has achieved great success and to facilitate the details and the follow-up 
for initiatives of the LPAA, the Nazca platform467 was set up. Launched in 2014 by 
the Peruvian chairman of COP20468, it logs the commitments made by non-State 
actors for climate change action. The registered actions are gathered according to 
462. UNFCCC, 2010, Decision 1/CP.16, paragr. 7
463. Message from the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, during a meeting of the Global 
Task Force of local and regional governments in New York, 28 May 2013.
According to UCLG, 2016, p. 6
464. Contributing to the fact that decisions are taken closer to the citizens
465. For more information, see ENERGIES 2050, 2016b
Consult the official site of MedCOP Climate 2016: http://medcopclimat.com/en/
medcop-mediterranean-forum-climate-tangier-2016
Or the official homepage for civil society: http://medcoptanger-sc.com/fr/index.html
466. LPAA – Lima Paris Action Agenda 
467. “Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action”
http://climateaction.unfccc.int/
468. UNFCCC, Newsroom, 2015. “An initiative from the French and Peruvian governments, 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the administration department of the 
UNFCCC”
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13 sectors: reduction in emissions; resilience; transport; access to energy and energy 
efficiency; renewable energies; agriculture; private financing; forest; innovation; 
construction; carbon enhancement; short term pollutants; and others.
On 5th October 2016, 11,615 actions were recorded on this platform, covering 
both the period pre-2020 and between 2020 and 2030 (which is also the duration 
for the implementation of CPDN/NDC) and the long term. On the same date, 
the following were committed: 2364 cities469, 167 regions470, 448 investors471, 236 
civil society organisations 472 et 2090 companies473, proving that there is a growing 
mobilisation of all stakeholders, in the North but also in the South.
On the Nazca platform, the range of commitments is established either by 
collective actions (Cooperative Initiatives, which are commitments taken collectively 
by a variety of non-State actors: businesses, cities, subnational regions, civil society 
investors, often in partnership with the country), reuniting different actors in the 
same goal, or by individual actions (Individual actions), which are a commitment 
by a sole actor to achieve a particular objective.
On 5th October 2016, 7369 individual actions were recorded474, apportioned 
as follows:
Figure 5:  Number of actors engaged in individual actions by sector 
(NAZCA)
469. http://climateaction.unfccc.int/cities
470. http://climateaction.unfccc.int/subnational-regions
471. http://climateaction.unfccc.int/investors
472. http://climateaction.unfccc.int/csos
473. http://climateaction.unfccc.int/companies
474. http://climateaction.unfccc.int/total-commitment-
themes?themeid=0&theme=&open=yes&type=individual&Country=0
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On 5th October 2016, 4246 cooperative actions were recorded475, apportioned as follows:
Figure 6:  Number of actors engaged in cooperative actions  
by sector (NAZCA)
Figure 7:  Cities engaged in NAZCA476
475. http://climateaction.unfccc.int/total-commitment-themes?themeid=0&theme=&open 
=yes&type=cooperative&Country=0
476. http://climateaction.unfccc.int/cities
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Among the numerous initiatives, the Covenant of Mayors serves as an example: 
several thousand cities, mainly in Europe and, more and more frequently, elsewhere, 
have committed to overtake objectives fixed on a national level in their lands on 
the subjects of climate policy. The new Covenant of Mayors for climate and energy, 
created in 2015, has reaffirmed this ambition until after 2020. The Covenant has 
gathered, by 5th October 2016, 6907 signatories, representing close to 214 million 
residents477.
Figure 8:  Signatories of the Covenant of Mayors
Another example is the programme Science based targets478 bringing together 
large multinationals, all committed to policies to reduce their GHG emissions.
These elements are just the “tip of the iceberg”, as the list of examples of non-State 
actors’ involvement is almost infinite and has been for many years. It has henceforth 
become evident that the contribution of all stakeholders is not only a key element 
of climate change action but also that it proves to be vital to raise the level of ambition 
in order to maintain the level of global warming below 2°C by the end of the 
century.
477. Covenant of Mayors’ site [online] http://www.covenantofmayors.eu/index_en.html 
478. Science based targets’ site [online] http://sciencebasedtargets.org/
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b. Initiatives that are already in progress, that should be prolonged 
and renewed
The Paris Agreement, leaning on decision 1/CP.20, recognises the initiatives and 
commitments by all actors, including those non-State actors479 launched as part of 
the Lima-Paris Action Agenda480. Decision 1/CP.21 states furthermore, the urgent 
need to intensify the world response to climate change and to promote a greater 
ambition for governments.
In order to create a link between the Covenant and the multiple voluntary 
initiatives, “two high-level champions”481 have been appointed for the period 
2016-2020. These personalities are notably responsible for seeing that the execution 
(of the extension of the LPAA initiatives) and intensification of voluntary initiatives 
by non-State actors are followed.482 In other words, these two champions should 
advance the Global Climate Action Programme through the so-called “non-Party 
stakeholders”.
Decision 1/CP.21 in this way details the tasks that fall to these high-level 
champions:483
“[...] to facilitate through strengthened high-level engagement in the period 2016–
2020 the successful execution of existing efforts and the scaling-up and introduction of 
new or strengthened voluntary efforts, initiatives and coalitions, including by:
a)  Working with the Executive Secretary and the current and incoming Presidents 
of the Conference of the Parties to coordinate the annual high-level event referred 
to in paragraph 120 above;
b)  Engaging with interested Parties and non-Party stakeholders, including to further 
the voluntary initiatives of the Lima-Paris Action Agenda;
c)  Providing guidance to the secretariat on the organization of technical expert 
meetings referred to in paragraph 111(a) above and paragraph 129(a) below”
In doing so, the two high-level champions have risen to the challenge, and a 
new climate change action agenda484 has been launched, formed by a “Global Climate 
Action Agenda”.
479. Decision 1/CP.21, Part IV, Enhanced action prior to 2020, paras. 106-132; and, Decision 
1/CP.21, Part V, Non-Party stakeholders, paras. 134-137
480. Decision 1/CP.21, paragr. 121
481. Hakima El Haite originating from Morocco, and Laurence Tubiana from France UN-
FCCC, Newsroom, 2016b
482. Decision 1/CP.21, paragr. 121
483. Decision 1/CP.21, paragr. 121
484. UNFCCC, Newsroom, 2016f
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Global Climate Action Agenda: The roadmap
Ms. Hakima El Haité and Ms. Laurence Tubiana, high-level climate champions from 
Morocco and France, have published their roadmap for the implementation of their global 
action plan. The action plan has the objective of strengthening cooperative initiatives 
between governments, cities, businesses, investors and citizens in order to rapidly reduce 
emissions and to help vulnerable countries to adapt to the impact of the climate and 
to develop their own sustainable future using clean energy.485
“As the appointed champions of global climate action:
• We believe that we need to, inter alia, be an interface between action on the ground 
and the UNFCCC negotiation process, and between non-Party stakeholders and Parties;
• We intend to track implementation of existing initiatives to demonstrate credibility, 
promote best practices and enhance delivery;
• We will also support new initiatives, focusing on adaptation, with a view to broad-
ening the country coverage and including more initiatives from developing country 
Parties and non-Party stakeholders;
• We are committed to working with all Parties and non-Party stakeholders, to respecting 
the principles of inclusiveness and transparency, and to promoting innovation.
• We will present, at COP 22, a joint report on climate action and on the implementation 
of this road map. ”486
Presentation of the roadmap487
A. To involve the interested Parties and non-Party stakeholders, including the 
promotion of voluntary initiatives from the Lima-Paris Action Agenda
1. To build on existing initiatives and to support new geographically-varied  
initiatives
2. To connect initiatives and alliances to national action plans such as Nationally 
Determined Contributions (NDC)
3. To assure more transparency, track results and establish credibility
B. To provide guidance to the secretariat on the organisation of technical meetings 
of specialists, and to work with the Executive Secretary and the current and 
future presidents of the Conference of the Parties to coordinate annual events 
to a high-level
The two champions have also invited governments and non-State actors to 
convey their points of view on this roadmap, as well as any useful input, aiming 
to stimulate climate action, up until 1st August 2016. 488
485. Official site of COP22, Marrakesh, High-Level Climate Champions Launch Roadmap 
for Global Climate Action [online]
http://www.cop22.ma/en/high-level-climate-champions-launch-roadmap-global- 
climate-action
486. UNFCCC, Newsroom, 2016b
487. UNFCCC, Newsroom, 2016b
488. CCNUCC, Newsroom, 2016c – To consult the champions’ letter [online]
http://newsroom.unfccc.int/media/658506/high-level-champions-invitation- 
submissions.pdf
Continued on page 155
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During the Bonn Conference, held in May 2016, the two champions reiterated 
their commitments, at the same time as showing their optimism.489
Hakima El Haité announced in this way: “The solidarity and trust built up in Paris 
should be the indicators of success in Marrakesh. COP22 should be a COP of action, 
launched on the work carried out in Bonn. We must strengthen solutions and concrete 
actions, at the same time as maintaining the spirit of Paris”
Laurence Tubiana, echoed this statement: “The time has come to connect fully the 
actions of governments, and in particular the NDC, with the numerous initiatives and 
alliances led by non-State actors: let’s bring the positive energy from the surroundings 
into ourselves”
The two champions were also present at the first Global Forum of Alliances and 
Coalitions, which took place on 23rd and 24th June in Rabat, Morocco. This forum 
brought together close to 450 participants, representing various stakeholders, 
including governments, multilateral institutions, NGOs, alliances, coalitions and 
the private sector.490
Facing this buzz that is getting organised day by day, the Action Agenda 
should become a reality so that the “spirit of Paris” endures. Everyone has a role to 
play and it is only together that the battle against climate change can be won. The 
COP22 in Marrakesh should make it possible to consolidate the foundations of 
this great mobilisation, by once again promoting the mobilisation of multiple 
stakeholders, and notably the participation of non-State actors in the fulfilment of 
fixed objectives according to the Paris Agreement.
III.7 Transparency
III.7.1 Transparency and implementation  
of the Paris Agreement
The enhanced transparency framework is one of the key aspects of the architecture 
of the new global climate regime adopted in Paris in December 2015. 
According to Deprez, A., Colombier, M., and Spencer (hereinafter Deprez 
et al.)491, the transparency framework is critically important to build trust inter-
nationally that countries are effectively making the changes necessary to combat 
climate change, as well as to evaluate and promote stepping up these actions. The 
paper highlights the need to build trust in collective action, i.e. the trust that a 
large number of countries will shift to a low-carbon economy and deliver on their 
undertakings, as well as in individual action. This strengthened trust must necessarily 
489. UNFCCC, Newsroom, 2016d
490. UNFCCC, Newsroom, 2016e
491. Deprez et al. 2015
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lead to robust policy measures and the establishment of a clear and reliable context 
to enable all actors – and the private sector in particular – to commit in turn by 
shifting their strategic orientations and investments. 
Deprez et al492 identify four principles to enable the transparency framework 
to build trust in collective action. 
• universality of reporting and of review to increase the coherence of NDCs;
• compliance with the principle of self-differentiation, allowing countries to 
use the reporting options most in line with their NDCs and their national 
circumstances;
• no-backsliding, designed to ensure there is no going backwards, which would 
threaten the ambition for the reporting and review process, conversely; and,
• on-going improvement, which aims to enhance climate change ambitions 
over time.
III.7.2 Framework established ahead of COP 21 
The first reporting framework established for actions to mitigate climate change 
initially consisted of a system differentiated between countries. 
First of all, all Parties were and are required to present their National Commu-
nications to the UNFCCC493. For developed countries, this document must 
include information on GHG emissions and reductions, national circumstances, 
policies and measures in place, the assessment of vulnerability, financial resources 
and transfer of technology, education, training and public awareness measures and 
any other details of the activities undertaken to implement the Convention. 
National Communications from developing countries must provide information 
on GHG inventories, measures to mitigate and to facilitate adaptation to climate 
change and any other information relevant to implementing the Convention. 
Developed countries are also required to submit their annual inventories of GHG 
emissions in addition to the National Communication.
The 2010 Cancun Agreements strengthened the existing transparency framework. 
The Parties agreed to share information every two years on policies and measures 
to combat climate change, according to their specific circumstances. This enhanced 
framework was implemented in 2014 and includes three main phases:
• An initial reporting phase; 
• National technical assessment of the reports submitted; and
• A third peer-to-peer exchange covering progress by the country. 
• Developed countries are required to submit Biennial Reports, while the reporting 
by developing countries takes the form of Biennial Update Reports.
492. Deprez et al. 2015
493. http://unfccc.int/national_reports/items/1408.php
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The second and third phases are also differentiated. The Biennial Update 
Reports from developing countries are submitted for International Consultation 
and Analysis (ICA) while the technical examination of the Biennial Update 
Reports from developed countries is known as an International Assessment and 
Review (IAR) process. 
III.7.3 New, enhanced transparency framework
The biennial reporting and review process introduced in the Cancun Agreements 
provides a solid basis to establish the enhanced transparency system explicitly called 
for in Article 13 of the Paris Agreement494. This new enhanced framework must:
• Monitor advances/progress towards achieving individual and collective emission 
reduction objectives;
• Increase understanding of how to complete NDCs. However, for some types 
of NDCs, such as those that do not have detailed mitigation goals, it will be 
more difficult to evaluate progress or expected impacts.
The new mechanism will be flexible with regard to defining the scope, frequency 
and level of detail in the reporting, as well as the scope of the reviews. 
The transparency framework will follow the process established under the 
UNFCCC to provide clarity on the support provided to fulfil obligations and 
deliver on undertakings under the Paris Agreement. The challenges of reporting 
and reviewing this type of information are well known. For the most part, they 
concern the availability and clarity of the information required and reported, as 
well as the lack of reporting methods and typology of activities related to climate 
change.
In the absence of clearly-defined rules and methodologies, reporting on financial 
support for measures to combat climate change poses a greater challenge, compared 
with reporting on GHG emissions and emission reductions. This is true for the 
reporting of climate financing through public interventions. In this instance, it is 
vital for all multilateral development banks, environment funds, international 
organisations, the private sector and national governments to participate in the 
communication effort. Communicating the support received by developing countries 
will also be critical, since few countries have established this process. In addition, 
ex-ante communication by developed countries on financing provided and used is 
seen as crucial, since this was previously done on a voluntary basis.
Moreover, in addition to the need to establish the rules and methodology for 
reporting climate financing, it also remains to establish a shared vision of the concepts 
introduced by the Paris Agreement - for example, the concepts of “progress in line 
with previous efforts” and the “provision of scaled-up financial resources”.
494. OECD/IEA, 2016
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According to Deprez et al495, discussions are currently under way with the 
UNFCCC to define the terms and conditions for communication on financing. 
Despite the political connection with reporting on mitigation actions, the topic is 
addressed in a separate parallel track by the Standing Committee for Finance. 
As stated in the OECD report496, ending differentiation between the Parties is 
one of the main features of the enhanced transparency framework ushered in by the 
Paris Agreement. A second important difference which can be highlighted concerns 
the purpose of reporting. Prior to this, the transparency system was based primarily 
on mitigation actions. Nevertheless, the new framework must also take into account 
transparency regarding the resources provided to complete mitigation and adaptation 
actions, in other words, the financial, technical and capacity-building resources 
needed to achieve objectives. Transparency on adaptation actions will also be a 
challenge for implementing the Paris Agreement. There is currently no agreement 
on how to monitor and assess adaptation actions. Deprez et al497 underline the 
potential role of the Adaptation Committee in developing and implementing a 
mechanism to increase the transparency of these adaptation actions. 
III.7.4 Conditions required to ensure transparency
Leaving aside the financial support required for the implementation of actions and 
which must be included in communication by the Parties, Dagnet’s498 article 
places the spotlight on the need to build capacity to enhance or develop sound 
national and international measuring, reporting and verification (MRV) systems, 
as well as robust domestic regulation procedures. 
The report emphasises the emergence of a range of initiatives since the Paris 
negotiations, such as: 
• the Capacity Building Initiative for Transparency (CBIT)499 established through 
the Global Environment Facility: the United States, Canada and the United 
Kingdom have committed to pay USD 30 million for the initiative. The aim 
is to consolidate the institutional and technical capacities of developing countries 
to meet the enhanced transparency requirements in the Paris Agreement, leading 
up to 2020 and beyond. 
• The Initiative for Climate Action Transparency500 : Germany, Italy, and the 
ClimateWorks Foundation have committed USD 16 million to this initiative, 
through the Children’s Investment Fund Foundation. The aim of the initiative 
is to provide all policymakers with the tools and support required to measure 
and assess the effects of their climate actions. For example, the Initiative for 
495. Deprez et al. 2015
496. OECD/IEA, 2016
497. Deprez et al. 2015
498. Dagnet, 2016
499. https://www.thegef.org/gef/CC/capacity-building-initiative-for-transparency
500. http://www.climateactiontransparency.org/
159
Guide to the Negotiations - UNFCCC (COP22, CMP12 and CMA1) - OIF/IFDD, 2016
Climate Action Transparency recently published the results of a stakeholder 
survey501 conducted to clarify needs, identify expected outcomes and tailor 
reference documents, which will guide countries in ensuring credible mea-
surement and reporting of GHG emissions, sustainable development and 
transformational impacts of their policies and actions. The findings highlight 
the need for more detailed methodological guidance and for better guidance 
on international reporting requirements to the UNFCCC and for national 
planning, reporting, and evaluation.
The paper also recommends learning from past experience and drawing on 
the work of UNFCCC bodies, as well as existing UNFCC training programmes, 
initiatives and partnerships around the subject of transparency. 
Capacity-building activities are thus central to the process of enhancing the 
transparency framework. It is vital that they empower actors to seize the opportunity 
represented by implementing the NDCs for their country and to become a leader 
in implementing the agenda to follow to achieve the goals. 
III.7.5 Next steps
Transparency was one of the items on the agenda for the Ad Hoc Working Group 
on the Paris Agreement (APA) during the Bonn Conference on Climate Change 
in May 2016. Ahead of this conference, the APA invited the Parties to communicate 
by the end of September 2016 their comments regarding the information required 
to facilitate clarity, transparency, and understanding of the NDCs, according to 
paragraph 28, and on the modalities, procedures and guidelines to enhance the 
transparency of the measures and support referred to Article 13 of the Paris Agreement. 
The Earth Negotiations Bulletin502 reports the conclusions of the Subsidiary 
Body for Implementation (SBI), and stresses “the importance of the principles of 
openness, transparency, and inclusion during the preparations for COP 22/CMP 12 in 
Marrakesh”. 
Therefore the aim in the coming months is to establish a shared understanding 
of the clauses in the Paris Agreement on transparency and how the current framework 
is going to change. It will be necessary to set priorities and a schedule defining the 
activities to be completed by the APA and the UNFCCC entities503.
501. http://www.climateactiontransparency.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/ICAT- 
Stakeholder-Survey-Results.pdf
502. IISD, 2016a.
503. OECD/IEA, 2016
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Deprez et al504 identifies three key challenges to be overcome to enhance 
transparency framework, namely collecting, processing and sharing information. 
For the first phase, the report suggests collecting information through the reviewed 
Biennial Reports, including: inventories, the description of NDCs, and progress 
towards the goals set in the NDCs, sector information, emission forecasts, support 
provided and received, and self-explanation of the choices of reporting options used 
in the revised Biennial Report. The report goes on to suggest using the Technical 
Examination phase to process the information and to merge the existing International 
Consultation and Analysis (ICA) and International Assessment and Review (IAR) 
procedures into one review process. Regarding the processing of transparency 
information, the report also stresses that there is currently no entity tasked with 
the aggregate evaluation of all efforts and progress on decarbonisation and proposes 
an Assessment of Collective Decarbonisation Progress. Lastly, the report points to 
the need for political visibility when it comes to transparency and proposes creating 
a database on implementation of decarbonisation, modelled on the existing UNFCCC 
emission inventory database, for the purposes of sharing information, 
Dagnet505 identifies a number of ways forward to enhance the transparency 
framework and accountability under the Paris Agreement: 
• Empower citizens and all stakeholders to participate in designing national 
policies and to be involved in the international verification process;
• Give better access to information to foster engagement and enable informed 
decision-making; 
• Highlight the co-benefits of sustainable development actions;
• Leverage cooperative initiatives by governments, international organisations, 
the private sector, city authorities and others to help achieve or go beyond 
national climate change commitments. 
The author also encourages the COP presidencies to work with the Open 
Government Partnership506, an international platform launched in 2011 for domestic 
reformers committed to making their governments more open, accountable and 
responsive to citizens. Opportunities to enhance transparency are also available 
outside of the UNFCCC. The Financial Stability Board (FSB) formed a task force 
in December 2015 to highlight companies’ financial exposure to the risks of climate 
change. The disclosure of this information increases transparency and can help to 
bring public and private financial flows into alignment with a low-carbon and 
climate-resilient trajectory. 
504. Deprez et al. 2015
505. Dagnet, 2016
506. http://www.opengovpartnership.org/
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III.8 Gender equality in the context of climate 
change negotiations
III.8.1 Context: Gender and equality between  
men and women
Gender refers to the analysis of the status of men and women, the qualities or 
characteristics that society ascribes to each sex, social relationships between 
men and women, and socio-cultural perceptions of gender507. Gender in the 
Paris Agreement is included under “gender equality”508.
The recognition of equality between men and women implies recognising the 
particular vulnerabilities of each sex in the face of climate change. Yet, these vulner-
abilities tend to aggravate social and economic inequalities: generally more affected 
by poverty and precariousness, women are also often more vulnerable to the conse-
quences of climate change. At the same time, many stakeholders agree on the critical 
role played by women and the close link between activities usually carried out by 
women, the environment and climate. This key role is also stressed in the education 
of children, with whom the future of sustainable and resilient development lie.
The subject of gender was thus dealt with during the Rio International Conference 
in 1992. Agenda 21, which was adopted at the time, identified women as one of 
the “major groups” of civil society who play a vital role in achieving sustainable 
development509. Chapter 24 of this document, “Global action for women towards 
sustainable and equitable development,”510 was dedicated to them. The question of 
gender equality in climate negotiations was also included in the Beijing Declaration 
of the Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995, which states: “Women’s empow-
erment and their full participation on the basis of equality in all spheres of society, 
including participation in the decision-making process and access to power, are fundamental 
for the achievement of equality, development and peace.”511 
507. United Nations Organisation for Agriculture. Why “gender”? [Online] 
http://www.fao.org/gender/gender-home/gender-why/pourquoi-parler-de-genre/fr
508. See box “Gender equality in the Paris Agreement”
509. United Nations, 1992b Action 21, Chapter 23
510. United Nations, 1992b Action 21, Chapter 24
511. United Nations, 1995, Annex 1, para. 13, p. 3
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Gender and climate
The gender aspect is a cross-cutting issue that - although not always considered 
central in the history of negotiations – is of great importance nonetheless. In effect, 
recognition of the different roles played by men and women would facilitate 
combating climate change and improve adaptation. 
In numerous countries, in particular the most vulnerable ones, women are the 
first victims of the consequences of climate change. It is they who cook, fetch 
wood and bring water. It is therefore women who should be given priority 
when it comes to raising awareness of energy conservation. They are the first 
to benefit from the introduction of renewable energy, and also the first to suffer 
from scarcer water resources. In their central role as educators of children they 
are also at the forefront of awareness for future generations.
Better representation of women among negotiators and inside the different 
organisations created as a result of the Convention would improve recognition 
of their crucial role. For the time there is unanimous agreement that not enough 
progress has been made on advancing gender equality. 
On the other hand, the gender issue has been essentially dealt with from an 
organisational point of view for now, although many consider that only a global 
approach would be appropriate.
Source – Guide to the negotiations 2015, updated
Figure 9:  Support to boost agricultural productivity of women 
through agroforestry to counter land degradation  
and promote community conservation. Ila village,  
Bateke Plateau, Democratic Republic of Congo512
512. A Collège Interdisciplinaire Territoires et Développements Durables (CITDD) project, 
supported by the IFDD, in partnership with the Brussels-Capital Region
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Based on the Beijing Declaration, COP 7 (2001) in Marrakesh put forward the 
need to have a more balanced representation of men and women among the elected 
members of the bodies created under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol513. 
But ten years later, at COP 18 in Doha in 2012 the Parties acknowledged that 
women continued to be under-represented in these bodies, despite declarations of 
intent514. To remedy this situation, the Parties set the goal of gender balance inside the 
negotiation and decision-making bodies. Progress towards achieving this objective 
will be reviewed in 2016 during COP 22 in Marrakesh. However, it appears that there 
is still a long way to go. According to the Annual Report on gender composition 
tracking progress achieved, presented in Warsaw in 2013515, only one body formed 
under the Convention or the Kyoto Protocol has achieved gender parity516. On average 
women represented only 23% of staff in these organisations in 2013.
According to the Annual Report on gender composition tracking progress 
achieved, presented in Paris in 2015, no body formed under the Convention or 
the Kyoto Protocol has achieved gender parity517. In these bodies, representation 
of women increased 5% in only one organisation, the Executive Committee of the 
Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage related to climate change, 
whereas the percentage fell 10% in the Executive Committee for the Clean Development 
Mechanism, the Consultative Group of Experts on National Communications 
from Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention, and the Technology 
Executive Committee. Other data also show a decline in the percentage of women 
compared with 2014 (a fall of 3% in the Adaptation Fund Board, of 7% in the 
Advisory Board of the Climate Technology Centre and Network) or practically no 
change in representation. The highest proportion of women in 2015, as a percentage, 
was around 40% in the Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee and the 
Compliance Committee facilitative branch.
Other than the question of parity in decision-making bodies, gender equality 
would also appear to be generally linked to the efficiency of climate action. Thus, 
in the 2010 Cancun Agreements, the Conference of the Parties recognised that 
“gender equality and the effective participation of women (…) are hugely important 
for effective action on all aspects of climate change”518. 
As from 2011, the Parties will endeavour to go beyond the declarations of 
principle and address the issue in more practical terms. During COP 17, the Secretariat 
requested the inclusion of the application of methods and tools respecting gender 
equality among cross-cutting issues, in the framework of the Nairobi Work Programme 
on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to climate change519. Policies on climate 
513. Decision 36/CP.7
514. Decision 23/CP.18
515. FCCC/CP/2013/4, Table 1.
516. The Consultative Group of Experts (CGE) on National Communications from Parties 
not included in Annex I to the Convention.
517. UNFCCC, 2015d, See Table 1, pp. 4-5
518. Decision 1/CP.16, para. 7
519. Decision 6/CP.17
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change must be gender-sensitive and respond to the differing needs of men and women 
in national and local contexts520. Decision 23/CP.18 aims to ensure that the needs of 
women and men are addressed equally in a more effective climate change policy521.
Another advance during COP 18 in 2012 was the recognition, in the Doha 
work programme on Article 6 of the Convention, that the problem of equality 
between women and men cuts across all sectors and concerns all aspects of Article 
6, i.e. education and public awareness of climate change and its effects; public 
access to information on climate change and its effects, public participation in the 
review of climate change and its effects and clarification of appropriate measures 
to address them; training of scientific, technical and managerial personnel; inter-
national cooperation on the design and sharing of material for education and 
public awareness of climate change and its effects, and education and training 
programmes522. In another sign of the growing recognition of the central impor-
tance of gender balance, COP 18 organised a first workshop on gender, which 
took place in Warsaw in 2013523. 
Following the work conducted under the auspices of the Subsidiary Body for 
Implementation (SBI) in 2014, COP 20 established the Lima work programme 
on gender for a two-year period524. Its work will be reviewed during COP 22 in 2016. 
The Programme deals in particular with the question of women representation in 
bodies created under the Convention, gender-sensitive climate policies, and tools 
to incorporate gender issues into climate activities. 
Regarding the first subject, the Parties are encouraged to promote training 
and capacity-building of representatives, in particular the less developed countries 
(LDC), small island developing states (SIDS) and African countries. 
The Programme also provided for two workshops. The first took place in 
Bonn in June 2015 under the auspices of the SBI, and covered mitigation, as well 
as development and technology transfer525. Clarification of the definition of gender 
terminology was also dealt with. The report on the workshop will be considered by 
the SBI during its 43rd session, held simultaneously with COP 21526. The SBI’s 
main conclusions concerned the organisation of training and awareness building 
activities on issues related to gender and climate change, while stressing the efforts 
to step up existing work in the areas of education, mitigation, funding, technology 
and capacity-building. The report also recapped on the need to implement sensitive 
and appropriate actions on gender in these particular feeds.527
520. Decision 23/CP.18
521. Decision 23/CP.18, para. 2
522. Decision 15/CP.18, Annex para. 8.
523. UNFCCC, 2013b
524. Decision 18/CP.20
525. http://unfccc.int/documentation/documents/advanced_search/items/6911.
php?priref=600008618#beg. 
526. Decision 18/CP.20, para. 11
527. FCCC/SBI/2,015/L.31, paragr. 6 [on line] http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/sbi/
eng/l31.pdf
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The second workshop was scheduled for May 2016 to focus in particular on 
adaptation, capacity-building and training of stakeholder representatives working 
on gender related issues. The Parties were invited to submit their views on the mat-
ters to be addressed in the workshop by 3 February 2016 of the latest.528 
For its part, the Secretariat prepared a technical report on the directives of the 
tools designed to ensure the integration of questions of gender in activities related 
to climate change in April 2016529 for review by the SBI at its 44th. session, during 
the Bonn Conference in May 2016.
Two workshops were held during the Conference on gender-sensitive policy, 
on Wednesday 18 May530 and Thursday 19 May531. During the informal discussions, 
many Parties wished to extend the Lima Work Programme on Gender to COP 22. 
With some disagreement on this point, especially regarding implementation, the 
Parties failed to agree and the issue was left pending.532
The SBI plenary session adopted its conclusions533, on Thursday 26 May, 
including534, SBI:
• welcoming the results of the workshop held during SBI 44 on gender-sensitive 
climate policy and a technical document produced by the Secretariat;
• expressing its appreciation for the two-year Lima Work Programme on Gender 
and the comments received in support of the programme;
• expressing its support for continuing and stepping up the work programme, 
and inviting the Parties and observers to submit their viewpoints on potential 
factors and guidelines for the continuation and intensification of the work 
programme, to be received by 29 August 2016, at the latest;
• requesting the Parties and observers to provide information on progress 
towards achieving the gender balance objectives and gender-sensitive climate 
policy; and
• agreeing to continue to examine this issue at SBI 45, with a view to preparing 
a draft decision for review during COP22.
This meeting is the culmination of a long process, for which hopes are running 
high, especially as a draft decision is included in the schedule for COP 22.
528. FCCC/SBI/2,015/L.31, paragr. 7 [on line] http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/sbi/
eng/l31.pdf
529. UNFCCC, 2016i
530. IISD, 2016b
531. IISD, 2016e
532. IISD 2016a, p. 16
533. FCCC/SBI/2016/L.16
534. IISD, 2016a, pp. 16-17
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III.8.2 From the topic of gender to “gender equality”  
in the Paris Agreement
During preparatory work for COP20 in Lima, in 2014, the African Group had 
called for the creation of a framework on gender in the context of climate change 
to go beyond simple participation of women535 in activities related to climate change. 
Jamaica had in turn expressed that according to them actions to be proposed should 
be guided by gender equality and not only gender balance536, a recommendation 
that was only partially taken into consideration in the decision of COP20 in Lima. 
It recommends in effect that the Parties “advance gender balance,” and to “achieve 
gender-responsive climate policy in all relevant activities under the Convention”537. 
The Group Women and Gender made a call in December 2014 for a binding 
agreement in Paris during COP21, ambitious and transforming that respects human 
rights, gender equality and rights of future generations. It also addressed the inte-
gration of this subject in the INDC, implementation 538 and in discussions on the 
development and transfer of technology. Furthermore, the Group had proposed in 
connection with this last subject a workshop on gender and technology in the 
framework of the Technology Mechanism created in 2010539.
The Conference of Lima was also an occasion to encourage various bodies 
created under the Convention, such as the Global Environment Facility and the 
Green Climate Fund, to integrate or reinforce integration of questions of gender 
in their activities540. 
There is general consensus on the subject of gender equality among the Parties, 
both developed and developing countries, as a general and guiding principle even 
if Saudi Arabia wished in 2015 to replace the concept of gender equality with that 
of “sensitivity to questions of gender”541. Numerous Parties, including the countries 
of the Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC), the Like 
Minded Group of States (LMDC), the LDC, Switzerland, Norway, Australia and 
Turkey, had thus made a call in September 2015 to include gender equality in the 
preamble of the Paris agreement542. The EU and India had already made similar 
calls in June 2015543. The EU, the African Group or even AILAC, among others 
had also requested that it appear in the objectives544. 
535. IISD, 2014, p. 4
536. IISD, 2014, p. 2
537. Decision 18/CP.20, para. 1
538. IISD, 2014, p. 2
539. IISD, 2014, p. 2
540. Decision 8/CP.20, paras. 17 and 18
541. IISD, 2015a, p. 5
542. IISD, 2015a, p. 4
543. IISD, 2015b, p. 5
544. IISD, 2015a, p. 5
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These proposals were included in the draft agreement545 prepared during the 
ADP-11 that took place in Bonn from 19-23 October 2015. In the end, in the 
final version of the Paris Agreement, the word “gender” was replaced by “gender 
equality”, to ensure recognition of the necessary equal involvement of both sexes 
in combating climate change, in the essential adaptation to it, and in the capacity- 
building topic.
Gender equality in the Paris Agreement
Decision 1/CP.21 includes the topic of gender equality, taking into account the 
need to involve everyone, by “Acknowledging that climate change is a common 
concern of humankind, Parties should, when taking action to address climate change, 
respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on human rights, the right 
to health, the rights of indigenous peoples, local communities, migrants, children, persons 
with disabilities and people in vulnerable situations and the right to development, as 
well as gender equality, empowerment of women and intergenerational equity546.
This is recalled from the preamble of the Agreement, which emphasises that 
“climate change is a common concern of humankind, Parties should, when taking action 
toaddress climate change, respect, promote and consider their respective obligations 
on human rights, the right to health, the rights of indigenous peoples, local communities, 
migrants, children, persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable situations and the 
right to development, as well as gender equality, empowerment of women and intergen-
erational equity547.
In Article 7, which establishes the global goal on adaptation, “Parties acknowledge 
that adaptation action should follow a country-driven, gender-responsive, participatory 
and fully transparent approach, taking into consideration vulnerable groups, communities 
and ecosystems, and should be based on and guided by the best available science and, as 
appropriate, traditional knowledge, knowledge of indigenous peoples and local knowledge 
systems, with a view to integrating adaptation into relevant socioeconomic and environ-
mental policies and actions, where appropriate548.
Finally, the topic of gender equality is included in Article 11, which addresses 
capacity-building, and which should in particular “be guided by lessons learned, 
including those from capacity-building activities under the Convention, and should be an 
effective, iterative process that is participatory, cross-cutting and gender-responsive.549
The year 2015 was critical as regards the recognition and consideration of the 
topic of gender equality at international level, most notably in the light of the 
progress made by the Paris Agreement in combating climate change, but also from 
a broader perspective.
545. ADP, 2015
546. Decision 1/CP.21
547. Decision 1/CP.21, Preamble of the Paris Agreement
548. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 7, para. 5
549. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, art. 11, para. 1
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Indeed, the United Nations post-2015 development agenda, following on 
from the Millennium Development Goals, established the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDG). The United Nations General Assembly thus adopted on 25 September 
2015 a 2030 agenda for sustainable development (2030 Agenda), which is set out 
in a document with the title “Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development550.
To summarise, the SDG are the outcome of a systemic approach with a similar 
purpose. They deal with the interconnected and interdependent elements of 
Sustainable Development (including, therefore, economic growth, social inclusion 
and environmental protection) while addressing the international community as a 
whole, that is both developed and developing countries.
Figure 11:  The SDG, Goal 5: Gender equality551
These 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) include a separate goal on 
achieving gender quality and empowering all women and girls (SDG5), as well as 
a second goal on reducing inequality within and among counties (SDG10). The 
targets set by the goal on gender equality guide countries towards ending all forms 
of discrimination and violence and to ensure that women, in all domains, can 
make their voice heard, make choices, access opportunities and resources, in addi-
tion to other provisions, on an equal footing. Eleven other goals – concerning 
subjects as varied as ending poverty and work, health, water and sanitation, just 
societies and sustainable cities – provide targets which are explicitly linked to 
achieving gender equality.552
550. United Nations, 2015
551. 
552. UN Women, 2015b, pp. 4-5
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“Gender equality is not only a fundamental human right, but a necessary foundation 
for a peaceful, prosperous and sustainable world. Providing women and girls with equal 
access [...] will fuel sustainable economies and benefit societies and humanity at large.” 553
553. See Sustainable Development Goals, Gender and equality [online] 
http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/gender-equality/
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General conclusion: COP 22... or  
the challenge of implementation
The agreement adopted during the 21st Conference of the Parties to the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP 21) in 2015 brings 
together, for the first time, all the Parties to the UNFCCC and is, therefore, historic. 
The aim, which is now included in the Paris Agreement, is to hold the increase 
in temperatures to well below 2°C and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature 
increase to 1.5°C, from now until the end of the century, above pre-industrial levels. 
The next stage, which is essential for giving practical expression to this high point, 
is the implementation of the commitments.
The Paris Agreement and Decision 1/CP.21, which operationalises it, enabled 
real progress to be made in responding to the challenges posed by climate change. 
In addition to the universal character of this agreement, a certain number of issues were 
reaffirmed and/or confirmed, with reference to mitigation and market mechanisms, 
and also adaptation, loss and damage, financing, transfer of technology, capacity- 
building, or the recognition of the role and necessary involvement of all players in 
combating global warming. The monitoring of implementation and transparency 
in order to achieve the goals were also reaffirmed.
As part of the preparation for COP 21, the Parties communicated throughout 
2015 their intended nationally determined contributions (INDC) to the UNFCCC 
Secretariat. States were required to provide evidence of the effort that they were 
ready to make individually and voluntarily to achieve the objectives of the Convention, 
mainly in terms of reducing or limited greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. This 
unprecedented and emphatically bottom-up approach was influential in leading 
to the first universal agreement on climate. The INDC are indeed evidence of 
a shared understanding of the challenges and a common ambition to combat 
climatic disorders and also of the sustainable development of our societies. The 
agreement adopted in Paris states that the Parties’ pledges, the INDC (“intended 
contributions”) will now be replaced by nationally determined contributions (NDC), 
or, in other words, concrete action plans once the Agreement enters into force. 
As at 5 October 2016, 163 INDC had been submitted to the UNFCCC554, 
covering 189 Parties (the European Union submitted one single INDC for all its 
Members). These contributions represent 96% of the Parties to the UNFCCC and 
554. UNFCCC, INDCs as communicated by Parties [online]
http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/INDC/Submission%20Pages/submissions.aspx
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n a total of 95.7% of global GHG emissions555. However, the current pledges, even 
if they were fully met, would not be sufficient to keep the temperature increase 
“well below 2°C”, the target set in the Paris Agreement556. In fact, Decision 1/
CP.21, paragraph 19, requested the Secretariat to prepare an evaluation report on 
the contribution of the INDC to combating climate change. This report, which was 
released in 2016, takes into account all of the INDC submitted by 4 April 2016. 
According to this document, with the title “Synthesis report on the aggregate effect of 
intended nationally determined contributions”557, average global GHG emissions are 
expected to be 8.7 Gt CO2 and 15.2 Gt CO2 in 2025 and 2030, respectively, 
above a scenario that is compatible with the 2°C pathway.
Beyond issues of implementing the commitments, raising the ambition therefore 
remains an essential corollary to the achievement of the goals set. In this context, 
as provided for by the Paris Agreement and in accordance with Decision 1/CP.21, 
each Party shall communicate an NDC every five years558, while having the oppor-
tunity to adjust it at any time, with a view to enhancing its level of ambition559. 
Related to these reflections is the requirement for clarity and transparency in the 
implementation of the NDC560, in order to meet the objectives of MRV (Measuring, 
Reporting and Verifying), which is at the heart of the ongoing process.
The drafting of a detailed regulation for market mechanisms (Article 6 of the 
Agreement) is important in order to develop the principles of environmental 
integrity and transparency, by learning from the experience gained from the Kyoto 
Mechanisms. A “race to the bottom” through harmful competition by States must 
be prevented, by using the cooperative approaches (CA) in Article 6.2, which are 
not under direct international control. The extensive experience of the CDM with 
MRV methodologies must be taken into account for the methodological structure 
of new mechanisms. Furthermore, it is also important to work very seriously on 
approaches that seek to accredit complete mitigation policies, such as renewable 
energy feed-in tariffs or carbon taxes. Approaches that aim to avoid double counting 
and guarantee global mitigation of emissions will most probably be a subject of 
dispute among the Parties. 
In addition to the other advances, the principles of equity, common butdif-
ferentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities are reaffirmed in the Paris 
Agreement, in accordance with the founding principles of the Convention. Adap-
tation to climate change was identified as a priority in the same way as mitigation. 
Real progress on adaptation regarding institutional coherence and financing are 
also one of the major issues for COP 22. The same is true for capacity-building, 
financing and technology transfer. Support should be given to the implementation 
555. UNFCCC, Newsroom, 2016a
556. The Paris Agreement set the goal of keeping the temperature increase “well below” 2°C.
557. UNFCCC, 2016d
558. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4, para. 9
559. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4, para. 11
560. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4, para. 8
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of ambitious measures by all States, including developing countries which, in the 
light of the inequalities in resources and their heightened vulnerability to climate, 
must receive support from developed countries.
The issue of financing is also a central part of the negotiations. Since Copenhagen 
in 2009, the developed countries have committed to mobilise every year, from 
2020 onwards, 100 billion dollars for climate projects in countries in the South. 
The Paris Agreement establishes the principle that this amount is a floor. It also 
operationalises the Green Climate Fund. COP 22 must in turn bring its share of 
concrete commitments. International cooperation is therefore essential and must 
continue, in the “spirit of Paris”, in order to close the gap between the targets and 
how to achieve them, by including once again all players.
The Paris Agreement reaffirms the critical role of non-State players in the 
process, in particular with regard to States’ shortfall in ambition. They became key 
players by innovating and implementing initiatives adapted to local contexts on a 
daily basis and all around the world. The decision which puts the Paris Agreement 
into place even dedicates Chapter V to them, “Non-State Stakeholders”561, and 
they are invited to scale up their efforts, to both find ways to reduce greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions and to build resilience to the adverse effects of climate 
change562.
This enthusiasm, the mobilisation of all States and all stakeholders glimpsed 
in Paris must continue at COP 22 and be sustained. The success of the Marrakesh 
Conference is also equally crucial.
The Marrakesh Conference must indeed contribute strong advances to this 
process, in particular in the framework of the entry into force of the Paris Agreement. 
It should be recalled that in order for it to take effect officially and become legally 
binding, the Paris Agreement must be ratified by at least 55 Parties accounting for 
at least 55% of global GHG emissions563. For the record, as at 5 October 2016, 
187 State Parties had signed the Paris Agreement, 72 of which had already ratified 
it officially, accounting for 56.75% of global GHG emissions. The requirements 
for the entry into force of the Paris Agreement have therefore been exceeded. 
By achieving the adoption of the Paris Agreement and by ensuring that it 
takes effect through its entry into force, the international community has met two 
of the first major challenges. It is a historic milestone. The next step is therefore, 
now more than ever, giving practical expression to and operationalising the goals, 
by facing the challenges of implementation during COP 22.
561. Decision 1/CP.21, p. 21
562. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 135
563. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 21
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Appendices
A.1 Bodies formed under the Convention
Institution Responsibilities
Subsidiary bodies common to the COP, CMP and CMA
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and  
Technological Advice (SBSTA)
Advises the COP and CMP on scientific issues and 
technologies which are specific to or shared by 
them. (Applicable to the Paris Agreement upon  
its entry into force and, therefore, to the CMA)
Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI)
Advises the COP and CMP on improving the effective 
application of the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol. 
(Applicable to the Paris Agreement upon its entry 
into force and, therefore, to the CMA)
Specialist bodies created by virtue of the COP
Climate Technology Centre and Network
Facilitates the establishment of a network of 
organisations, initiatives and national, regional, 
sectoral and international technology networks.
Technology Executive Committee
Seeks to carry out the application of the framework 
for implementing meaningful and effective actions 
to enhance the transfer of or access to technology.
Standing Committee on Financing
Helps the Conference of the Parties to carry  
out its functions relating to the Convention’s  
financial mechanism.
Adaptation Committee Promotes the implementation of enhanced action for adaptation.
Forum on the impact of response measures564 
Helps the countries concerned to deal with the 
impacts of response measures that have been 
implemented.
Executive Committee of the Warsaw international 
mechanism on loss and damage
Addresses loss and damage associated with climate 
change impacts, in particular extreme weather events 
and phenomena that are gradual, in developing 
countries that are particularly vulnerable to the 
adverse effects of climate change.
Paris Committee on Capacity-building
Created during COP 21, in Paris, to address gaps 
and needs, both current and emerging, in imple-
menting capacity-building in developing country 
Parties and further enhancing capacity-building 
efforts, including with regard to coherence and 
coordination in capacity-building activities.
Working and specialist expert groups created by virtue of the COP
Consultative Group of Experts on national  
communications of non-Annex I Parties (CGE)
Assists the non-Annex I Parties in preparing  
their national communications.
Least Developed Countries Expert Group (LDCEG)
Advises the least developed countries on preparing 
and implementing adaptation plans, among other 
things.
564. Work programme overseen by subsidiary bodies
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Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris  
Agreement (APA)
Prepares for the entry into force and the operation-
alisation of the Paris Agreement by preparing draft 
decisions to be recommended through the Conference 
of Parties to the Conference of the Parties acting 
as a meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement 
for consideration and adoption at its first session.
Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban  
Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP)  
(closed since end of 2015)
Helped to prepare a protocol, another legal instrument 
or an agreed outcome with legal force, applicable 
to all the Parties, which should enter into force no 
later than 2020 and was adopted in 2015 in Paris.
Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative 
Action of the Convention (AWG-LCA) (closed as 
from end of 2012)
Spearheaded the process allowing the integral,  
effective and on-going application of the Convention 
by concerted action by 2012 and beyond, with a 
view to adopting an “agreed result” adopted in 
Doha in 2012.
Specialist bodies of the CMP
Executive Board of the CDM
Ensures the effective implementation and correct 
operation of the clean development mechanism 
(CDM).
Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee
Spearheads the implementation and verification 
of the Joint Implementation (JI) in the countries 
referred to in Annex I.
Compliance Committee
Is responsible for guaranteeing compliance with 
commitments and supports the Parties finding it 
difficult to comply with their obligations under the 
Kyoto Protocol. This committee includes a facilitative 
branch and an enforcement branch.
Ad Hoc Working Group on the new commitments 
for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol  
(AWG-KP) (closed since end of 2012)
Supports the process for making commitments for 
the post-2012 period by Annex I Parties that are 
also Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, as adopted in 
2012 in Doha.
A.2 The main negotiating groups 
The main negotiating groups
The climate change negotiation process revolves around regional groups and nego-
tiation coalitions. The regional groups are derived from the official United Nations 
classification system, according to their geographical situation, whilst the negotiation 
coalitions are political alliances formed on the basis of common interests. During 
negotiations, the countries usually speak on their own behalf or on behalf of a 
negotiation coalition.
United Nations Regional Groups
The regional groups do not necessarily share the same interests in relation to the 
negotiations on climate change. The members of the Bureau are elected from regional 
groups and Small Island Developing States (SIDS).
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The regional groups are Africa, Asia and the Pacific Region (including Japan), 
Eastern and Central Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean (GRULAC, from 
the Spanish) and the Western Europe and Others Group (WEOG). “The others” are 
Australia, Canada, the United States, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland.
The African Group
The African Group is the only regional group to function as a genuine negotiation 
coalition. It has 54 members, all of whom share a variety of causes for concern, such 
as desertification, the lack of water resources, vulnerability to the impacts of climate 
change and the fight against poverty. The Group currently makes joint statements, 
mainly on questions relating to adaptation, technology transfer, capacity building 
and financing.
Negotiation coalitions
AOSIS (Alliance of Small Island States)
AOSIS is an ad hoc pressure group which gives a voice to the majority of Small 
Island Developing States (SIDS) during negotiations at the United Nations. It has 
44 members that share their geographical vulnerability to the impacts of climate 
change, especially the rise in sea levels, which poses a threat to the survival of several 
islands. Most AOSIS countries also belong to the Group of 77 and China (G77/
China) and nine are among the Least Developed Countries (LDC)565. Bahrain is 
the only SIDS member of the United Nations which does not belong to AOSIS; 
conversely, the Cook Islands and Niue belong to AOSIS but are not SIDS members 
of the United Nations566.
Least Developed Countries (LDC)
The group of LDC comprises 48 countries among the least developed (34 in 
Africa, thirteen in Asia and one in the Caribbean)567. They defend their interests 
jointly with the United Nations, especially in relation to climate change. They share 
considerations about their vulnerability and their need for support in planning 
their adaptation. The UNFCCC also recognises the special needs of the LDC, 
which are the least capable of facing up to the impacts of climate change.
Group of 77 and China (G77/China)
The G77/China comprises 133 developing countries and China568, which together 
would account for 85% of the population of the planet569. China is an associate 
member rather than a full member of the G77. The G77/China supports in particular 
565. http://aosis.org/members and http://unohrlls.org/about-sids/country-profiles
566. Ibid.
567. http://unohrlls.org/about-ldcs
568. http://www.g77.org/doc/members.html
569. See for example http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/213_ 
149_130854955925976208-G77_China%20statement%20ADP2-10%20opening 
%20plenary.pdf
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the economic interests of its members in miscellaneous questions within the United 
Nations. The G77/China member countries can sometimes adopt diverging positions 
during the climate change negotiations, which they then defend via another nego-
tiation coalition or regional group570.
European Union
The European Union is a political and economic union of 28 member countries. 
It is represented by the European Union, which is a Party to the Convention and 
the Kyoto Protocol571, but which has no voting right distinct from that of individual 
countries. Despite some differences, they often adopt a common position and 
speak with a single voice during climate change negotiations.
Umbrella Group
The Umbrella Group is a flexible coalition of developed countries which do not 
belong to the European Union and which has been formed in the context of climate 
change negotiations. It has emerged from the JUSSCANNZ572 group and is active 
in all the UN forums despite the group not always comprising the same countries. 
Although informal, the list normally includes Australia, Canada, the United States, 
Russia, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway and Ukraine (other countries are 
added periodically, depending on the topics addressed).
Environmental Integrity Group (EIG)
The Environmental Integrity Group was formed in 2000 by OECD members 
which did not agree with the positions adopted by the Umbrella Group, namely 
Switzerland, Mexico and the Republic of Korea. It has subsequently been joined 
by Monaco and Liechtenstein. Mexico and South Korea are rare OECD members 
that are not included in Annex I (see Sheet 6). Member countries are frequently 
known to negotiate on an individual basis given the huge differences in their 
national contexts. Otherwise, the group is normally coordinated by Switzerland.
BASIC
BASIC is a group of countries made up of Brazil, South Africa, India and China. 
It was founded at a meeting held in November 2009 to define a common stance 
for the Copenhagen Conference (COP 15, December 2009). After the meeting, 
BASIC published a series of positions considered to be non-negotiable by its members, 
in particular a second commitment period for developed countries by virtue of the 
Kyoto Protocol and scaled-up financing for the mitigation and adaptation of 
developing countries573. Since then, the group regularly meets in order to share its 
positions and to develop a shared strategy. As BASIC is made up of the most important 
emerging countries and large emitters, it now stands out as an indispensable actor 
in international climate negotiations.
570. http://unfccc.int/6343.php.
571. Initially as the European Economic Community
572. JUSSCANNZ is the acronym for “Japan, the USA, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, 
Norway and New Zealand”.
573. www.sei-international.org/publications?pid=1643
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Coalition for Rainforest Nations
This coalition started to take shape in 2005 under the initiative of Papua New 
Guinea. Its goal is recognition of the efforts made by developing countries to slow 
down emissions caused by deforestation. The composition of this coalition has 
varied over time. It currently includes 52 countries from Africa, Central America, 
South America, the Caribbean, Asia and Oceania574. Its members do not always 
speak with the same voice and the Coalition for Rainforest nations can make a 
statement on behalf of certain among them only.
Group of Countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus, Albania  
and Moldova (CACAM)
CACAM groups countries from Eastern and Central Europe and Central Asia, 
including Albania, Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, the Republic of Moldova, 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. There are also observers, such as Azerbaijan. These 
countries have created a coalition seeking recognition for their status as non-
Annex I countries with economies in transition under the UNFCCC and the 
Kyoto Protocol575. The reason is that the UNFCCC does not define the term 
“developing country” clearly and that these countries do not view themselves as 
developing countries despite their exclusion from Annex I of the Convention576. 
The CACAM countries rarely take a common stance on other issues.
Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America (ALBA, from the Spanish)
ALBA was originally a political, social and economic organisation to promote 
cooperation in these areas between the socialist countries of Latin America and the 
Caribbean and offer an alternative to the Free Trade Area of the Americas advo-
cated by the United States577. ALBA thus became a negotiation coalition in 2010, 
representing a hub of six countries: Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua 
and Antigua and Barbuda, joined occasionally by Dominica and Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines. This coalition bases its positions on the principle that developed 
countries must demonstrate ambitious action in world efforts to combat climate 
change578.
Like Minded Developing Countries (LMDC)
The Like Minded Group is a spontaneous coalition of countries created during the 
Bonn Conference on climate change in May 2012. Its members are part of the 
G-77/China and, in its strategy, aims to reinforce and unify this group579. It is 
574. http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/213_149_ 
130855981051940810-CfRN_ADP2-10_opening_statement.pdf ; et, www.rainfor-
estcoalition.org
575. Ibid.
576. https://unfccc.int/1031.php
577. www.alianzabolivariana.org ; and www.americasquarterly.org/hirst/article
578. www.portalalba.org/index.php/2014-03-29-22-04-24/documentos/1299-2010- 
06-25-x-cumbre-otavalo-ecuador-declaracion-especial-sobre-cambio-climatico
579. www.twnside.org.sg/title2/climate/info.service/2012/climate20121005.htm
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made up of several countries from the Arab world, India, China, several emerging 
Asian economies and certain active South American Parties, especially Venezuela, 
Bolivia and Cuba. Also named “Developing countries with similar views”, this 
coalition is also found in other international forums, especially the World Trade 
Organisation. It is a group of States uniting around a very strong central position 
on major questions for developing countries, mainly equity and respect for the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities580. Note that several large 
oil producers are found in this group.
Arab Group
The Arab Group is made up of 22 member States from the League of Arab States, 
namely Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, Sudan, 
Morocco, Tunisia, Kuwait, Algeria, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Qatar, 
Mauritania, Somalia, Palestinian Authority, Djibouti and the Comoros. The contours 
of this coalition are well defined inasmuch as its members have been accustomed 
to working together since 1945 as a pressure group towards international institutions 
under the name of the League of Arab States (commonly called the Arab League). 
The Arab Group countries are linked together by a certain shared culture, the Arabic 
language and the Muslim religion. Nevertheless, the Middle-East conflicts cause 
tension between them.
A.3 History of climate change negotiations
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was 
adopted in 1992 during the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. In this framework 
document, the UNFCCC signatory countries undertake to stabilise the greenhouse 
gas (GHG) concentrations at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system. Following this historic event, the question of 
global warming has increasingly taken centre stage on the international agenda. To 
supplement the commitments made in Rio, the 3rd Conference of the Parties to 
the UNFCCC (COP 3)581 adopted the Kyoto Protocol in December 1997. This 
obliges the Parties included in Annex I of the UNFCCC (developed countries) 
that have ratified the Protocol to reduce jointly the emission level of six greenhouse 
gases (GHG) by at least 5% compared with the 1990 level in the period 2008-
2012582. This was the first binding provision, by virtue of international law, to limit 
countries’ greenhouse gas emissions. 
580. www.twnside.org.sg/title2/climate/info.service/2013/climate130301.htm
581. The Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP) meets annually. Each conference 
is therefore referred to using the acronym COP x; Paris was the 21st conference and was 
therefore COP 21.
582. Kyoto Protocol, Art. 3, para. 1
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Controversies over certain points of the Protocol could not, however, be settled 
in Kyoto and the Parties continued to negotiate on these topics in subsequent 
years. The Marrakesh Accords adopted in 2001 finally allowed the adoption of 
operationalisation modalities for the Kyoto Protocol. However, the Protocol only 
came into force in February 2005 and its implementation was delayed in a most 
countries. Australia only ratified it in December 2007, for example. Canada even 
withdrew in 2011. And the United States, the largest GHG emitter in the world 
until 2004 (since passed by China)583, has never ratified the Protocol. 
With the aim of continuing to combat climate change after the first commitment 
period of the Kyoto Protocol (2008-2012) and formalising the contribution made 
by developing countries to mitigation and adaptation efforts, the Parties embarked 
on a dialogue about long-term cooperation in 2005. Special working groups were 
set up in 2007 to facilitate the progress of negotiations. This involved an Ad Hoc 
Working Group on the further commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto 
Protocol (AWG-KP), which discussed the modalities of the second commitment 
period of the Kyoto Protocol; and the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term 
Cooperative Action – AWG-LCA which constituted a specific framework for 
negotiations on the post-2012 issues under the Convention. 
COP 13 (2007) provided a two-year road map on these issues known as the 
Bali Action Plan. This aimed to reach an agreement in 2009 in Copenhagen on a 
post-2012 climate regime under the Convention. The Parties did not manage to 
reach a detailed agreement at the planned date. The negotiations therefore continued 
during the next COP (Cancún in 2010 and Durban in 2011), before being concluded 
in Doha in 2012. At the same time, the Parties, acting as a Meeting of the Parties 
to the Kyoto Protocol, agreed on an amendment to the Protocol providing for 
GHG reduction targets during a second commitment period from 2013 to 2020. 
With these decisions, the 18th Conference of the Parties (COP 18) to the UNFCCC 
and the 8th Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the 
Kyoto Protocol (CMP 8) in Doha brought the mandates of the Ad Hoc Working 
Group under the Convention (AWG-LCA) and the Ad Hoc Working Group under 
the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP) to an end.
At the same time, a new stage had commenced with the creation of the Ad Hoc 
Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) in 2011. 
This group has been working for more than three years on preparing an agreement 
for the COP 21 in Paris, which would enter into force in 2020. The next Conferences 
of the Parties, in Doha, Warsaw and Lima, moved in this direction, whilst attempting 
to plug the ambition gap between the commitments taken by the Parties by 2020 
and those necessary to limit global warming to less than 2°C by the end of the century. 
In 2015, this process resulted in the adoption of the first universal agreement on 
climate at COP 21 in Paris.
583. According to data from the CAIT tool of the World Resources Institute on historical 
emissions of countries.
[Online] http://cait2.wri.org.
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Before describing briefly the history of the negotiations by analysing the main 
stages that are the Bali Action Plan, the Copenhagen Accord , the Cancún Agreements, 
the Durban Platform, the Doha Climate Gateway, the outcome of Warsaw and 
the Lima Call for Climate Action, the first part of this history of the negotiations will 
enlighten the reader on the current structure of negotiations and their evolution.
The table below presents a timeline of important milestones in the negotiations 
on climate change:
Table 6. Timeline of important milestones in the negotiations 
on climate change until 2015
Important milestones Negotiation terms
1990
Submission of the first Assessment Report 
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC)
1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development – Rio de Janeiro
Opening of three conventions  
for ratification: The United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC), the Convention  
on Biological Diversity (CBD) and  
the Convention to Combat  
Desertification (CCD)
1994
1995
Second IPCC evaluation report submitted
COP 1 – Berlin Berlin Mandate
1996 COP 2 – Geneva Second IPCC evaluation report presented
1997 COP 3 – Kyoto Kyoto Protocol
1998 COP 4 – Buenos Aires Buenos Aires Action Plan: timetable  for implementation of the Protocol
1999 COP 5 – Bonn
2000 COP 6 – The Hague
Conference suspended as not all  
the questions regarding the protocol  
application rules could be settled
2001
Third IPCC evaluation report submitted
COP 6 resumed – Bonn Bonn Agreements: agreement on  the implementation of the Protocol
COP 7 – Marrakesh
Marrakesh Accords: finalisation  
of technical details relating to  
the Kyoto Protocol
2002
World Summit on Sustainable Development – 
Johannesburg
COP 8 – New Delhi Delhi Declaration
2003 COP 9 – Milan Decision on afforestation and reforestation under the CDM adopted
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Important milestones Negotiation terms
2004 COP 10 – Buenos Aires
Buenos Aires Work Programme:  
agreement on adaptation and  
response measures
2005
COP 11 – Montreal Entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol
CMP 1 – Montreal Formation of the AWG-KP
2006
COP 12 – Nairobi
CMP 2 – Nairobi
Nairobi Work Programme on impacts, 
vulnerability and adaptation to climate 
change 
2007
Fourth IPCC evaluation report submitted
COP 13 – Bali
CMP 3 – Bali
Bali Action Plan 
Formation of the AWG-LCA
2008
COP 14 – Poznań
COP 4 – Poznań
Poznań strategic programme for  
technology transfer
2009
COP 15 – Copenhagen
CMP 5 – Copenhagen
Copenhagen Accord
2010
COP 16 – Cancún
CMP 6 – Cancún
Cancún Agreements
2011
COP 17 – Durban
CRP 7 – Durban 
The Durban Platform
2012
“Rio +20” United Nations Conference  
on Sustainable Development The future we want
COP 18 – Doha
CMP 8 – Doha
Doha climate gateway
Doha amendment
2013
Fifth IPCC Assessment Report submitted  
(first working group)
COP 19 – Warsaw
COP 9 – Warsaw
Warsaw framework for REDD+ 
Warsaw international mechanism on 
loss and damage
2014
Fifth IPCC Assessment Report submitted  
(continued: second and third working groups)
COP 20 – Lima
CMP 10 – Lima
 Lima Call for Climate Action
2015
Adoption of SDG during the Sustainable 
Development Summit
Publication of the summary report by  
the UNFCCC Secretariat on the INDC
COP 21 – Paris 
CMP 11 – Paris
Sustainable Development Goals
Paris Agreement 
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The table below indicates the meeting sequence of various bodies of the UNFCCC 
and the Kyoto Protocol until 2015.
Table 7. History of Conferences and Meetings of the  
Parties and of Subsidiary Bodies and Working Groups  
of the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol until 2015
Meetings of Subsidiary Bodies (SB-x): 
• Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI)
• Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA)
1995
Geneva SB 1
Berlin First Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention  on Climate Change (COP 1)
1996 Geneva
SB 2, SB 3 AND SB 4
COP 2 
1997
Bonn SB 5, SB 6 AND SB 7
Kyoto COP 3
1998
Bonn SB 8 
Buenos Aires
COP 4 
SB 9
1999
Bonn SB 10 
Bonn
COP 5 
SB 11
2000
Bonn SB 12 
Bonn and 
Lyon SB 13 
The Hague
COP 6 
SB 13 resumed
2001
Bonn
COP 6 resumed 
SB 14 
Marrakesh
COP 7 
SB 15
2002
Bonn SB 16 
New Delhi
COP 8 
SB 17
2003
Bonn SB 18 
Milan
COP 9 
SB 19 
2004
Bonn SB 20 
Buenos Aires
COP 10
SB 21 
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2005
Bonn SB 22 
Montreal
COP 11
First Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties  
to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP 1)
SB 23
2006
Bonn
First session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the further commitments  
for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP 1) 
SB 24
Nairobi
COP 12
CMP 2
AWG-KP 2 
SB 25
2007
Bonn
AWG-KP 3 
SB 26
Vienna AWG-KP 4
Bali
COP 13
CMP 3
AWG-KP 4 resumed 
SB 27
2008
Bangkok
AWG-KP 5 
First session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action 
(AWG-LCA 1)
Bonn
AWG-KP 5 resumed 
AWG-LCA 2 
SB 28 
Accra
AWG-KP 6 
AWG-LCA 3
Poznań
COP 14
CMP 4 
AWG-KP 6 resumed
AWG-LCA 4
SB 29
2009
Bonn
AWG-KP 7 
AWG-LCA 5 
Bonn
AWG-KP 8 
AWG-LCA 6 
SB 30 
Bonn
Informal meeting of the AWG-KP 
Informal meeting of the AWG-LCA
Bangkok
AWG-KP 9 
AWG-LCA 7 
Barcelona
AWG-KP 9 resumed 
AWG-LCA 7 resumed 
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Copenhagen
AWG-KP 10 
AWG-LCA 8 
SB 31
COP 15
CMP 5
2010
Bonn
AWG-KP 11 
AWG-LCA 9 
Bonn
AWG-KP 12
AWG-LCA 10 
SB 32
Bonn
AWG-KP 13
AWG-LCA 11 
Tianjin
AWG-KP 14 
AWG-LCA 12 
Cancún
AWG-KP 15
AWG-LCA 13
SB 33
COP 16
CMP 6
2011
Bangkok
AWG-KP 16 
AWG-LCA 14
Bonn
AWG-KP-16 (continued)
AWG-LCA 14 (continued)
SB 34
Panama
AWG-KP-16 (continued)
AWG-LCA 14 (continued)
Durban
AWG-KP-16 (continued)
AWG-LCA 14 (continued)
SB 35
COP 17
CMP 7
2012
Bonn
AWG-KP 17
AWG-LCA 15
First session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform  
for Enhanced Action (ADP-1)
SB 36
Bangkok
AWG-KP 17 (continued)
AWG-LCA 15 (continued)
ADP-1 (continued – informal meeting)
Doha
AWG-KP 17 (continued)
AWG-LCA 15 (continued)
ADP 1 (continued)
SB 37
COP 18
CMP 8
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2013
Bonn ADP 2-1
Bonn
ADP 2-2
SB 38
Warsaw
ADP 2.2
SB 39
COP 19
CMP 9
2014
Bonn ADP 2-4
Bonn
ADP 2-5
SB 40
Bonn ADP 2-6
Lima
ADP 2-7
SB 41
COP 20
CMP 10
2015
Geneva ADP 2-8
Bonn
ADP 2-9
SB 42
Bonn ADP 2-10
Bonn ADP 2-11
Paris
ADP 2-12
SB 43
COP 21
CMP 11
Negotiation framework
After the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol, technical discussions on climate change 
took place mainly under the auspices of two permanent bodies584, namely: 
• the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI), mandated to advise the COP 
and CMP on improving the effective application of the Convention and the 
Kyoto Protocol;
• the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) which 
advises the COP/CMP on scientific and technical issues involving them.
• In addition, as indicated above, two working groups worked to renew the Kyoto 
Protocol and to make the Bali Action Plan a reality from 2007 to 2012: 
584. http://unfccc.int/6241
188
A
p
p
e
n
d
i
c
e
s
• Ad Hoc Working Group on the further commitments for Annex B Parties 
under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP)585. This group was established in 2005 
to facilitate the negotiations on the commitments of developed countries 
(Parties included in Annex I of the UNFCCC) for the second commitment 
period from 2013 to 2020. These negotiations covered new GHG emission 
reduction targets and how to achieve them, for example market mechanisms586. 
• Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA). 
The Dialogue on long-term cooperative action to address climate change by 
enhancing implementation of the Convention was initiated in 2005 during 
the Montreal Conference (COP 11). It aimed to enhance the implementation 
of the Convention, mainly by making it easier to analyse cooperation approaches 
in respect of sustainable development, adaptation and technological potential. 
At the end of this two-year dialogue uniting all the Parties to the Convention 
a new subsidiary body, the AWG-LCA, was created in Bali in December 2007587. 
Its mandate was to complete successfully, in two years, a process to enable the 
effective application of the Convention through long-term cooperation action.
The mandate of both these working groups, scheduled to end in Copenhagen 
in 2009, was extended until the Doha Conference (2012).
A new working group then took up the reins: 
• Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action 
(ADP)588. Set up in Durban in 2011, the ADP started its work in 2012. Its 
mandate is to develop for 2015 a new protocol, another legal instrument or 
an agreed outcome with legal force by virtue of the Convention that will 
apply to all the Parties. This should enter into force in 2020. It was also tasked 
with studying measures to compensate for the lack of pre-2020 ambition level 
in terms of the 2°C objective. 
The decision to create the Durban Platform marks the start of a new and 
significant chapter in the collective effort by Parties to combat climate change. In fact, 
after difficult discussions since Copenhagen in 2009, the Durban Platform opened 
a more inclusive climate regime transcending the traditional lines separating the 
so-called “developed” and “developing” countries. 
Diagram 16 below summarises the main stages of the negotiations and the 
framework in which they took place up to the establishment of the Paris Agreement, 
in 2015.
585. By virtue of Article 3.9 of the Kyoto Protocol, following Decision 1/CMP.1, Study of 
paragraph 9 of Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol on the commitments of the Annex I 
Parties for the following periods
586. The Kyoto Protocol’s Annex B is a list of Parties which have made quantified commitments 
to reducing or limiting GHG emissions
587. Decision 1/CP.13.
588. Decision 1/CP.17.
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Diagram 16.  Chronology of negotiations and framework  
for negotiations until 2015589
589. © ENERGIES 2050, October 2016
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It should be noted that the Paris Agreement also mandates the permanent Sub-
sidiary bodies (see Part II. Issues of permanent subsidiary bodies), making them the 
Agreement’s Subsidiary bodies for implementation and scientific and technological 
advice. Article 18 provides that:
“The Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary 
Body for Implementation established by Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention shall 
serve, respectively, as the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice [see 
Section II.2] and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation [see Section II.1] of this 
Agreement. The provisions of the Convention relating to the functioning of these two 
bodies shall apply mutatis mutandis to this Agreement. Sessions of the meetings of the 
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary Body for 
Implementation of this Agreement shall be held in conjunction with the meetings of, 
respectively, the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary 
Body for Implementation of the Convention”590. 
And that through Decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 7, the Parties decide to establish 
the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement [see Section II.3]. it “shall 
prepare for the entry into force of the Agreement and for the convening of the first session 
of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement”591 
and “shall hold its sessions starting in 2016 in conjunction with the sessions of the 
Convention subsidiary bodies and shall prepare draft decisions to be recommended 
through the Conference of the Parties to the Conference of the Parties serving as the 
meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement for consideration and adoption at its first 
session”592.
History of the negotiations
Bali Action Plan (2007)
The widely-publicised COP 13 was held in Bali in a climate of citizen pressure. 
The delegates had the task of establishing a multilateral cooperation framework for 
the post-2012 period. Their efforts produced an agreement on a two-year roadmap 
– the Bali Action Plan593. This consists of a set of decisions emanating from the 
Dialogue on long-term cooperative action to address climate change by enhancing 
implementation of the Convention, initiated during the Montreal Conference 
(2005)594. The Bali Action Plan forms a coherent basis for negotiations with a view 
to adopting an “agreed outcome”, i.e. a climate regime commencing after 2012. 
590. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 18
591. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 8
592. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 8
593. Decision 1/CP.13.
594. Decision 1/CP.11.
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A change in formulation was one of the most significant developments brought 
by the Bali Action Plan. For the first time, the terms “developed” and “developing” 
countries replaced the terms “Parties included in Annex I” and “non-Annex I Parties”. 
This innovation extended the perspective to new combinations and effort levels by 
the countries. Another major advance was the link established between the mitigation 
efforts of developing countries and the financial and technological support from 
developed countries.
The negotiation process opened up by the Bali Action Plan, that should have 
ended in 2009, only finally reached an end in 2012 in Doha. It is structured 
around four focal points: 
• Mitigation. This issue was shown as one of the most thorny issues of COP 
13. The United States, Canada and other Parties favoured tough language on 
developing countries’ actions and commitments; the Group of 77 and China 
(G77/China) sought greater emphasis on a discourse dealing more with the 
commitments of Annex I Parties, therefore of developed countries595. Lastly, 
both views were taken into account and the Parties agreed to examine the option 
of taking596: 
 – For the developed countries: “measurable, reportable and verifiable nationally-
appropriate mitigation commitments or initiatives, including quantified 
GHG emission limitation and reduction objectives”, taking into account 
differences in their national circumstances;
 – For the developing countries: “nationally appropriate mitigation actions 
(...) in the context of sustainable development, supported and enabled by 
technology, financing resources and capacity-building, in a measurable, 
reportable and verifiable manner”.
• Adaptation. It was decided to boost the action for adaptation to the adverse 
effects of climate change, mainly by examining international cooperation in 
order to achieve the urgent application of miscellaneous adaptation measures, 
given the immediate needs of particularly vulnerable developing countries, 
mainly the Least Developed Countries (LDC), the Small Island Developing 
States (SIDS) and the African countries597. 
• Technology development and transfer. The Bali Action Plan provides for 
reflecting on effective mechanisms to eliminate the obstacles of access by devel-
oping country Parties to environmentally sound technologies at affordable cost 
and facilitate their roll-out598. The debates on these issues have mainly covered 
the financing of these technologies and the intellectual property rights. These 
issues are also discussed in other forums such as those of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO).
595. IISD, 2007
596. Decision 1/CP.13, para. 1b.
597. Decision 1/CP.13, para. 1c.
598. Decision 1/CP.13, para. 1d.
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• Financing. The mitigation measures of developing countries were linked for 
the first time in Bali to the financial and technological support provided by 
the developed countries. Financing is also envisaged to help developing countries 
to adapt to the adverse effects of climate change. The Bali Action Plan thus 
sets up the bases for the financial framework to support developing countries 
in their mitigation and adaptation efforts599.
Copenhagen Accord (2009)
The Copenhagen Conference (COP 15) was intended to endorse the main compo-
nents of a post-2012 climate regime using two negotiating processes, firstly under 
the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP) and secondly under the Convention (AWG-LCA). 
But negotiations collapsed on this regime. Only a political agreement in the form 
of a high-level declaration by a few States could be reached during the COP 15, 
known as the Copenhagen Accord. A total of 114 Parties stated their affiliation 
to it600. Despite not being legally binding, a positive point is that the Copenhagen 
Accord includes the two principal GHG emitters, namely China and the United 
States. 
The Accord underlines the political desire of States associated with it to address 
climate change in accordance with the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities. Noted by the COP 15601, the Copenha-
gen Accord clarifies certain aspects of the negotiations, like the long-term GHG 
emission reduction targets and financing. The developed countries set themselves 
the goal of assembling collectively 100 billion US dollars a year until 2020 to 
finance climate projects of developing countries. Lastly, this Accord served as the 
basis for negotiations leading to the Cancún Agreements.
Cancún Agreements (2010)
Despite the far more modest expectations than at the Copenhagen Conference, or 
perhaps because of it, the Cancún Conference resulted in a “balanced set” of deci-
sions which the international community greeted with enthusiasm. The Cancún 
Agreements assembled the progress in Copenhagen into a formal agreement and 
sent a political signal to continue the discussions on the second commitment 
period of the Kyoto Protocol. The Parties associated themselves unanimously with 
this, with the exception of Bolivia. 
The significant progress brought by the Cancún Agreements mainly consists 
of the formal creation of institutions, such as the Green Climate Fund (GCF), the 
Adaptation Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN). 
Other progress made includes creating a register to facilitate support for Nationally 
599. Decision 1/CP.13, para. 1e.
600. http://unfccc.int/5262.
601. Decision 2/CP.15.
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Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMA) and the launch of the REDD+, which aims 
at Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing 
Countries (REDD) and includes the role of conservation, durable forestry man-
agement and development of forest carbon stocks in developing countries (the “+” 
in REDD+). 
They also provide for the preparation of National Adaptation Plans (NAP), 
mainly for the least developed countries602.
Durban Platform (2011)
The Durban Conference (COP 17) launched the process for negotiating a unique 
agreement under the UNFCCC, with the creation of the Ad Hoc Working Group 
on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP). This group has the mandate 
of implementing “a process to develop a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed 
outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties”, which should 
enter into force no later than 2020603. Also known as the Durban Platform, this 
process has made it possible to encourage long-term cooperation involving all the 
countries. It thus represents significant progress in the central question of whether 
the developed countries or the developing countries should make the effort. One 
of the goals of the Platform is “ensuring the highest possible mitigation efforts by all 
Parties”604. 
This progress was not achieved without difficulty. Major greenhouse gas emitters 
– Canada, Russia and Japan – refused to commit to a second commitment period605, 
which provoked considerable controversy. However, by reaffirming the willingness 
of the Parties to reach agreement on a second commitment period under the Kyoto 
Protocol, the outcome of the Durban Conference was ultimately to strengthen 
trust between the Parties. It testifies to a universal political will to combat climate 
change with a constructive commitment by the most vulnerable countries and 
emerging countries. The initiative of China, which announced its willingness to 
commit to reducing its emissions from 2020 onwards under certain conditions, 
brought with it other emerging countries that have become major GHG emitters, 
such as Brazil and South Africa606.
Progress was also made at the Durban Conference on the topic of adaptation 
to climate change, with a framework and guidelines for the NAP created the previous 
year in Cancún607. These aim to build up the capacities of developing countries, 
mainly the least developed and the most vulnerable countries, in terms of assessing 
and reducing their vulnerability to the impacts of climate change.
602. Decision 1/CP.16, paras. 14-16
603. Decision 1/CP.17, paras. 2 and 4
604. Decision 1/CP.17, para. 7
605. Decision 1/CMP.7, Annex 1.
606. www.ips.org/TV/cop17/basics-make-small-steps-towards-emission-reduction-deal
607. Decision 5/CP.17.
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The Doha Climate Gateway
The Doha Climate Gateway, at outcome snatched at the last minute on the last 
evening of the 2012 conference, refers to two major elements. Firstly, the adoption of 
the “Doha Amendment” to the Kyoto Protocol that records the second commitment 
period in it. This commenced on 1 January 2013 and will end on 31 December 
2020. The countries are free to choose its date of entry into force, even if the Doha 
Decision encourages them to implement the second commitment period before 
ratifying it. The second element in the Doha Climate Gateway is the conclusion 
of negotiations under the Bali Action Plan of 2007. In Doha, the Parties finally 
disbanded the AWG-KP and AWG-LCA, whose mandates had been extended for 
several years. 
The Doha Conference (COP 18) therefore allowed a certain streamlining of 
the UNFCCC negotiation process. The ADP, SBI and SBSTA henceforth form 
the only three negotiation groups, compared with the five that existed in 2012. 
The Doha Decision reaffirms the ambition to adopt “a protocol, another legal 
instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force” by 2015. It also provides for a 
negotiation text to be available before May 2015. Other major progress made at 
the COP 18 was the consideration of loss and damage suffered in the developing 
countries which are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. 
It thus sets up an institutional mechanism for dealing with loss and damage. 
Warsaw Conference (2013)
Although the Warsaw Conference (COP 19) proved disappointing in terms of 
climate urgency, it nevertheless produced a series of decisions which map out the 
route towards the Paris Conference. One of its advances was to clarify further the 
modalities for preparing the draft negotiation text for 2015 and for the submission 
process for the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) of the 
Parties to the UNFCCC608. The INDC indicate the voluntary efforts of countries 
in terms of climate change that could be included in the 2015 agreement. The 
term “contributions” adopted finally achieved consensus in the final minutes of the 
Warsaw negotiations. It nevertheless leaves major issues hanging – differentiation 
between the countries based on their different levels of development and financial 
support, technology transfer and capacity-building. 
In addition, the Parties were invited in Warsaw to intensify their efforts to reduce 
the ambition gap for the pre-2020 period, by cancelling, for example, the certified 
emission reductions (CER)609.
The agreement on the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN) 
rules, which signals its operationalisation, and on the Warsaw International Mech-
anism for Loss and Damage was a positive signal towards the implementation of 
608. Decision 1/CP.19.
609. Decision 1/CP.19, para. 5c.
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the Cancún Agreements and the Durban and Doha decisions. REDD+ was also 
the subject of numerous decisions of a technical nature, which now form the 
“Warsaw Framework for REDD+”. In addition, pledges for finance amounting to 
almost 280 million US dollars were announced in Warsaw for the REDD+. A sum 
in total contrast to the sum the GCF could count on in December 2013, which 
was no more than 6.9 million US dollars. This figure greatly fuelled the loss of 
confidence among developed and developing countries, who deplored the 71% 
decrease in financing of climate-related activities in 2013610. To remedy this, a 
high-level ministerial dialogue on climate finance was established in Warsaw, with 
meetings planned every two years until 2020. Directives for the Green Climate 
Fund were also adopted to make it more operational611. 
Lima Call for Climate Action and the road to Paris (2014)
On the final straight to Paris, the Lima Conference (COP 20) capitalised on the 
outcomes of previous Conferences of the Parties and managed to lay the bases for 
the future agreement of 2015. After extended negotiations, the Parties adopted in 
December 2014 “the Lima Call for Climate Action”, which contains especially in 
its annex a draft version of the future Paris agreement612. It also states that this 
should give balanced consideration to six issues: mitigation, adaptation, financing, 
development and transfer of technologies, capacity-building and transparency of 
measures and support. 
The Lima Call also includes a decision about the INDC. This sets out their 
scope, the data they can contain, the submission methods and measures to be 
taken by the Secretariat613. The Parties are invited especially to include elements on 
adaptation and implementation resources. Lastly, they are asked to specify the 
reason why they believe their efforts to be fair and ambitious614.
The Parties also adopted a set of decisions under the COP and the tenth 
Conference of the Parties acting as a Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol 
(CMP 10) that was held at the same time. These contribute among other things 
to the operationalisation of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and 
Damage. They establish the Lima work programme regarding gender615, with 
results scheduled for review during the COP 22 in 2016. The Lima Ministerial 
Declaration on education and awareness-raising was also adopted during the COP 
20616. This aims to raise the awareness of children and the general public to the 
effects of climate change and encourage them to change their behaviour. 
610. IISD, 2013, p. 31
611. Decision 4/CP.19.
612. Dwcision 1/CP.20, Annex
613. Decision 1/CP.20, paras. 9-16
614. Dwcision 1/CP.20, para. 14
615. Decision 18/CP.20.
616. Decision 19/CP.20.
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Progress on adaptation remained modest in Lima. Although many countries 
sought revised guidelines for the National Adaptation Plans (NAP), the Conference 
of the Parties saw no need for the review617. In addition, the COP expressed its 
concern in Lima over the lack of funds to meet the needs of the LDC, and notably 
the deficit in the LDC Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF), 
which could support the NAP formulation and implementation process618. 
In addition, the Parties held a first annual high-level ministerial meeting 
aimed at reinforcing the implementation of measures identified under the work of 
Work stream 2 relating to the commitments for the pre-2020 period.  In terms of 
financing, the Parties also held their first biennial ministerial meeting relating to 
the work programme on long term financing. Lastly, the first biennial reports and 
sixth national communications were assessed under the auspices of the SBI for the 
first time in Lima, with the assessment of seventeen countries.
The Paris Agreement, adoption of the first universal 
Climate agreement (2014)
During COP 21, in Paris, the Parties adopted what would become the first universal 
legally binding climate agreement, bringing together all Parties to the UNFCCC. 
The Paris Agreement and Decision 1/CP.21, which are aimed at operational-
ising it, enabled real progress to be made with regard to global issues. In addition 
to including all the Parties to the UNFCCC, a certain number of issues were 
reaffirmed and/or confirmed, such as mitigation and market mechanisms, and also 
adaptation, loss and damage, financing, technology transfer, capacity-building, and 
the recognition of the role and necessary involvement of all players in combating 
global warming, and all this through the prism of monitoring implementation and 
transparency, with a view to achieving the targets.
At the end of COP 21, the Parties agreed to implement a real long-term 
programme, a particular feature of which is the target set of limiting the global 
temperature increase to 2°C (“well below 2°C), and even to 1.5°C, above pre-
industrial levels by the end of the century,
The principles of equity, common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capacities were reaffirmed, in accordance with the founding principles 
of the Convention.
The next stage is implementation, which will be at the centre of COP 22 in 
Marrakesh.
617. http://www4.unfccc.int/nap/sitepages/Home.aspx. 
618. Decisions 3, 4 and 8/CP.20
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Diagram 17. Chronology of climate negotiations from 1988 to 2016619
619. © ENERGIES 2050, October 2016
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A.4 Themed sheets
Sheet 1.  United Nations Framework Convention  
on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
Date of entry into force: 21 March 1994
Ratification status: 197 Parties620, including the European Union (EU)621
Supreme decision-making body: Conference of the Parties (COP)
Main objective [Article 2]: “[...] stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow 
ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not 
threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.” 
UNFCCC Annexes:
Annex I – List of 41 Parties, including the EEC622: developed countries and countries 
with economies in transition623;
Annex II – List of 24 Parties, including the EEC624: wealthiest developed countries625.
Commitment of the Parties:
All Parties: for example, prepare a national greenhouse gas emission inventory, 
implement mitigation programmes and adaptation actions, offer cooperative 
support in technological research and dissemination and facilitate the education 
and awareness of the general public (Article 4.1).
Annex I Parties: mainly, implement national policies to mitigate climate change 
and weaken emissions in the long term (Article 4.2).
Annex II Parties: support developing countries financially and technically, mainly 
by helping to prepare their national communications, to ease their adaptation to 
climate change and encourage access to technologies (Articles 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5).
Link to the Convention site: www.unfccc.int 
Link to the Convention text: www.unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/convfr.pdf
620. As at 5 October 2016 [online] http://unfccc.int/2631
621. The European Union signed the Convention whilst it was still the European Economic 
Community (EEC).
622. EU Today
623. http://unfccc.int/2774.
624. EU Today
625. Originally 25, but Turkey was deleted from Annex II by an amendment that entered 
into force on 28 June 2002, in accordance with Decision 26/CP.7
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Sheet 2.  Kyoto Protocol
Date of entry into force: 16 February 2005.
Ratification status of the Kyoto Protocol: 192 Parties626, including the EU627; 
four Parties to the Convention have not ratified the Kyoto Protocol.
Ratification status of the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol: Eighteen 
Parties (as at 30 September 2014).
Supreme decision-making body: Conference of Parties acting as a meeting of 
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP).
Main objective: instigate quantified and legally-binding targets for limiting and 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions to boost the UNFCCC.
Protocol Annexes:
Annex A: List of the six greenhouse gases targeted by the Kyoto Protocol: carbon 
dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), dinitrogen oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons 
(HFC), perfluorocarbons (PFC) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6).
Annex B: List of 39 Parties, included the EEC628: developed countries and countries 
with economies in transition which have made quantified commitments to reducing 
or limiting greenhouse gas emissions.
Commitment of the Parties:
Annex B Parties
Limit or reduce by 5.2% the quantity of GHG emissions compared with 1990 
emissions, except countries with economies in transition, which can choose a ref-
erence year other than 1990629;
Implement national or regional policies and measures to fulfil compliance with 
quantified commitments to limit and reduce greenhouse gases (Articles 2 and 4). 
The Parties can fulfil their commitments through domestic measures and flexibility 
mechanisms;
Publish an initial report giving the information required to implement the commit-
ments, especially for the accounting of assigned amounts (Article 7);
Publish a report demonstrating the progress made in achieving commitments 
(Articles 3 and 7); and 
626. As at 5 October 2016 [online] http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/ 
items/2613.php
627. The European Union (EU) signed the Protocol whilst it was still the European Economic 
Community (EEC).
628. EU Today
629. Article 3 para. 5 of the Kyoto Protocol.
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Set up a national emissions inventory system based on methodologies approved by 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (Article 5); 
All Parties
Prepare programmes to establish the national inventory of greenhouse gas emissions, 
to mitigate and facilitate the adaptation to climate change, cooperate to support 
technology transfer, research and education and present in their national commu-
nications information on the actions undertaken to combat climate change (Article 10); 
Parties included in Annex II of the UNFCCC
Finance developing countries, mainly to help them set in place their national emissions 
inventory and encourage technology transfer (Article 11).
Doha amendment: 
The second period of commitment of the Kyoto Protocol was adopted at CMP 8630 
under the title “Doha Amendment” It commenced on 1 January 2013 and will 
end on 31 December 2020631. Thus this period will last eight years and not five years 
as for the first period. Regarding its effective date, although the Doha Decision 
encourages countries to implement the second commitment period before the 
countries ratify it, the countries are free to choose from what date they will enforce it.
Link to the Protocol text: www.unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpfrench.pdf.
Link to the text of the Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol according to para-
graph 9 of Article 3 (Doha Amendment) for the second period of commitment: 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2012/cmp8/fre/13a01f.pdf.
630. Eighth Conference of Parties acting as a Meeting of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol.
631. Decision 1/CMP.8.
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Sheet 3.  The Durban Platform
Context: The Conference of the Parties in Durban in 2011 provided a new oppor-
tunity to discuss the structure of the climate regime pre- and post-2020. Although 
the 2011 Durban Conference did not result in the adoption of the agreed outcome 
that the Bali Action Plan provided for, the Conference did give the mandate 
required to negotiate a single agreement under the auspices of the UNFCCC, with 
the creation of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced 
Action (ADP). 
Supreme decision-making body: New subsidiary body called the Ad Hoc Working 
Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP)632. This new working 
group commenced its work in 2012. 
Objectives: 
“Prepare a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force, 
applicable to all the Parties” – or “2015 agreement”, which had to be adopted by the 
COP 21 in Paris in 2015 and should enter into force no later than 2020; 
Identify and explore the options to raise the ambition levels in line with the conclu-
sions of the 5th Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC); 
Prepare its work plan, including the mitigation, adaptation, financing, development 
and transfer of technologies, transparency of measures, support and capacity building.
Link to the Durban Platform text: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cop17/
fre/09a01f.pdf
632. Decision 1/CP.17.
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Sheet 4.  UNFCC structure and role of the main  
decision-making bodies
The Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action 
(ADP)633 commenced its mandate in 2012 and aims “to prepare a protocol, another 
legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force, applicable to all the Parties” for 
2015 which should enter into force in 2020.
The Conference of the Parties (COP), the highest authority of the Convention, 
brings together those countries which, by signing and ratifying the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), have become Parties to 
this Convention. As such, the COP aims to implement the ultimate Convention 
objective. 
The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol (CMP) is a totally separate legal entity from the COP and is the supreme 
decision-making body of the Kyoto Protocol. The CMP includes the sub-group of 
Parties to the Convention which have ratified the Kyoto Protocol. The Parties to 
the Protocol alone have the right to participate in decisions made by the CMP.
The Bureau of the COP and the Bureau of the CMP administer the intergovern-
mental process for the COP and for the CMP. 
The UNFCCC Secretariat coordinates and organises the meetings of the various 
bodies and provides technical expertise. 
The Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) are two partner organisations of the UNFCCC and play 
a key role in the process. The GEF has been in existence since 1991 and was 
named as the entity responsible for administering UNFCCC funds earmarked to 
help developing countries. The IPCC helps establish the scientific base by publishing 
climate change assessment reports every five years and specialist studies on specific 
topics. 
633. Decision 1/CP.17.
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Sheet 5.  Basic information on the Kyoto Protocol  
flexibility mechanisms
To allow Annex B countries a certain flexibility and lower the cost of reducing 
GHG emissions, three market mechanisms were included in the Kyoto Protocol: 
joint implementation (JI), the clean development mechanism (CDM) and emissions 
trading.
Joint implementation (JI)
Under JI, two Annex I Parties can trade emission reduction units (ERU) from 
projects to reduce GHG emissions or to build up the carbon sinks634. There are 
two tracks for participating in the JI projects635, depending on whether a Party 
satisfies or does not satisfy all the eligibility criteria, mainly involving the holding 
of a national inventory:
Track 1 applies if both Parties comply with all the criteria. In this case, State nego-
tiates with State and the credits (ERU) are subtracted from the number of assigned 
amount units (AAU) granted initially to the country hosting the project.
Track 2 applies if one Party does not comply fully with all the criteria. The project 
then proceeds under the same process as the one set up for the CDM. An inde-
pendent auditor must validate the project and satisfy himself as to the number of 
GHG emissions actually avoided. The allocation of credits (ERU) generated by 
the project is governed by the JI Supervisory Committee. 
The JI Supervisory Committee operates under the authority of the CMP. It is 
responsible for checking the reductions in GHG emissions coming from JI projects 
carried out under Track 2 and must also account for these activities in an annual 
report submitted to the CMP636. During CMP-2, the Parties adopted the internal 
regulations of the Supervisory Committee and the forms for the description of the JI 
project as proposed by the Supervisory Committee in its annual report. In addition, 
in respect of guidelines, the Parties decided to adjust the thresholds for small JI 
projects in line with the revised thresholds for small-scale projects under the CDM637.
Clean development mechanism (CDM)
The CDM allows an Annex I Party to obtain certified emission reductions (CER) 
by performing projects to reduce GHG emissions or build up the carbon sinks in 
the territory of a non-Annex I Party638. 
634. By virtue of Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol
635. Decision 9/CMP.1.
636. Ibid.
637. The thresholds for activities of small-scale projects under the CDM were revised in 
Decision 1/CMP.2
638. By virtue of Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol
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To be eligible for the CMD, a project must meet the principle of additionality, i.e. 
it must lead to a reduction in GHG emissions which would not have occurred 
without it. A “baseline scenario” – a business-as-usual situation – has to be defined, 
therefore, so that the additionality of a project can be assessed. The CER calculation 
must also take account of leaks, i.e. the net variation in GHG emissions produced 
outside the scope of a project, but which is nevertheless attributable to the project639.
The procedures and rules governing the CDM were laid out in the Kyoto Protocol 
before being defined more precisely by the Marrakesh Accords at the COP-7 in 2001. 
The CDM Executive Board is the body responsible for supervising the CDM and 
must submit recommendations to the CPM640. For this purpose, it submits an 
annual report containing information on the progress made from Executive Board 
actions for the implementation and correct operation of the CDM. 
GHG emission trading (and emission trading systems)
GHG emission trading, as a Kyoto Protocol flexibility mechanism, provides for 
GHG emission trading by the national governments of Annex B Parties between 
themselves in order to achieve their mitigation targets more easily. Following a 
market logic, a country can choose to reduce its own GHG emissions or purchase 
some from elsewhere. The GHG emissions are therefore reduced where they cost 
the least, which makes the reduction efforts all the more effective. 
The three flexibility mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol form “emission trading 
systems”. These systems, which together form the carbon market, have seen major 
expansion, although this has slowed in recent years, mainly because of the economic 
recession and the lack of demand for carbon credits. The carbon market is made 
up of regulated and voluntary market systems:
the regulated market has come about thanks to “cap-and-trade systems”, the result 
of national, regional or international regulations;
the voluntary market results from speculation in the value of reduction credits or 
the demand by consumers or companies that want to offset their GHG emissions.
The so-called “voluntary” market runs on the fringes of the regulated market. It does 
not rely on the legal obligations of participating entities to generate the demand. 
Purchasers of reduction credits are either speculators anticipating an increase in 
the value of credits in the future or businesses seeking to comply with voluntary 
commitments or businesses and consumers wishing to offset their GHG emissions. 
The global market is also compartmentalised over and beyond the division between 
the regulated market and the voluntary market, due to the fact that the cap-and-trade 
systems are not fungible. Indeed, each market is virtually independent. The prices 
of different carbon units vary according to supply and demand in the various market 
segments.
639. Decision 3/CMP.1.
640. Decision 17/CP.7.
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Table 8. Kyoto Protocol flexibility mechanisms
Mechanism Parties involved Transaction unit Description
Emissions 
trading 
(Article 17)
Between the 
Annex B Parties
AAU Assigned  Amount Unit
Allocation of AAU based on the 
GHG emission reduction objective 
published in Annex B and market 
trading.
RMU Removal Unit
Allocation of the RMU based  
on Land Use, Land Use Changes 
and Forestry (LULUCF) for the 
sequestration of GHG and trading 
within a market system.
Joint  
implementation 
(JI) (Article 6)
Between the 
Parties included 
in Annex I
ERU Emission  Reduction Unit
Issuing of an ERU to finance an 
activity to reduce GHG emissions 
in another Annex I Party, in the 
2008-2012 period.
Clean  
development  
mechanism 
(CDM)  
(Article 12)
Between  
an Annex I  
Party and a 
non-Annex I 
Party.
CER Certified Emission Reduction
Issuing of a CER to finance a 
project to reduce GHG emissions  
in a non-Annex I Party, in the 
2008-2012 period.
tCER Temporary CER
Issuing of a tCER, valid until 
the end of a given commitment 
period, for an afforestation and 
reforestation activity under the 
CDM.
lCER Long-term CER
Issuing of an lCER, valid until 
the end of a given commitment 
period, for a reforestation activity 
under the CDM.
206
A
p
p
e
n
d
i
c
e
s
Sheet 6.  Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
The IPCC was created in 1988 to provide policymakers with regular assessments 
of the climate situation, in order to understand better changes in the climate, the risk 
and consequences of climate change and any adaptation and mitigation strategies. 
Since 1990, the IPPC has been publishing every five to six years an Assessment 
Report of the climate made up of observations from three working groups. The 
first group takes an inventory of scientific research into changes in the climate. The 
second assesses the consequences of climate upheavals in miscellaneous sectors and 
attempts to propose adaptation solutions. The third covers the mitigation of the 
effects of human activity on the climate.
The Fifth IPCC Assessment Report, published in 2013 and 2014, represents the most 
comprehensive assessment to date and is based on several thousand scientific and 
archived climate studies641. Its observations are based on more efficient systems than 
previously, enabling more in-depth understanding and analyses than in previous reports. 
Working group I: The physical science basis (published in September 2013)642
This section presents the major observations with a higher level of confidence than 
the previous reports, mainly in terms of the role of human activities in climate 
change. Thus, “It is extremely likely that human influence has been the dominant cause 
of the observed warming since the mid-20th century”643. Note that these observations 
depend on four different mitigation scenarios (Representation Concentration 
Pathways – RCP). The four RCP contain “one mitigation scenario leading to a very 
low forcing level (RCP2.6), two stabilisation scenarios (RCP4.5 and RCP6) and one 
scenario with very high greenhouse gas emissions (RCP8.5)”644.
Other key observations include645:
“Warming of the climate system is unequivocal”.  
“Since the 1950s, many of the observed changes are unprecedented over decades to 
millennia. The atmosphere and ocean have warmed, the amounts of snow and ice have 
diminished, sea level has risen, and the concentrations of greenhouse gases have increased” 
“Human influence on the climate system is clear. This is evident from the increasing 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere, positive radiative forcing646, observed 
warming and understanding of the climate system”. 
641. 5th IPCC Assessment Report: www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5
642. First working group: www.climatechange2013.org
643. www.climatechange2013.org/images/report/WG1AR5_SPM_brochure_fr.pdf
644. www.climatechange2013.org/images/report/WG1AR5_SPM_brochure_fr.pdf
645. www.climatechange2013.org/images/uploads/ar5_wg1_headlines_fr.pdf
646. Radiative forcing is “the change in energy flux caused by a driver and is calculated at the 
tropopause or at the top of the atmosphere”. The surface will be warmed when the radiative 
forcing is positive See: www.climatechange2013.org/images/report/WG1AR5_SPM_
brochure_fr.pdf
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“New GHG emissions will imply continued warming”. 
“ Limiting climate change will require substantial and sustained reductions of 
greenhouse gas emissions”. 
“Global surface temperature change for the end of the 21st century is likely to exceed 
1.5°C relative to 1850 to 1900 for all RCP scenarios except the most ambitious647”. 
“It is likely to exceed 2°C” according to the mitigation scenarios where the radiative 
forcing has not reached its maximum towards 2100. 
In all the envisaged mitigation scenarios, except for the most ambitious, “warming 
will continue beyond 2100”.
“Most aspects of climate change will persist for many centuries even if emissions of CO2 
are stopped”. 
Working group II: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability (published  
in March 2014)648
This section reviews the potential and adaptation limits to climate change by taking 
into account impacts noted and future risks of climate change along with the vulner-
ability of human and natural systems. It emphasises the possible risks of climate 
change and the principles to be followed for efficient adaptation. It includes a 
regional atlas that underlines the observations for each continent. The main global 
observations include649:
“Increasing magnitudes of warming increase the likelihood of severe, pervasive, 
and irreversible impacts”
Changes in climate have already caused “impacts on natural and human sys-
tems on all continents and across the oceans”. Evidence of these impacts has increased 
since the last IPCC Assessment Report. 
Without sufficient mitigation, these changes pose huge risks for human health, 
food security and economic development.
The impacts of recent extreme climate events “highlight the serious vulnerability 
and exposure” of certain natural and human systems to the current climate variability, 
whilst major uncertainties exist over responses to these systems in the future.
With rising sea levels, the world’s coastal communities “will increasingly experience 
adverse impacts such as submergence, coastal flooding and coastal erosion”.
647. The mitigation scenarios used by IPCC are called Representation Concentration Pathways 
(RCP) The four RCP contain one mitigation scenario leading to a very low forcing level 
(RCP2.6), two stabilisation scenarios (RCP4.5 and RCP6) and one scenario with very 
high greenhouse gas emissions (RCP8.5)”. The RCP can therefore represent a whole range 
of climate policies for the 21st century. See: www.climatechange2013.org/images/report/
WG1AR5_SPM_brochure_fr.pdf
648. Second working group: www.climatechange2014.org
649. http://ipcc-wg2.gov/AR5/images/uploads/WG2AR5_SPM_FINAL.pdf; see also the 
French (unofficial) translation: http://www.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/ 
ONERC_Resume_decideurs_vol2_AR5_fr_non_officielle_V3_Figures.pdf
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An increasing number of land and fresh water species worldwide face a high risk 
of extinction.
Immediate mitigation measures are essential to avoid hazardous climate change; 
early action will earn more time for us to adapt to the impacts.
Adaptation measures are also essential, but there are limits and some risks will 
be inevitable.
 “Many key risks constitute particular challenges for the least developed countries 
[...], given their limited ability to cope”.
This report notes that adaptation is starting to be incorporated in certain scheduling 
processes and that adaptation experience is accumulating in all regions.
Working group III: Mitigation of Climate Change (published in April 2014)650
This section is linked to the global UNFCCC goal651. It presents the changes in 
GHG emissions up to the present day and possible trajectories until 2100 using 
different mitigation scenarios. It assesses the cross-cutting and sectoral mitigation 
measures, the needs of such measures and the climate finance issues. The key 
observations of this section include652:
Despite a growing number of mitigation policies, total anthropogenic GHG emissions 
“were the highest in human history from 2000 to 2010”.
“About half of cumulative anthropogenic CO2 emissions between 1750 and 2010 
have occurred in the last forty years”.
“Economic and population growth continue to be the most important drivers of 
increases in carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel combustion”.
“Mitigation scenarios in which it is likely that the temperature change caused by 
anthropogenic GHG emissions can be kept to less than 2 °C relative to pre-industrial 
levels are characterised by atmospheric concentrations in 2100 of about 450 ppm 
CO2eq” (compared with 396 ppm in 2013 globally653). These scenarios require a 
large-scale transition in the power supply sector, which is currently a major source 
of GHG emissions.
“Baseline scenarios, those without additional mitigation, results in global mean surface 
temperature increases in 2100 from 3.7°C to 4.8 °C compared with pre-industrial 
levels”.
650. Third working group: www.mitigation2014.org
651. Convention objective (Art. 2): “stabilisation, in accordance with the relevant provisions 
of the Convention, of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system”.
652. http://report.mitigation2014.org/spm/ipcc_wg3_ar5_summary-for-policymakers_
approved.pdf ; also see the (unofficial) French translation: http://www.developpement- 
durable.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/ONERC_Resume_decideurs_vol3_AR5_fr_non_officielle_ 
V3.pdf
653. WMO: https://www.wmo.int/pages/mediacentre/press_releases/documents/1002_GHG_ 
Bulletin.pdf
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International cooperation is required to reduce the GHG emissions effectively 
along with new forms of investment.
“Within appropriate enabling environments, the private sector, along with the public 
sector, can play an important role in financing mitigation”.
Synthesis Report654 
This report for policymakers incorporates and summarises the observations of the 
three working groups and two special reports on renewable energy (2011) and 
extreme event risk management (2012).
654. http://www.ipcc-syr.nl
210
A
p
p
e
n
d
i
c
e
s
Sheet 7.  Thematic glossary
Additionality Characterises the GHG emission reductions generated by the compen-
satory projects must be greater that the emissions which would have 
occurred without these projects. The goal of environmental additionality 
is to demonstrate that a project produces actual, measurable, additional 
and long-term GHG reductions.
Adaptation Ability of a system to adjust its mechanisms, processes and structure to 
climate change. Adaptation can be spontaneous or planned; it can occur 
in response to or in advance of a change in conditions.
Hot air
“Hot Air”
Due to their industrial recession in the 1990s, certain Annex B countries 
to the Kyoto Protocol (like Russia and Ukraine) received higher emission 
limitation targets than their total amount of emissions without taking 
any measures for domestic reduction. This quota surplus (hot air) could 
potentially be sold to other countries via flexibility mechanisms. 
Improvement in  
greenhouse gas  
removals
Calculated improvement of greenhouse gas removals between a base-
line scenario and a project. The removal designates the penetration of 
greenhouse gases in a living organism that assimilates these gases, 
thereby allowing the disappearance of the removed greenhouse gases.
Annex I Annex I is attached to the United Nations Framework on Climate Change. 
It quotes forty developed countries and countries with economies in 
transition that have made commitments to stabilise the greenhouse gas 
emissions at 1990 levels.
Annex II Annex II is attached to the United Nations Framework on Climate 
Change. It identifies 24 developed countries (including in Annex I) that 
have agreed to provide financial and technological aid to developing 
countries to combat climate change.
Annex B Annex B is attached to the Kyoto Protocol. It identifies 38 developed 
countries and countries with economies in transition that have made 
commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions during the 
period 2008-2012.
Anthropogenic Greenhouse gas emissions caused by human activities are called anthro-
pogenic when they do not come from natural emissions. These are additional 
emissions which can be considered as pollution. 
Mitigation Human intervention to reduce the sources of greenhouse gases or reinforce 
the sinks of greenhouse gases, either by extending the surface area or 
by improving their removal capacity.
Afforestation Action of planting trees on land that has had no forest cover for a certain 
number of years.
Carbon dioxide  
capture and  
storage
The process of increasing the carbon content of a carbon reservoir other 
than the atmosphere. This process designates the separation of CO2 from 
flue gases or from processing fossil fuels to produce CO2-rich fractions 
and long-term storage underground in exhausted oil and gas reservoirs, 
coal seams and saline aquifers. 
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Carbon neutrality Objective of no longer emitting GHG, or more realistically, action of 
investing in one or more projects that will avoid producing an equivalent 
quantity of GHG than generated by the entity seeking carbon neutrality. 
Climate change Climate variations that are attributed directly or indirectly to human 
activities, altering the composition of the atmosphere , and which are added 
to the natural variability of the climate note during comparable periods.
Fossil fuel Natural gas, petroleum, coal or any solid, liquid or gaseous fuel derived 
from these materials.
Supplementarity In the context of the UNFCCC, supplementarity refers to the option available 
to the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol to introduce, in addition to the Kyoto 
mechanisms, suitable domestic policies, energy-related or otherwise, to 
fulfil the GHG emission reduction objectives in the long term.
Compliance Obligation whereby the emitter is required to comply with his objectives 
of GHG emission reductions. The verification of compliance with the com-
mitments and mandatory objectives is an essential factor in a mandatory 
emission reduction system. Compliance includes the verification modalities, 
the organisation responsible for verifying the compliance and the possible 
sanctions. 
Synonym: obligation compliance
Business as usual Greenhouse gases resulting from general trends in an economy with no 
emission control policy. This reference is used to estimate the effectiveness 
of policies and measures undertaken to combat greenhouse gas emissions.
Compensatory credits Emission rights representing a tonne of sequestered or removed equivalent 
CO2, given to the promoter of a compensatory credit project to reduce 
GHG emissions.
Woodland clearance Conversion of forest to non-forest.
Synonym: Deforestation
Emission right Any emission right symbolises the reduction of GHG emissions by one 
metric tonne of equivalent carbon dioxide, i.e. an emission unit, an emis-
sion quota or a compensatory credit. These rights can be traded inside 
international or national carbon trading systems.
Greenhouse gas  
emission
Total mass of a GHG which is released into the atmosphere during a 
given period.
CO2 equivalent
 
The concentration of carbon dioxide (CO2) that would cause the same 
amount of radiative forcing as a given mixture of CO2 and other green-
house gases.
NOTE 1: The CO2 equivalent is calculated using the mass of a given GHG 
multiplied by its global warming potential.
NOTE 2: Annex B lists global warming potentials established by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Greenhouse gas  
emission or removal  
factor
Factor reporting the activity data on the GHG emissions or absorption.
NOTE: A greenhouse gas emission or removal factor can include an oxidisa-
tion factor.
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Fungibility Quality of what is consumed through use and which can be replaced by 
other similar products. In the context of the carbon market, fungibility 
makes no distinction between the categories of units and considers 
them all identical (one AAU would therefore be equivalent to a JI project 
unit and also to a unit resulting from an internal measurement of energy 
efficiency).
Carbon leakage Part of GHG emission reductions in Annex B countries that may be offset 
by an increase in emissions in non-constrained countries above their 
baseline levels. This can occur through (i) relocation of energy-intensive 
production units in non-constrained regions; (ii) increased consumption 
of fossil fuels in these regions through decline in the international price 
of oil and gas triggered by lower demand for these energies; and (iii) 
changes in revenues (thus in energy demand) due to improved economic 
conditions. 
NOTE: The term also refers to the situation in which a carbon capture 
activity (tree planting, for example) on one piece of land inadvertently, 
directly or indirectly, triggers an activity, which in whole or part, counteracts 
the carbon effects of the initial activity.
Greenhouse  
gases (GHG)
Gaseous constituents of the atmosphere, both natural and anthropo-
genic, that remove and re-emit the infrared radiation. They help maintain 
the heat in the Earth’s atmosphere. These gases are produced by both 
natural and anthropogenic processes. The main gases are water vapour, 
carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), dinitrogen oxide (N2O), the chlo-
rofluorocarbons, hydrofluorocarbons (HFC), nitrogen trifluoride (NF3), 
perfluorocarbons (PFC) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6). 
Energy intensity Ratio of energy consumption to economic or physical output. At the national 
level, energy intensity is the ratio of total domestic consumption or final 
energy consumption to Gross Domestic Product or physical output.
GHG inventory Assessment that measures the GHG emissions from activities of an entity 
(country, business, municipality, etc.). This assessment is calculated in 
relation to a reference year.
Carbon market Name for a group of greenhouse gas emissions trading and transaction 
mechanisms. The carbon market designates both the voluntary market 
for the voluntary compensation of GHG emissions and the regulated 
markets that make the regulated emitters compliant.
Voluntary market Carbon credits trading mechanism not linked to national or international 
regulations.
Materiality An item of information, an error or an inaccuracy are normally considered 
as material if they can influence people building on them. This concept 
comes into play when verifying project data and embodies the idea that 
there is a threshold beyond which the search for other potential errors 
is not longer justified in terms of time, money or the efforts required. 
Thus, if the error found generates a difference in the emission reductions 
of the project which is below the set threshold, this error is viewed as 
negligible or, in other words, immaterial.
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Clean development  
mechanism (CDM)
Flexibility mechanism provided for under the Kyoto Protocol (Art. 12). 
It assumes the implementation of emission reduction or avoidance 
projects in the developing countries. The CDM projects require at least 
three partners: the developing country (project host), the private inves-
tor (project manager) and the Annex B country from which the private 
investor comes.
Joint implementation (JI) Flexibility mechanism provided for under the Kyoto Protocol. This mechanism 
is used by the governments of developed countries and countries with 
economies in transition, and their companies, to finance greenhouse gas 
emission reduction projects in the other developed countries and countries 
with economies in transition (mainly the Eastern European countries and 
Russia). In return, these States receive emission credits that they can sell 
or deduct from their own national efforts.
Baseline This is a historical level used to calculate subsequent changes in green-
house gas emissions. This level is determined micro-economically or 
macro-economically. It is of crucial importance in determining the addi-
tionality level of reductions resulting from joint initiative projects or 
those implemented under the Clean Development Mechanism or the 
Joint Implementation.
Carbon black Carbon black, also known as furnace black or lamp black, is an amor-
phous form of the carbon produced by industrial activity. It is a climate 
forcer (has a warming effect on the climate) that has only been of inter-
est to the scientific community for a few years. 
Global warming  
potential (GWP)  
or planet warming  
potential (PWP)
Index describing the radiation characteristics of greenhouse gases. The 
GWP or PWP represents the combined effect of the time these gases 
remain in the atmosphere and their relative effectiveness in absorbing 
outgoing infrared radiation. This index approximates the time-integrated 
warming effect of a unit mass of a given greenhouse gas in the atmo-
sphere, relative to that of CO2.
NOTE: The reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
contain planet warming potential tables.
Greenhouse gas  
programme
Voluntary or mandatory, international, national or sub-national system 
or plan which records, counts or manages the emissions, removals, 
greenhouse gas emission reductions or improvements in greenhouse 
gas removals.
Carbon sink Any process, activity or mechanism, natural or artificial, that removes a 
greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a precursor of a greenhouse gas from the 
atmosphere (for example, trees, plants and oceans). 
Reforestation Planting of forests on lands that had previously contained forests but have 
been converted to other uses.
Additional reductions See Additionality
Greenhouse gas  
emission reduction
Calculated drop in GHG emissions between the baseline scenario emissions 
and the actual emissions avoided by a project.
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Reduction in emissions  
from deforestation and  
forest degradation 
(REDD+)
International issue of the post-2012 climate regime on the financial 
provisions and the transfer of technology under the reduction plan for 
emissions caused by deforestation and forest degradation. This issue 
also includes the protection and sustainable management of forests and 
the promotion of forest carbon stocks in the developing countries resulting, 
for example, from adapted silvicultural practices or plantings.
Greenhouse gas  
reservoir
Physical unit or biosphere, geosphere or hydrosphere component capable 
of storing or accumulating a GHG removed from the atmosphere by a 
greenhouse gas sink or a GHG captured at its source.
NOTE 1: The total mass of carbon contained in a GHG reservoir at a 
given moment can be called reservoir carbon stock.
NOTE 2: A GHG reservoir can transfer GHG to another reservoir.
NOTE 3: Collecting a GHG at its source before it enters the atmosphere 
and stoking the GHG collected in a GHG reservoir can be called GHG 
capture and storage.
Baseline scenario Hypothetical reference case that represents in the best possible way the 
conditions that would be the most likely in the absence of the green-
house gas project.
NOTE: The baseline scenario coincides with the GHG project chronology.
Sequestration Action of removing the carbon from the atmosphere. CO2 sequestration 
projects can participate in two distinct and sometimes complementary 
ways to carbon sequestration: (i) by extracting the carbonic gas from 
the atmosphere and storing it as over- and underground biomass; (ii) 
by producing additional renewable biomass where the waste-to-energy 
conversion can avoid the recourse to fossil fuels. 
Greenhouse gas source Physical unit or process releasing a GHG into the atmosphere.
Affected greenhouse  
gas source, sink or  
reservoir
GHG source, sink or reservoir influenced by the activity of a project 
through modifications to the supply and demand of the market regarding 
its associated products or service or through physical movement.
NOTE 1: Unlike the associated GHG sources, sinks or reservoirs which 
are linked physically to a GHG project, the affected GHG sources, sinks 
or reservoirs are linked to a GHG project by changes caused by market 
supply and demand.
NOTE 2: An affected GHG source, sink or reservoir is normally found off 
the project site.
NOTE 3: The reductions in emissions or the increases in GHG removals 
attributable to the affected GHG sources, sinks or reservoirs are commonly 
called “leaks”.
Controlled greenhouse  
gas source, sink or  
reservoir
A GHG source, sink or reservoir that operates under the guidance or 
influence of an author of a greenhouse gas project proposal through 
financial, political, management or other instruments.
NOTE: A controlled GHG source, sink or reservoir is normally found on 
the project site.
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Associated greenhouse  
gas source, sink or  
reservoir
A GHG source, sink or reservoir with material or energy flows entering or 
exiting the project or which are contained within it.
NOTE 1: An associated GHG source, sink or reservoir is normally found 
upstream or downstream of the project and can be located on or off 
the project site.
NOTE 2: An associated GHG source, sink or reservoir can also include 
activities relating to the design, construction or declassification of a project.
Standard of  
performance
Simplified approach of additionality and the baseline scenario. Rather 
than seeking to prove the additionality and to determine the baseline 
scenario for each project, the standard of performance is an approximate 
evaluation that establishes a generic baseline scenario as a quantitative 
standard of performance. Any project where the emissions are below 
this predefined standard is considered as additional.
Monitoring Continuous or periodic assessment of emissions and removals of GHG 
or other GHG-related data.
Emission  
cap-and-trade  
system
System that assigns rights to companies for their greenhouse gas emissions 
based on governmental environmental objectives. Compensatory credits 
issued thanks to a GHG reduction project can also be traded in this system. 
Tonne of carbon  
equivalent
See equivalent CO2
Removal unit Unit issued by the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol and which covers the net 
removal by carbon sinks of GHG from Land Use, Land Use Changes and 
Forestry (LULUCF) activities.
Emission unit Under the cap-and-trade system, an emission unit designates a right of 
emission generated by the government according to the declared GHG 
emissions verified by the companies. A right of emission relates to the 
authorisation to emit 1 tCO2eq.
Assigned amount  
units (AAU)
Units issued by the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol in their national register. 
The amount assigned is calculated according to emissions of the base 
year and quantified emission reduction commitments. This quantity is 
expressed as a percentage.
Certified emission  
reduction (CER)
Certified emission reductions (CER) are emission credits obtained 
through CDM projects. These credits can be applied directly to fulfil the 
quantified commitments of Annex B countries.
Note : the acronym UCRE for Certified units of emissions reduction is also 
used.
Emission reduction  
units (ERU)
These are units converted from an assigned amount unit (AAU) or a removal 
unit and handed to the project participant under joint implementation 
activities.
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Target user Person or organisation identified by those in charge declaring information 
relating to greenhouse gases and which relies on this information to take 
decisions.
NOTE 1: The target user can be the customer, the responsible party, the 
administrators of the GHG programme, regulators, the financial commu-
nity or other stakeholders involved such as local authorities, ministerial 
departments or non-governmental organisations.
NOTE 2: The level of assurance is used to determine the accuracy a vali-
dator or verifier gives to his validation or verification plan to detect any 
errors, omissions or false declarations.
NOTE 3: There are two assurance levels (reasonable or limited) that result 
in validation or verification reports that are formulated differently. See 
ISO 14064-3: 2006 A.2.3.2 for sample validation and verification reports.
Land Use, Land  
Use changes a 
nd Forestry (LULUCF) 
Land use and their changes (forest, agriculture, natural areas, etc.) have 
a significant influence on carbon storage (sink) and methane (CH4) 
releases and therefore on climate change. They contribute to the anthro-
pogenic emissions taken into account by the Kyoto Protocol. The problem 
of land and forest use goes hand in hand with the concerns of two other 
conventions: biodiversity and desertification.
Vulnerability Vulnerability defines to what extent a system can be degraded or damaged 
by climate change. It depends not just on the sensitivity but also on the 
adaptability of the system to new climatic conditions.
217
Guide to the Negotiations - UNFCCC (COP22, CMP12 and CMA1) - OIF/IFDD, 2016
Sheet 8.  UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol document listings
Name Description
Decision x/CP.x COP decision
Decision x/CMP.x CMP decision
FCCC/AWGLCA/x AWG-LCA preparatory document or provisional or current agenda
FCCC/CP/x COP preparatory document or provisional or current agenda
FCCC/KP/CMP/x CMP preparatory document or provisional or current agenda
FCCC/KP/AWG/x AWG-KP preparatory document or provisional or current agenda
FCCC/SBI/x SBI preparatory document or provisional or current agenda
FCCC/SBSTA/x SBSTA preparatory document or provisional or current agenda
FCCC/SB/x Preparatory document or provisional or current agenda of the two subsidiary bodies
GCF/x Preparatory document of the Green Climate Fund
/ARR/x Report of the individual examination of the GHG inventory (from 2005)
/TRR.x/x Report of the technical review of the biennial report
/WEB/IRI/x Report of the individual examination of the GHG inventory/Document published  on the Web only (listing used until 2004 inclusive)
/ASR/x GHG inventory annual status report
/WEB/SAI/x GHG inventory summary and assessment report/Document published on the Web only
/COM/x National communication
/DPR/x Demonstrable Progress Report (Demonstrable Progress Report)
/IDR.x
In-depth Review
(In-Depth Review)
CDM EB-x CDM Executive Board Report
SMSN/IGO/x Document submitted by intergovernmental organisations
SMSN/NGO/x Document submitted by non-governmental organisations
/TP/x Technical document 
/Add.x Text added to a document presented previously (Addendum)
/Amend.x Amendment to a text 
/Corr.x Correction of a text
/CRP.x Conference Room Paper
/INF.x Information series containing general information
/L.x Limited distribution document: Draft report or text
/MISC.x Miscellaneous documents: Points of view of Parties and observers; list of participants
/Rev.x Text revision which supersedes the text published previously
Non paper Internal, unofficial document to facilitate the negotiations
Note: 
• x indicates a serial number.
• For the Green Climate Fund documents (GCF/x), see: www.gcfund.org/documents/in-ses-
sion-documents.html
Source: http://unfccc.int/2644
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Sheet 9.  Abbreviations and acronyms (French – English)
Français Anglais 
ABPA Alliance Bolivarienne pour les Peuples 
de notre Amérique (ALBA en espagnol)
Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples  
of our America (ALBA in spanish)
BAPA
AILAC Alliance indépendante de l’Amérique 
latine et les Caraïbes
Independent Alliance of Latin America 
and the Caribbean
AILAC
ALBA Alliance bolivarienne pour les peuples 
de notre Amérique
Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples  
of Our America
BAPOA
AND Autorités Nationales Désignées Designated National Authorities DNA
AP Accord de Paris Paris Agreement PA
APEI Alliance des petits États insulaires 
(www.sidsnet.org/aosis)
Alliance of Small Island States AOSIS
ADP Groupe de travail spécial sur la 
plate-forme de Durban pour une 
action renforcée
Ad Hoc Working Group on the 
Durban Platform for Enhanced Action
ADP
AEI Analyses et Examens Internationaux International Analysis and Review IAR
CAI Consultations et Analyses 
Internationales 
International Consultations and 
Analysis
ICA
CCNUCC Convention-cadre des Nations Unies 
sur les Changements Climatiques 
United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change
UNFCCC
CDD Cadre pour les Diverses Démarches Framework for Various Approaches FVA
CDN Contribution Déterminée au niveau 
National 
Nationally Determined Contributions NDC
CdP Conférence des Parties à la 
Convention-cadre des Nations Unies 
sur les changements climatiques
Conference of the Parties to the United 
Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change
COP
CE Comité Exécutif Executive Board EB
CESNU Conseil économique et social des 
Nations Unies
United Nations Economic and Social 
Council
ECOSOC
CET Comité exécutif de la technologie Technology Executive Committee TEC
CPDN Contribution Prévue Déterminée au 
niveau National 
Intended Nationally Determined 
Contribution
CPDN
CPF Comité Permanent Finances Standing Committee for Finance SCF
CRA Conférence des Parties servant en tant 
que Réunion des Parties de l’Accord 
de Paris 
Conference of the Parties serving  
as the Meeting of the Parties to  
the Paris Agreement
CMA
CRP Conférence des Parties agissant 
comme Réunion des Parties au 
Protocole de Kyoto
Conference of the Parties serving as 
Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol
CMP
CRTC Centre et Réseau des Technologies  
du Climat 
Climate Technology Center and 
Network
CTCN
CSF Conseil de Stabilité Financière Financial Stability Board FSB
DC Démarches Concertées Cooperative Approaches CA
DSE Dialogue structuré entre experts Structured Expert Dialogue SED
EET Equipe d’experts techniques Team of Technical Experts TTE
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Français Anglais 
EOD Entités Opérationnelles Désignées Designated Operational Entities DOE
FA Fonds d’Adaptation Adaptation Fund AF
FEM Fonds pour l’Environnement Mondial Global Environment Facility GEF
FPMA Fonds des Pays les Moins Avancés Least Developed Countries Fund LDCF
FPP Fonds de Préparation de Projets Project Preparation Facility PPF
FSCC Fonds Spécial des Changements 
Climatiques
Special Climate Change Fund SCCF
FVC Fonds Vert Climat Green Climate Fund GCF
GEMO  
(ou PDVS)
Groupe d’États ayant la même optique 
(ou Pays en développement aux vues 
similaires)
Like Minded Developing Countries 
(Like Minded Group)
LMDC  
(ou LMG)
GEPMA Groupe d’Experts sur les Pays les 
Moins Avancés
Least Developped Country Expert 
Group
LEG
GES Gaz à Effet de Serre Greenhouse Gas GHG
GETT Groupe d’Experts pour le Transfert de 
la Technologie
Expert Group on Technology Transfer EGTT
GIEC Groupe Intergouvernemental 
d’Experts sur l’évolution du Climat 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change
IPCC
GtCO2e Gigatonne de CO2 équivalent Gigaton of CO2 equivalent GtCO2e
GTS-AP Groupe de Travail Spécial sur  
l’Accord de Paris 
Ad Hoc Working Group on  
the Paris Agreement 
APA
G77/Chine Groupe des 77 et Chine (www.G77.org) Group of 77 and China G77/China
EEI Evaluation et Révision internationale International Assessment and Review IAR
AIEDE Association internationale pour 
l’échange de droits d’émission
International Emissions Trading 
Association
IETA
MCC Mécanisme de Crédit Conjoint Joint Crediting Mechanism JCM
LPAA Plan d’Actions Lima-Paris Lima-Paris Action Agenda LPAA
MAAN Mesures d’Atténuation Appropriées 
au niveau National
Nationally Appropriate Mitigation 
Actions
NAMA
MDD Mécanisme pour un Développement 
Durable
Sustainable Development Mechanism SDM
MDP Mécanisme de Développement 
Propre
Clean Development Mechanism CDM
MNV Mesurer, Notifier, Vérifier Measuring, Reporting, Verification MRV
MOC Mise en œuvre Conjointe Joint Implementation JI
M&P Modalités et Procédures Modalities and Procedures M&P
NMM Nouveau Mécanisme de Marché New Market Mechanism NMM
NR Niveaux de référence Reference Levels RL
NRE Niveaux de référence des émissions Reference Emission Levels REL
ODD Objectifs de Développement Durable Sustainable Development Goals SDGs
OCDE Organisation de Coopération et de 
Développement Economique
Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development 
OECD
OMM Organisation météorologique 
mondiale
World Meteorological Organization WMO
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Français Anglais 
ONG Organisations Non Gouvernementale NGO Non 
Govern-
mental 
Organization
ONU Organisation des Nations unies United Nations UN
OS Organe subsidiaire Subsidiary Body SB
OSCTS Organe Subsidiaire de Conseil 
Scientifique et Technologique 
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and 
Technological Advise
SBSTA
OSMOE Organe Subsidiaire de Mise en Œuvre Subsidiary Body for Implementation SBI
PANA Plan d’Action National d’Adaptation National Adaptation Programme  
or Action
NAPA
PED Pays en développement Developing country DC
PEID Petits Etats Insulaires en Développement Small Island Developing States SIDS
PET Processus d’examen technique sur 
l’atténuation
Technical examination process TEP
PIB Produit Intérieur Brut Gross Domestic Product GDP
PK Protocole de Kyoto Kyoto Protocol KP
PMA Pays les Moins Avancés Least Developped Countries LDC
PNA Plan National d’Adaptation National Adaptation Plan NAP
PNUE Programme des Nations Unies pour 
l’Environnement
United Nations Environment 
Programme 
UNEP
PTN Programme de Travail de Nairobi  
sur les incidences des changements 
climatiques et la vulnérabilité et 
l’adaptation à ces changements
Nairobi Work Program on impacts, 
vulnerability and adaptation to 
climate change
NWP
RB Rapport Biennal Biennial Report BR
RBA Rapport Biennal Actualisé Biennial Updated Report BUR
RCMD Responsabilités communes mais 
différenciées
Common but differentiated 
responsibilities
CBDR
RCMD-CR Responsabilités communes mais 
différenciées et capacités respectives
Common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective 
capabilities 
CBDR–RC
REDD Réduction des émissions issues de la 
déforestation et de la dégradation 
forestière
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation 
and forest Degradation
REDD
RET Réunion d’experts techniques Technical Expert Meeting TEM
RIT Relevé international des transactions International Transaction Log ITL
SA Secteur d’activité Workstream WS
SA1 Secteur d’activité 1 Workstream 1 WS1
SA2 Secteur d’activité 2 Workstream 2 WS2
UE Union Européenne European Union EU
UQA Unité de quantité attribuée Assigned Amount Unit AAU
URCE Unité de Réduction Certifiée Certified Emission Reduction CER
UTCATF Utilisation des terres, changement 
d’affectation des terres et foresterie 
Land Use, Land Use Changes and 
Forestry
LULUCF
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Sheet 10. Abbreviations and acronyms (English – French)
Anglais Français
AAU Assigned Amount Unit Unité de quantité attribuée UQA
ADP Ad Hoc Working Group on the  
Durban Platform for Enhanced Action
Groupe de travail spécial sur la  
plate-forme de Durban pour une 
action renforcée
ADP
AF Adaptation Fund Fonds d’Adaptation FA
AILAC Independent Alliance of Latin  
America and the Caribbean
Alliance indépendante de l’Amérique 
latine et les Caraïbes
AILAC
AOSIS Alliance of Small Island States Alliance des petits États insulaires 
(www.sidsnet.org/aosis)
APEI
APA Ad hoc working group on the Paris 
Agreement 
Groupe de travail spécial de l’Accord 
de Paris
GTS-AP
BAPA Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples  
of our America (ALBA in spanish)
Alliance Bolivarienne pour les Peuples 
de notre Amérique (ALBA en 
espagnol)
ABPA
BAPOA Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of 
Our America
Alliance bolivarienne pour les peuples 
de notre Amérique
ALBA
BR Biennial Report Rapport Biennal RB 
BUR Biennial Updated Report Rapport Biennal Actualisé RBA 
CA Cooperative Approaches Démarches Concertées DC
CBDR Common but differentiated 
responsibilities
Responsabilités communes mais 
différenciées
RCMD
CBDR–RC Common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective 
capabilities 
Responsabilités communes mais 
différenciées et capacités respectives
RCMD-CR
CDM Clean Development Mechanism Mécanisme de Développement Propre MDP
NDC Nationally Determined Contributions Contribution Déterminée au niveau 
National 
CDN 
CER Certified Emission Reduction Unité de Réduction Certifiée URCE
CMA Conference of the Parties serving  
as the Meeting of the Parties to  
the Paris Agreement
Conférence des Parties servant  
en tant que Réunion des Parties  
de l’Accord de Paris 
CRA 
CMP Conference of the Parties serving as 
Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol
Conférence des Parties agissant 
comme Réunion des Parties au 
Protocole de Kyoto
CRP
COP Conference of the Parties to the United 
Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change
Conférence des Parties à la 
Convention-cadre des Nations Unies 
sur les changements climatiques
CdP
CPDN Intended Nationally Determined 
Contribution
Contribution Prévue Déterminée  
au niveau National 
CPDN 
CTCN Climate Technology Center and 
Network
Centre et Réseau des Technologies  
du Climat 
CRTC 
DC Developing country Pays en développement PED
DNA Designated National Authorities Autorités Nationales Désignées AND
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Anglais Français
DOE Designated Operational Entities Entités Opérationnelles Désignées EOD
EB Executive Board Comité Exécutif CE
ECOSOC United Nations Economic and Social 
Council
Conseil économique et social  
des Nations Unies
CESNU
EGTT Expert Group on Technology Transfer Groupe d’Experts pour le Transfert  
de la Technologie
GETT
EU European Union Union Européenne UE
FSB Financial Stability Board Conseil de Stabilité Financière CSF
FVA Framework for Various Approaches Cadre pour les Diverses Démarches CDD
G77/China Group of 77 and China Groupe des 77 et Chine (www.G77.org) G77/Chine
GCF Green Climate Fund Fonds Vert Climat FVC
GDP Gross Domestic Product Produit Intérieur Brut PIB
GEF Global Environment Facility Fonds pour l’Environnement Mondial FEM
GHG Greenhouse Gas Gaz à Effet de Serre GES
GtCO2e Gigaton of CO2 equivalent Gigatonne de CO2 équivalent GtCO2e
IAR International Analysis and Review Analyses et Examens Internationaux AEI
IAR International Assessment and Review Evaluation et Révision internationale EEI
ICA International Consultations a 
nd Analysis
Consultations et Analyses 
Internationales 
CAI 
IETA International Emissions Trading 
Association
Association internationale pour 
l’échange de droits d’émission
AIEDE
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change
Groupe Intergouvernemental 
d’Experts sur l’évolution du Climat 
GIEC 
ITL International Transaction Log Relevé international des transactions RIT
JCM Joint Crediting Mechanism Mécanisme de Crédit Conjoint MCC
JI Joint Implementation Mise en œuvre Conjointe MOC
KP Kyoto Protocol Protocole de Kyoto PK
LDC Least Developped Countries Pays les Moins Avancés PMA
LDCF Least Developed Countries Fund Fonds des Pays les Moins Avancés FPMA
LEG Least Developped Country Expert 
Group
Groupe d’Experts sur les Pays les 
Moins Avancés
GEPMA
LMDC (ou 
LMG)
Like Minded Developing Countries 
(Like Minded Group)
Groupe d’États ayant la même 
optique (ou Pays en développement 
aux vues similaires)
GEMO (ou 
PDVS)
LPAA Lima-Paris Action Agenda Plan d’Actions Lima-Paris LPAA
LULUCF Land Use, Land Use Changes and 
Forestry
Utilisation des terres, changement 
d’affectation des terres et foresterie 
UTCATF 
M&P Modalities and Procedures Modalités et Procédures M&P
MRV Measuring, Reporting, Verification Mesurer, Notifier, Vérifier MNV
NAMA Nationally Appropriate Mitigation 
Actions
Mesures d’Atténuation Appropriées 
au niveau National
MAAN
NAP National Adaptation Plan Plan National d’Adaptation PNA
NAPA National Adaptation Programme or 
Action
Plan d’Action National d’Adaptation PANA
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Anglais Français
NMM New Market Mechanism Nouveau Mécanisme de Marché NMM
Non 
Govern-
mental 
Organization
NGO Organisations Non Gouvernementale ONG
NWP Nairobi Work Program on impacts, 
vulnerability and adaptation to 
climate change
Programme de Travail de Nairobi  
sur les incidences des changements 
climatiques et la vulnérabilité et 
l’adaptation à ces changements
PTN
OECD Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development 
Organisation de Coopération et  
de Développement Economique
OCDE
PA Paris Agreement Accord de Paris AP
PPF Project Preparation Facility Fonds de Préparation de Projets FPP
REDD Reducing Emissions from Deforesta-
tion and forest Degradation
Réduction des émissions issues de la 
déforestation et de la dégradation 
forestière
REDD
REL Reference Emission Levels Niveaux de référence des émissions NRE
RL Reference Levels Niveaux de référence NR
SB Subsidiary Body Organe subsidiaire OS
SBI Subsidiary Body for Implementation Organe Subsidiaire de Mise en Œuvre OSMOE 
SBSTA Subsidiary Body for Scientific and 
Technological Advise
Organe Subsidiaire de Conseil 
Scientifique et Technologique 
OSCTS 
SCCF Special Climate Change Fund Fonds Spécial des Changements 
Climatiques
FSCC
SCF Standing Committee for Finance Comité Permanent Finances CPF
SDGs Sustainable Development Goals Objectifs de Développement Durable ODD
SDM Sustainable Development Mechanism Mécanisme pour un Développement 
Durable
MDD
SED Structured Expert Dialogue Dialogue structuré entre experts DSE
SIDS Small Island Developing States Petits Etats Insulaires en Développement PEID
TEC Technology Executive Committee Comité exécutif de la technologie CET
TEM Technical Expert Meeting Réunion d’experts techniques RET
TEP Technical examination process Processus d’examen technique  
sur l’atténuation
PET
TTE Team of Technical Experts Equipe d’experts techniques EET
UN United Nations Organisation des Nations unies ONU
UNEP United Nations Environment 
Programme 
Programme des Nations Unies pour 
l’Environnement
PNUE
UNFCCC United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change
Convention-cadre des Nations Unies 
sur les Changements Climatiques 
CCNUCC 
WMO World Meteorological Organization Organisation météorologique 
mondiale
OMM
WS Workstream Secteur d’activité SA
WS1 Workstream 1 Secteur d’activité 1 SA1
WS2 Workstream 2 Secteur d’activité 2 SA2
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ENERGIES 2050 was born with the certainty that the development 
trajectories of our societies are not inevitable. As an informal net-
work since 2007, and as a French non-profit and non-governmental 
organisation working exclusively in the general interest since 2011, 
ENERGIES 2050 contributes relentlessly to the transformation of 
our societies for a more humane, plural and united future.
Gathering members and partners from more than sixty nationalities, ENERGIES 2050 works interna-
tionally to set up a new, positive and inclusive development model and to convert constraints into action 
possibilities. As a collective adventure in the quest for better ways of living together , ENERGIES 2050 
has committed to the Great Transition, including the energy transition, sustainable cities and regions 
and the shift towards a more humane, plural and united society, bringing peace and respecting the 
common goods of humanity.
ENERGIES 2050 breaks its activities down into five complementary areas:
• Executing demonstrative and repeatable implementation projects accompany by technical studies and 
research actions to show the possibilities.
• Organising or attending meetings and conferences in order to expand the opportunities for exchanges 
and discussions.
• Publishing research results to pool and share knowledge.
• Educating, training and building the capacities so that each individual can understand, know and act.
• Communicating to the greatest number to inform, mobilise and unit the desire to act.
ENERGIES implements projects in more than thirty countries. ENERGIES 2050 is active in the 
following topics: eco-development and sustainable development; climate, environment and energy 
policy; energy transition; development of renewable energy sources; responsible and sustainable tourism; 
buildings and the construction sector; challenges and opportunities in rural and urban areas; sustainable 
cities; natural resources and the common goods of humanity; ecological and environmental economics; 
responsible business dynamics and corporate performance; low-carbon development strategies; gender; 
environmental education; social dynamics; behaviour change and citizen action; and the social solidarity 
economy. 
ENERGIES 2050 is a recognised player in climate change negotiations and in preparing and setting 
up national and international strategies and action programmes. ENERGIES 2050 is also known for 
successfully introducing concrete mitigation and adaptation projects with huge innovation potential 
and for deploying essential capacity-building programmes to support country ownership and boost 
national excellence. ENERGIES 2050 has especially been privileged to support several African countries 
in preparing their Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) and in producing briefing 
files for submission to the Green Climate Fund. The association also launch ethiCarbon Afrique® in 2012. 
This strong, solidarity-based and innovative tool is designed to contribute to a real African energy 
revolution.
ENERGIES 2050
8 avenue du Docteur Julien Lefebvre – 06270 Villeneuve Loubet – France
info@energies2050.org – www.energies2050.org
+33 (0)6 80 31 91 89
The Institut de la Francophonie pour le développement durable (IFDD – Institute of the French-
speaking world for Sustainable Development) is a subsidiary body of the Organisation internatio-
nale de la Francophonie (OIF – International Organisation of the Francophonie) and its headquarters 
are in Quebec City.
Under its original name of Institut de l’Énergie des Pays ayant en commun l’usage du Français (IEPF – 
Energy Institute for Countries with French as a common language), the IFDD came into being in 
1988 following the 11th Summit of the Francophonie held in Quebec in 1987. It was created in the 
wake of the global energy crises and from a desire of Heads of State and Government for cooperative 
action to develop the energy sector in member countries. In 1996, the Institute took the resolutions 
of the Rio Earth Summit 1992 as the major guide for its action and became the Institut de l’énergie et 
de l’environnement de la Francophonie (Energy and Environment Institute of the French-speaking 
World) And in 2013, following the Rio+20 Conference, it was renamed Institut de la Francophonie 
pour le développement durable (IFDD – Institute of the French-speaking world for Sustainable 
Development). 
Its mission is to contribute to:
• training and capacity-building in sustainable development of various categories of development 
players in French-speaking countries in the energy and environment sectors;
• support for development players in initiatives to prepare and implement sustainable development 
programmes;
• the promotion of the sustainable development approach in French-speaking countries;
• the development of partnerships in the various economic and social development sectors, mainly 
environment and energy, for sustainable development.
IFDD action falls under the Strategic Framework of the Francophonie, within mission D “Sustainable 
development, economy and solidarity” and Strategic Objective 7 “Contribute to the preparation and 
implementation of the post-2015 development programme and sustainable development goals”.
The Institute is in particular lead partner in the following two programmes under the OIF 2015-2018 
schedule, implemented in partnership with other OIF units:
• Increase the capacities of target countries to develop and implement national, regional and local 
sustainable development strategies which are inclusive, participative and results-based;
• Build up the capacities of French-speaking players to allow active participation in international 
negotiations and decisions on the economic, environment and sustainable development, and their 
implementation.
www.ifdd.francophonie.org
The International Organisation of La Francophonie (OIF) is an institution founded on sharing a 
language – French – and common values. It currently groups 80 States and governments, including 
57 members and 23 observers. The 2014 Report on the French language worldwide sets the number 
of French speakers at 274 million.
The OIF carries out political and cooperation actions on all five continents in the following priority 
areas: French language and cultural and linguistic diversity; peace, democracy and human rights; 
education and training; sustainable development and solidarity. OIF pays special attention in all its 
actions to young people and women and to access to information and communication technologies.
The Secretary General runs the political action of the Francophonie as its international spokesman 
and official representative. Mrs Michaëlle Jean has been the Secretary General of the Francophonie 
since January 2015.
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23 observers
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Guide to the negotiations assessment form – From Paris  
to Marrakesh or the challenge of implementation
To assist us in improving the next versions of the Guide to the negotiations, we should 
be grateful if you would assess this version on a scale of 1 to 4, adding your comments 
below.
1 = highly satisfactory 2 = satisfactory 3 = rather unsatisfactory 4 = highly unsatisfactory
Clarity of issues
1
2
3
4
Presentation of main progress  
from COP 21:
1
2
3
4
Presentation of main expectations of 
COP 22 and in achieving objectives:
1
2
3
4
Relevance of the level of detail:
1
2
3
4
Comments on the format:
Other comments:
Please forward the form to the following address:
Institut de la Francophonie pour le développement durable (IFDD)
56 rue Saint-Pierre, 3rd floor
Quebec City (Quebec) G1K 4A1, Canada
Fax: +1 418 692-5644
E-mail: ifdd@francophonie.org
The reality of climate change is acknowledged unanimously. However, and in spite of international negotiations, it has to be recognised that the progress 
made over recent decades has been too modest with regard to the many out-
standing challenges and the urgent need to take action. Scientific analyses 
highlight gradual disruptions and a global rise in temperatures over the last two 
centuries, at an increasing pace during recent decades. They are mainly caused by 
greenhouse gas emissions associated with our consumption and production 
modes, with consequences that are already irreversible.
The agreement reached in Paris, in December 2015, during the 21st Conference 
of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) is of critical importance in the climate negotiation process. 
Fruit of a momentum created in 2011 with the launch of the Ad Hoc Working 
Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, with the principal mandate 
of preparing a legal instrument for 2015, the Paris Agreement realises States’ 
universal commitment to face up to climate change. While respecting national 
circumstances and the UNFCCC’s founding principle of shared but differentiated 
responsibilities, the Agreement reaffirms the necessary raising of ambition and 
measures to take in order for our societies to develop on low-carbon, resilient 
and united pathways. However, and even if it is announced as officially binding, 
the challenge of implementation still remains, and the next steps are equally 
important in transforming the collective vision and ambition into reality on the 
ground.
The success of the Marrakesh Conference is therefore as crucial as establish-
ing the first universal agreement on Climate and the now completed process of 
its entry into force, making it legally binding. The international community 
faced an important initial challenge, but the goals now need to be made workable, 
by dealing with the challenges of implementation.
With the aim of helping participants to better understand the challenges of 
COP 22, this guide analyses COP 21 in detail and deciphers the Paris Agreement 
(Part I). The issues regarding the permanent subsidiary bodies are presented (Part II), 
before placing into perspective the major subjects of debate, which are central to 
COP 22 (Part III). Boxes supplemented by information diagrams and themed 
sheets provide the reader with all the keys to understand the negotiations. 
Although this publication is intended especially for negotiators from Francophone 
countries, it should also be a useful tool for all other delegates.
The negotiations, which remain the competence of the State Parties to the 
UNFCCC, will not succeed without the mobilisation of each and everyone of 
them. The time for the collective is on the agenda and Marrakesh, heralded as the 
Conference of implementation, must take the success further.
INSTITUT DE LA FRANCOPHONIE POUR LE DÉVELOPPEMENT DURABLE (IFDD)
56, RUE SAINT-PIERRE, 3E ÉTAGE, QUÉBEC (QUÉBEC)  G1K 4A1  CANADA
The IFDD is a subsidiary body of the International Organisation of the Francophonie.
www.ifdd.francophonie.org
